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This dissertation fuses traditional military history and modern Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) technology to study the relationship between terrain, military force, and imperial 
control in the Roman world.  Drawing on ancient authors’ general antipathy towards warfare on 
“broken ground,” I argue that Rome’s army struggled to wage war efficiently and effectively in 
mountainous territory.  Using GIS technology and open-access data developed by natural 
scientists, we can map such rugged terrain in the ancient world on a larger scale than ever before, 
and integrate military topography into broader discussions of imperial power dynamics. 
 The dissertation offers three case studies which demonstrate the potential use of GIS 
analysis for histories of Roman imperialism.  The first, on the Spanish wars of the late 3rd and 
early 2nd century BCE, considers how rugged terrain shaped Rome’s conquest of foreign 
territory.  While Rome was initially hesitant to extend its forces into the Iberian highlands, it was 
compelled to adjust its strategy when the concentration of force in river valleys and coastal 
plains failed to quell widespread resistance in the hills.  The second case study examines the 
Jewish revolt between 66 and 73 CE, in which the defensive terrain of Judaea and Galilee helped 
turn local discontent into outright rebellion.  The third and final case study reconstructs the 
Romans’ northeastern frontier during the first two centuries CE, considering how Rome 
deployed its garrisons in response to the challenges of the eastern Anatolian mountains.  In this 
exceptionally rugged region, the empire struck a careful balance between its primary mission—
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intermittent, large-scale warfare with the Parthians—and the necessity of addressing small-scale, 
endemic brigandage within the frontier zone.    
 Overall, this dissertation highlights Rome’s fundamental pragmatism in response to 
environmental challenges; the longevity of Rome’s rule depended, to a large extent, on its 
willingness to balance the costs and rewards of imperial control, and to govern by compromise 
where it could not efficiently dominate by force.  The dissertation also suggests the importance 
of GIS tools and training within the historian’s toolkit, and outlines a flexible methodology for 
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At its core, this dissertation is a study of power and space in the Roman world.  
Combining traditional techniques of ancient history with modern tools of digital mapping and 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS), it explores the spatial settings of Roman imperialism, 
asking how the depth and nature of empire shifted with the physical landscape.  This inquiry 
reveals the Romans as deeply pragmatic practitioners of power, whatever their rhetoric of 
boundless imperium.  While Rome’s capacity for violent conquest and political control was 
seldom matched in the pre-modern world, it was not limitless, and the success and endurance of 
the empire depended in part on the willingness of imperial leaders to compromise their ambitions 
in the face of environmental obstacles. 
In its most basic form, the dissertation’s central argument can be expressed as a logical 
syllogism: 
1. Rome’s ability to control territory rested in large measure on military force: that is, the 
threat and exercise of violence by armed agents of the state. 
2. Certain types of terrain, most notably mountains, hills, and other topographically broken 
ground, hampered the ability of Roman armies to exercise violence efficiently (and, by 
extension, to threaten it credibly).1 
                                                          
1 While this dissertation will focus primarily on the ways in which rugged terrain raised the probable costs 
of warfare, we should not forget that the relative poverty of most mountainous regions also made imperial 
military activity inefficient by decreasing its probable economic rewards. 
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3. Therefore, broken ground shaped Rome’s ability to control territory, and in consequence 
the dynamics of Roman imperialism on rugged terrain were distinctly different from how 
they were in the plains.  The empire’s control over hilly and mountainous space was often 
tenuous, and rested more on cooperation than forcible coercion.   
We may thus use the physical landscape of the ancient world (as reconstructed by modern GIS 
technology) as a lens to analyze the priorities and possibilities of military imperialism.  By 
examining the environmental challenges of Roman warfare, we can learn something new and 
valuable about the empire that this warfare helped to create.   
  
Section One: Force, Control, and Military Imperialism 
 
While each of the following chapters touches on its own historical and historiographical 
issues, this introduction sets out the basic context and methodological principles that inform the 
dissertation as a whole.  Before turning to the potentially less-familiar realm of historical GIS, let 
us begin by framing the first principle of my argument, that Rome’s control over its empire was 
won and held, in large part, through military force.  To start, this claim’s central concepts—force 
and control—must be defined, because they will continue to underlie the discussion of Roman 
warfare and imperialism. 
 By “control,” I refer to the ability of the Roman state to command the obedience of a 
given territory’s inhabitants; to make its people do what Rome wanted (or, perhaps more 
frequently, not to do what Rome did not want).2  The term is roughly equivalent to “power” in 
                                                          
2 Except where questions of internal disunity matter, I typically discuss Rome in this dissertation as a 
unified state in its relations with provinces, frontiers, and neighbors.  While this approach omits some 
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much of the scholarship on Roman imperialism: William Harris, in his ambitious Roman Power, 
bemoans the term’s ill-defined ubiquity, but uses it nevertheless.3  The Romans themselves 
would have expressed “control” as imperium, the right to command (though for our purposes the 
term need have no connotations of legitimacy or legality).4   
 As a category of analysis, control exists independently of any specific policy ends.  
Whatever Rome’s imperial goals in a territory—acculturation, taxation, slaughter, or mere peace 
and quiet—control was a necessary precondition for success.  In isolation, therefore, more 
expansive and intensive control was always desirable for both practical and ideological purposes, 
and imperium sine fine was a certainly a cornerstone of Roman political thought.5  As the case 
studies here will demonstrate, however, controlling space and its inhabitants was an expensive 
proposition.  While Roman authors were not always willing to admit it, the empire calculated the 
costs it was willing to bear to control a given territory based on the likely political and economic 
rewards.  Roman imperialism was thus shaped by a tension between an ideological will to power 
and the practical recognition that total control was impossible; resources and power had to be 
carefully managed in order to align the geography of control with the empire’s political goals.     
                                                          
nuances of imperial decision-making (see for instance Millar 1977, Talbert 1984), it allows a clearer 
focus on the power dynamics between Rome and its foreign subjects.  See discussion in Morley 2010, 22-
23. 
 
3 Harris 2016, 1. “Control” both better captures the my meaning here, and avoids entanglement in the 
many previous uses of “power.”  Among others, see Luttwak 1976 (esp. 195-200); Landers 2003 (esp. 8-
12), who also uses “spatial integration” as a rough synonym; Morris and Scheidel 2009; Ando and 
Richardson 2017. 
 
4 Richardson 2008.  Cic. Inv. Rhet. 2.169 gives potentia as a value-neutral alternative: “power is the 
possession of things suitable to keep what is your own, and to take what belongs to others.” (potentia est 
ad sua conservanda et alterius adtenuanda idonearum rerum facultas.) 
 
5 Verg. Aen. 1.279, and see Lintott 1981.  On distinctions between intensive and extensive control, see 
both Mann 1986 (esp. 7-10) and Landers 2003. 
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 If control was the necessary precursor to any of the various forms of Roman domination, 
“force” was a crucial tool in achieving this goal.  Drawing heavily on Edward Luttwak, I define 
force as the ability of the armed agents of the Roman state to inflict violence—crudely put, to kill 
people and destroy their possessions—and, crucially, to credibly threaten to do so.6  Military 
force thus has two distinct but related components: active force (a “wasting resource” consumed 
in its use through the necessary casualties of even successful warfare) and threatened force, 
which may generate control through the fear of destruction.7  As Luttwak correctly stresses, the 
latter variety of force is more important in the efficient maintenance of empire; indeed, he 
identifies power (my “control”) as obedience caused by the fearful perception of force.8 
 To be sure, violence and the fear thereof are not the only factors which generated control 
in the Roman world; Michael Mann’s influential The Sources of Social Power identifies military 
force as just one of four building blocks of state authority (along with ideological, economic, and 
political power).9  This dissertation gives more attention to force than other sources of control 
because force, alone among the tools of the Roman state, was unilateral.10  If we consider 
Mann’s other forms of power in the Roman context—the acculturation of provincials; the 
creation of legitimate governing rules and institutions; outright bribery—all required a degree of 
local consent, a willingness of imperial subjects to accept the ideological and material “benefits” 
                                                          
6 Luttwak 1976, 195-200. 
 
7 For an unusually direct description of the dynamics of force, threats, and fear: Onas. 6.11.  Cf. Lee 2020, 
which discusses the closely related concept of “latent” force. 
 
8 Luttwak 1976, 197-98.  For a quite different definition of power, and a thorough review of earlier 
theoretical literature on the subject, see Arendt 1970. 
 
9 Mann 1986, 1.1-33.  See also Mann 1984.  Mann’s other sources of social power feature more heavily in 
Ando and Richardson 2017; Monson and Scheidel 2015.  
 
10 It was “despotic,” as opposed to “infrastructural” power.  Mann 1984, 188-89. 
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of empire in exchange for their compliance.  Force worked differently.  The fear of death and, 
failing that, the realities of destruction, were the final bulwark of imperial authority, and violence 
the last guarantor of Roman control. 
 This structural outline of force and control paints an admittedly bleak picture of life under 
the Romans.  In narrowing our focus to the military dynamics of Roman imperialism, we should 
not forget that other varieties of social power were constantly in play; in many cases, Rome’s 
control over its subjects was based on more than terror alone.  At the same time, this was a 
violent world, both socially and politically; as Greg Woolf argues, the ideology of the Pax 
Romana concealed a wide variety of anti-imperial warfare both on and behind the Roman 
frontiers.11  Banditry was endemic: even if latrones themselves lacked a coherent political 
program, their existence was an affront to ideals of imperial order, and policing was an important 
task of the Roman military.12  Indeed, the size and expense of the Roman army in the imperial 
period speak to the importance of force in maintaining the emperors’ rule.  Rome did not 
maintain hundreds of thousands of soldiers idly.13  Military force, the army’s ability to commit 




                                                          
11 On social violence: Fagan 2011.  On political violence: MacMullen 1966; Dyson 1971; Woolf 2002; 
Gambash 2015. 
 
12 Shaw 1984; Fuhrmann 2012. 
 
13 For select contributions on the grand strategy debate, discussed further in Chapter Four: Luttwak 1976; 
Mann 1979; Millar 1982; Isaac 1990; Wheeler 1993a; 1993b; Whittaker 2004. 
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Section Two: Space and the Environment 
 
With these definitions of force and control in mind, let us consider the impact of space on 
Roman imperialism.  For this subject, John Landers’ The Field and the Forge provides an 
important methodological starting point.  In this ambitious work, Landers explores “the effects 
that western economies' reliance on organic sources of energy and raw materials had on the 
spatial organization of human activities,” and particularly on the imposition of state control, from 
the development of agriculture to the industrial revolution.14  Landers stresses the importance of 
“demographic space,” a conception of geography that emphasizes the relationship between 
human activity and the longue durée material constraints of the pre-industrial world.15  The 
attempts of states to exert control over the world, to integrate space into cohesive, interdependent 
units, relied heavily on the supply and movement of resources (caloric energy being the most 
important in the ancient case).  Centuries of statecraft and state-building can thus be envisioned 
as an attempt to balance the benefits of control with the costs of pacification and resource 
extraction. 
Landers provides an important model for thinking through the relationship between force, 
control, and space in the ancient world: as he stresses, the mechanics of power are intimately 
rooted in their physical settings, and cannot be properly understood in isolation from the natural 
environment.  Violence, after all, is an intensely physical affair.  Although scholars since the late 
20th century have admirably broadened their scope of inquiry to the cultural, social, and 
intellectual features of military life, combat (as Adrian Goldsworthy argues) remained the most 
                                                          
14 Landers 2003, 1. 
 
15 Landers 2003, 5-6.  Landers draws this intellectual framework from the Annalistes, most notably 
Fernand Braudel (Braudel 1949, v. 1).  
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important role of the Roman army, and the material, technological, and environmental conditions 
of warfare exerted a profound influence on its nature and success.16 
That said, The Field and the Forge is generally more interested in economic than military 
history, though its emphasis on the material conditions of power is naturally useful for the study 
of ancient warfare as a tool of state control.  Recent work by Wayne Lee applies Landers’ 
concepts more directly to warfare, and shares this dissertation’s interest in analyzing military 
activity within its physical and ecological context.17  Lee focuses on the range of possible means 
for conquerors to solidify their control over captured territory, given the ability of the 
environment to support its occupiers logistically and to reward them economically and 
politically.  This dissertation remains alert to these factors: mountains could present harrowing 
challenges to ancient logistics, and were typically less lucrative spaces for imperial control.  
However, I dedicate more attention to the limits which topography placed on the direct 
imposition and re-imposition of control through violence, and I end to emphasize tactical and 
operational factors more than strategic ones. 
Drawing on the models of Landers and Lee, let us return to the second proposition of my 
opening syllogism, that all space was not created equal for the purposes of Roman control.  
Thinking in terms of “demographic space,” certain geographies of economic resources were 
more difficult for the Romans to exploit, to the point that targeting these resources for imperial 
                                                          
16 Goldsworthy 1996, esp. 1-11.  Goldsworthy draws this methodology from Keegan 1976 (and cf. 
Hanson 1989).  Among numerous works relying on the physicality and environmental setting of ancient 
warfare: Kromayer and Veith 1903-1931; Cary 1949; Engels 1978; Hughes 1994; Shean 1996; Erdkamp 
1998; Roth 1999.  For a broader overview of late 20th and early 21st century military historiography, see 
Citino 2007. 
 
17 Lee 2020 (forthcoming).  My thanks to Dr. Lee for providing and discussing an early copy of this work. 
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control might not be worth the effort.  In the more traditional language of military geography (for 
which Donald Engels’ Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army is 
foundational to the study of the ancient world) certain types of environments made it physically 
more difficult for the Romans to project and enact military force, and thus to exercise political 
control.18  Landers encapsulates how these two factors could come together to impede effective 
imperial authority: “logistical and other constraints...made it almost impossible to maintain a 
controlling presence in thinly populated areas with difficult terrain.  Whatever constitutional or 
ideological fictions might be maintained, remoter areas of forest, hills, or moorland were prone 
to slip outside the effective control of central or regional authorities..."19 
This dissertation is interested in exactly these sorts of spaces and the dynamics of 
violence and imperialism within them, and in particular in hills, mountains, and otherwise 
“broken ground.”20  As Chapter One argues more fully, we know that the Romans were 
traditionally uncomfortable fighting in such areas, and for good reason.  By examining these 
peripheral spaces of military force and political control, we can uncover patterns in both local 
resistance and Roman priorities, as the empire negotiated power relationships on hostile ground.  
However, in order to integrate the physical environment properly into narratives of Roman 
imperial warfare, we need to be able to characterize, analyze, and “think with” terrain.  The 
careful employment of GIS technology allows us to do exactly that.  
                                                          
18 Engels 1978. 
 
19 Landers 2003, 265, and see 250-74. 
 
20 While forests and marshlands presented similar obstacles to Roman control (see McNeill 2004; Tucker 




Section Three: Locating Broken Ground: GIS and Historical Geography 
 
 Historical geography, in both its traditional and digital manifestations, is composed of 
two sub-fields: cultural and physical geography.  While closely related, each has its own sets of 
resources and challenges.  When it comes to cultural geography and locating the settlements and 
structures of the ancient world, this project benefits from over thirty years of sustained progress 
in mapping Greco-Roman civilization.  Locational data has long been important in Classics, 
especially on the archaeological side of the field, and works such as Kennedy and Riley’s 
Rome’s Desert Frontier from the Air demonstrate the rewards of geospatial ancient studies.21    
Yet despite ambitious projects such as the Tabula Imperii Romani, a modern reference atlas for 
the ancient world remained unavailable until the release of the Barrington Atlas in 2000.22  
Subsequent work by the Pleiades Project and the Ancient World Mapping Center at the 
University of North Carolina has both expanded on the Barrington data and made it digitally 
available for use in GIS platforms.23  As a result, scholars today have better and more readily 
available resources than ever before to understand the configurations of human space in Rome‘s 
world, and the cultural-geographic side of this dissertation draws extensively on datasets already 
developed for classical studies.24 
                                                          
21 Kennedy and Riley 1990. 
 
22 Talbert 2000.  See further: Bagnall 1980, 27; Talbert 1992; 2018. 
 
23 Ancient World Mapping Center: <awmc.unc.edu>.  Pleaides: <pleiades.stoa.org>.  I have served as 
Director of AWMC and Co-Managing Editor of Pleiades, and maintain active ties with both 
organizations.  
 
24 Other important contributions in ancient geospatial digital humanities include Stanford’s Orbis 
(<orbis.stanford.edu>) and those of the Pelagios Commons (<commons.pelagios.org>). 
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We enter less well-trodden territory when it comes to physical geography, particularly 
when it comes to the use of digital tools to evaluate the topographical backdrop to ancient 
society.  These tools and the datasets they produce were developed by the modern scientific 
community for the solution of distinctly modern problems; modifying them to our ends is thus a 
necessarily messy and imperfect process.  When it comes to rugged terrain, however, the basics 
are reasonably simple.  Broken ground, in quantitative terms, can be defined by variation in 
elevation: areas where elevation varies widely over a relatively small area are more “broken” 
than those where elevation is more constant.  The first step in building a GIS model of broken 
ground is therefore a Digital Elevation Model (DEM), a dataset which associates points on the 
earth’s surface with their elevation above sea-level.  This dissertation relies on a DEM known as 
SRTM-90: elevations were measured by sophisticated radar equipment on NASA’s Shuttle 
Radar Topography Mission in February 2000, with a data resolution of approximately 90 m (that 
is, 90 x 90 m grid squares on the Earth’s surface are assigned a single elevation value).25  This 
resolution is detailed enough to capture the ruggedness of the landscape accurately, but not so 
detailed as to be skewed by terrain changes caused by modern construction. 
 From our elevation dataset, we can use a variety of GIS techniques to determine a given 
area’s degree of local elevation variation, the “broken-ness” of the ground.26  For our purposes, 
                                                          
25 Farr et al. 2007.  The data used here was processed by the Consortium for Spatial Information and is 
available for download at < https://cgiarcsi.community/data/srtm-90m-digital-elevation-database-v4-1>.  
On CSI’s processing methods, see: Reuter 2007.  SRTM-90 data, along with a wide variety of other 
DEMs and geospatial datasets, can also be downloaded from the US Geological Survey’s EROS Data 
Center (<https://eros.usgs.gov>). 
 
26 For an excellent and well-sourced survey of the various mathematical approaches to broken ground, 
along with helpful tutorials on performing them using GIS software: Cooley, S.W. “Terrain Roughness: 




the most useful metric is the Terrain Roughness Index (TRI).  This statistic, originally developed 
for ecological research but applied more recently in the social sciences, is defined as the total 
difference in elevation between a central grid-square and the eight squares surrounding it.27  
Figure 1 shows two examples of TRI calculation; the example on the right is quantifiably more 
rugged than that on the left.28 
 In combination, the SRTM-90 digital elevation model and TRI processing provide a 
quantitative measure for the ruggedness of terrain almost anywhere on Earth.  Correlating TRI 
statistics with their probable impact on the Roman army is somewhat harder.  Judging by 
historical comparanda and personal experimentation, it seems likely that TRI values between 100 
and 200 m would have started to affect Roman military performance.29  However, we cannot 
state with absolute confidence how broken the ground had to be for it to affect military 
performance in the way we see throughout Greco-Roman military literature; there is certainly no 
single TRI value below which Roman forces could always operate easily and above which they 
could not.  The physics of campaign and combat are multivariable, and TRI statistics are 
predictive but never determinative.  As a result, TRI figures are best used comparatively.  Even if 
we cannot pinpoint the correlation between TRI and military performance, we can still use this 
metric to think through local variations in imperial power relationships. 
                                                          
27 Riley et al. 1999.  For social-scientific applications see: Jimenez-Ayora and Ulubasoglu 2015; Nunn 
and Puga 2012. 
 
28 All figures, maps, and tables in this dissertation are located at the end of their respective chapters. 
 
29 For instance, Gettysburg’s famous Round Top hills have TRI values between 110-120 m.  Just outside 
Durham, North Carolina, the hills of Eno River State Park (a moderately strenuous hike for the author and 
his dog, and substantially imposing in places for infantry combat) reach ruggedness scores of 120-130 m.  
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 TRI analysis forms the methodological bedrock of Chapters Two through Four; in 
combination with other techniques of digital geography and data processing, it allows us to bring 
questions of space and terrain to the forefront of military history in a way that was 
technologically impracticable before the 21st century.  At the same time, historical GIS does not 
always overcome the fundamental difficulties of ancient geography: where our traditional 
sources fail, technology is no panacea, and, all too frequently, we simply cannot locate a town, 
tribe, or battle.  This dissertation champions the inclusion of GIS among the many tools of the 
historical profession (and the beginning of Chapter Two outlines some ways that digital methods 
can accommodate uncertain and ambiguous data better than their analog predecessors).  Yet at 
the same time, it remains necessary to temper the enthusiasm of the digital humanities with the 
traditional rigor of ancient studies.  This dissertation seeks to turn technology on those questions 
it can answer, and to openly acknowledge those it cannot.    
 
Section Four: Structure and Argument 
 
The dissertation’s organization roughly follows the three clauses of the syllogism laid out 
above.  Thus far, I have asserted the (relatively uncontroversial) opening proposition and defined 
the crucial terms of power and control (along with outlining a GIS methodology for the analysis 
of military terrain).  Chapter One draws on ancient literary evidence to defend the syllogism’s 
second proposition.  Analyzing the topoi of Roman battle narratives, it reconstructs a set of 
perceptions and preferences concerning combat on broken ground, a cultural discourse shared by 
Roman authors and their social peers in command of the army.  In this military mindset, broken 
ground was typically an unsuitable environment for combat.  Ancient authors believed that rough 
terrain generally hindered Roman troops while giving substantial advantages to their opponents, 
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particularly in the foreign wars of conquest and counterinsurgency that subjected the 
Mediterranean world to imperial authority. 
The remaining three chapters explore the syllogism’s conclusion and implications, 
presenting a series of case studies on different aspects of Roman control.  Chapter Two examines 
the initial imposition of control through conquest, analyzing the geography of Rome’s Spanish 
campaigns between 218 and 179 BCE.  It argues that while Roman behavior in these wars 
reflected the same distaste for hill- and mountain-warfare which we see in Chapter Two’s literary 
portrait, the Romans were capable of adaptation; over two generations of warfare, the geographic 
foci of Roman operations shifted upcountry, from the coastal plains and river valleys to the more 
challenging environments of the Spanish foothills and mountains.  Exploring the Roman 
conquest of Spain with questions of space and the physical environment firmly in mind, and with 
the assistance of GIS mapping and statistical analysis, Chapter Two thus gives new insights into 
how Roman deployment in the Iberian peninsula responded to a shifting strategic environment.     
Chapter Three studies the failure and rejection of Roman control through rebellion, 
taking as its subject the well-documented Jewish Revolt of the first century CE.  Here, GIS 
brings new perspectives to the military geography of Judaea during the opening months of the 
revolt, giving the most direct evidence that broken ground incubated resistance against Roman 
authority.  Considering the military geography of Cestius Gallus’ disaster at Beth Horon and the 
disposition of Josephus’ strongholds in the Galilee, we see how provincial malcontents shared 
Rome’s perception that broken ground opened opportunities for successful local insurgency.  
The hopes which some Jews placed in such defensive terrain helps explain local decisions 
between compliance and rebellion. 
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Chapter Four considers the long-term maintenance of Roman control through garrisoning 
and frontier policy, exploring the layout of the Roman frontier in eastern Asia Minor in the first 
and second centuries CE.  As in Chapter Two, GIS analysis reveals a fundamental tension 
between two missions: large-scale warfare against rival empires (in this case the Parthians, in 
Chapter Two the Carthaginians) and small-scale counterinsurgency and policing actions against 
the locals themselves.  And as in Chapter Two, we see both a general Roman preference for the 
former mission (and the level ground on which it was typically carried out) and a degree of 
strategic flexibility: when pressed, the empire extended its garrisons up the Anatolian mountains, 
accepting the risks it saw as inherent to such terrain.  Though similar in some of its conclusions 
to my investigation of Rome’s Spanish wars, Chapter Four considers a larger area and a much 
longer stretch of time, and draws on material evidence as much as literary, taking as its basis 
Timothy Mitford’s monumental survey of the Upper Euphrates frontier.30  At this spatial and 
temporal scale, GIS analysis sheds light not only on the decision-making of individual Roman 
commanders, but  also on the hotly-debated nature and purpose of the imperial frontier system 
over the course of generations. 
Taken together, these case studies remind us, on the one hand, that the Romans remained 
vulnerable to the structures and strictures of the natural environment, even as they possessed 
military capabilities surpassing those of any of their neighbors.  For all that the Romans might 
push the “limits of the possible” in exceptional displays of concentrated force, their authority 
remained dependent on quotidian, cost-effective military action.  In literary perception and 
military reality, broken ground made such operations more difficult and less desirable, shifting 
                                                          
30 Mitford 2018. 
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the strategic dynamics of imperial control to the benefit of Rome’s restive subjects and 
neighbors.31 
On the other hand, these case studies depict the Romans as careful, calculating wielders 
of power: the strength and duration of Roman rule depended in part on a more flexible 
conception of control than appears in imperial panegyric and self-promotion.  In the many 
rugged regions of the Roman world, the empire thrived thanks not only to its capacity for 
successful violence, but also to the flexibility with which it ruled mountaineers who could not be 
dominated by force alone.
                                                          











BROKEN GROUND AND ROMAN WARFARE 
 
If pressed, most historians of Roman warfare would recognize the empire’s anxieties 
about combat on mountainous, hilly, or otherwise topographically “broken” ground.1  Concern 
with such spaces forms a background hum in our sources, and the impact of topography on 
military success was well understood during the Roman period: Polybius hypothesized that “in 
the majority of land and sea battles in a war defeat is due to difference of position.”2  Centuries 
later, Vegetius wrote, “the good general should know that a large part of victory depends on the 
actual place in which the battle is to be fought.”3  There is certainly an awareness in modern 
scholarship, especially in the older “battle histories” of the 19th and 20th centuries, that high 
ground and defiles could shape the outcome of ancient combat.4  Meanwhile the 20th and 21st 
century debacles of the United States and USSR in Afghanistan have reaffirmed, for professional 
                                                          
1 As noted in the Introduction, terrain could also be “broken” by vegetation and hydrological factors.  
While in many cases such features would have similar effects on Roman military performance as rugged 
terrain, I exclude them here both in the interests of space and because of the difficulties inherent in 
mapping ancient ecology and hydrology with modern data. 
 
2 Polyb. 5.21: ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον κινδύνων τοὺς πλείους καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν 
σφάλλουσιν αἱ τῶν τόπων διαφοραί. 
 
3 Veg. Mil. 3.13: Bonum ducem conuenit nosse magnam partem uictoriae ipsum locum, in quo 
dimicandum est, possidere. 
 




and recreational historians alike, the importance of environmental obstacles to conquest and 
control.  
That said, the systematic, structural impact of terrain on Roman violence and control has 
not yet received a great deal of intensive study.5  Fernand Braudel opens his classic The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II with a discussion of 
mountains in the region’s longue durée history, characterizing them as a world apart from the 
more “civilized” plains.6  In a passing comment on the ancient world, he draws conclusions 
similar to this chapter on the depth of Rome’s control over the Mediterranean highlands: “even 
Rome itself, in all its years of power, can have meant very little [in the mountains], except 
perhaps through the military camps that the empire established for security reasons in various 
places on the edges of unconquered mountain lands.”7  Yet Braudel does not particularly explain 
his observation of imperial authority’s fragility on rugged terrain.  There is a certain trans-
historicism to his work (particularly in the early chapters that form much of the basis for the field 
of historical geography): this is simply the way that mountains were. 
Forty years later, Brent Shaw picked up the theme of montane imperialism in a trio of 
outstanding articles on ancient Cilicia-Isauria and Mauretania Tingitana, the closest direct 
parallels to what I attempt in this dissertation.8  Developing Braudel’s observations more fully, 
                                                          
5 Despite its promising title, Syme 1988 (“The Subjugation of Mountainous Zones”) is primarily 
concerned with more limited questions of Augustan Spain. 
 
6 Braudel 1995 (orig. 1949), 25-43 
 
7 Braudel 1995 (orig. 1949), 34. Trans. Siân Reynolds.  As we will see in Chapter Four, this statement 
undervalues the degree of Roman penetration into mountainous regions.    
 
8 Shaw 1986; 1990a; 1990b. 
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Shaw argues that mountains in the ancient world were spaces of imperfect imperial authority; 
rugged space was ruled loosely, and through inter-personal contacts rather than the more 
enduring structures of state power.  His explanation for this phenomenon hinges on the limited 
technological capacity of ancient states: “the impact of mountain terrain was decisive in a pre-
modern world where the technological forces of domination were inadequate to the task of 
controlling this type of topography.”9  Yet Shaw, like Braudel, does not explore these 
unspecified “technological forces of domination” at any length.  Moreover, his analysis is limited 
by a complete lack of maps connecting the structures of Roman control to Isaurian and 
Mauretanian geography on anything more than a general level.  His work deserves tremendous 
praise, but leaves important questions unanswered. 
My goal here is to explore more rigorously the impact of physical topography on Roman 
imperialism, and to push back on the trans-historical assumption that the Romans dealt with and 
thought about hills and mountains in a “timeless” way, divorced from their particular cultural 
and military circumstances.  While there are certainly commonalities between the Romans’ 
approach to mountain warfare and those of comparable empires—the physical realities of rough 
terrain shaped the range of available tactical and strategic responses—this chapter seeks to 
outline the relationship between broken ground and military force in the Romans’ own eyes. 
The ultimate target of my analysis is Rome’s “way of doing business” on rough terrain, a 
culturally ingrained set of ideas and preferences about warfare and the physical environment.  
Rooted in both the physical nature of ancient battlefields and Roman military tradition, this 
discourse of combat on rough terrain (to borrow theoretical language from John Lynn) helped to 
                                                          
9 Shaw 1986, 82. 
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shape the course of Roman warfare and the geography of empire.10  While flexible in its 
application over time and space, Rome’s basic modus cogitandi for broken ground formed a 
crucial strategic backdrop to the conquest and rule of mountainous regions.  By exploring how 
the Romans thought about broken ground, we may thus lay the foundations for later chapters’ 
case studies of how they acted over it. 
When we survey ancient military literature, it becomes evident that Roman commanders, 
given the choice, generally did not like to wage war on rough terrain.  Ancient authors—either 
military men themselves, or members of a shared literary and cultural milieu with Roman 
commanders—believed with good reason that rugged terrain made Rome’s army worse at 
combat, while increasing the enemy’s chances of victory (or, at the very least, of surviving to 
fight another day).  The political result of this dynamic, in the vision of our sources, was that 
imperial control in hills and mountains tended to be shallow and tenuous, if it existed at all.  In 
short, we should identify the Roman army itself as key among the “forces of domination” cited 
by Shaw. 
*** 
 Before substantiating these claims of Roman antipathy to combat on broken ground and 
its political results, it remains to discuss briefly some matters of historiography and 
methodology, outlining general principles for how to handle literary evidence on ancient combat. 
In its attempt to understand the mechanics of the Roman army as a fighting institution, 
this chapter shares much in common with Adrian Goldsworthy’s influential The Roman Army at 
                                                          
10 Lynn 2003, 331-41.  On the ways in which Rome’s memory of its distant military past shaped the 
practices of later empires, see Lendon 2005.  
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War.11  Along with numerous other scholars (all drawing to greater or lesser extent on John 
Keegan’s Face of Battle), Goldsworthy revived scholarly attention on combat as the defining 
purpose of the Roman army.12  While Goldsworthy makes little mention of terrain and the 
physical environment, his goal, like my own, is to reconstruct “how the [Roman] army actually 
worked on campaign,” how physics and psychology shaped its functioning as a tool of state 
violence.13 
Goldsworthy’s work is ambitious and thoroughly researched, and his goals are laudable 
(even if I disagree with him on certain points of both substance and methodology).  Yet he has 
been rightly criticized for an overly credulous approach to ancient literary evidence: in short, for 
taking what our sources say as unproblematic representations of the way combat actually 
worked.14  The distinctive Greco-Roman methods for writing about battles did not necessarily 
match their ways of fighting them, and while ancient combat narratives remained tethered to 
military fact, we must be careful in this case not to conflate representation and reality.  Thus, 
while I share Goldsworthy’s interest in the mechanics of Roman warfare, the analysis in this 
chapter relies on a different methodology, one that emphasizes the importance of literary topoi in 
                                                          
11 Goldsworthy 1996.  Goldsworthy responded to an alternative, socio-cultural historiography, best 
represented a decade later in Southern 2006. 
 
12 Keegan 1976.  Keegan’s methodology made a controversial entrance to ancient studies with Hanson 
1989.  For the mechanics and experience of combat in the Roman world, see Lee 1996; Lloyd 1996; 
Gilliver 1999; Sabin 2000; along with Wheeler 1979, less indebted than the others to the Face of Battle 
school. 
  
13 Goldsworthy 1996, 11. 
 
14 See in particular Catherine Gilliver’s review in Greece and Rome 45.2 (1998) 230-31.  Though 
Gilliver’s own The Roman Art of War (1999) is somewhat better in this respect, her analysis similarly 
struggles to disentangle topoi and literary convention from reality. 
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historical analysis and the connection (but not necessarily the equivalence) between the discourse 
and reality of Roman warfare. 
 Even when our ancient authors know of what they speak in military affairs—an open 
question in some cases—they do not always care to depict the realities of warfare accurately in 
their prose.15  As J.E. Lendon persuasively argues, battle narratives in ancient texts are heavily 
shaped by literary convention, “products as much of culture as of observation.”16  For any given 
battle, our sources blend what actually happened with what (to ancient habits of thought) was 
supposed to happen, rendering our evidence a strange mixture of historical fact with stock 
narratives, archetypes, and topoi.17  Recognition of the extent to which ancient military narratives 
were cultural products threatens to sweep the feet from beneath traditional histories of Roman 
warfare.  In the absence of archaeological corroboration—occasionally available at such famous 
sites as Masada, Numantia, and Kalkriese—we cannot securely reconstruct the tactical ebb and 
flow of any individual battle or the operational dynamics of any given campaign. 
 However, for understanding the structural and systematic factors that shaped the military 
performance and political impact of the Roman empire, the embeddedness of ancient military 
narratives within cultural and literary traditions is a benefit, not a hindrance.  As Lendon writes, 
“the way ancient authors describe the details of battle can tell us about the mental rigging of the 
                                                          
15 For an example of disagreement over an author’s basic military knowledge, see the debate over Livy, 
with the condemnation of him as a military historian in Walsh 1958 (and cf. Walsh 1961), and rebuttals in 
Roth 2006 and Koon 2010, who give more charitable evaluations of his historical quality. 
 
16 Lendon 1999, 274.  Cf. Lendon 2017a; 2017b.   
 




societies in which they lived.”18  Topoi of combat, in short, reveal a great deal about ancient 
culture, values, and habits of mind.19  Of particular interest in this chapter are the set of “rules” 
for broken ground shared by the writers of Roman military literature (and, we should suspect, by 
their social peers commanding Roman armies): a common set of assumptions about the ways 
rough terrain affected military operations and preferences about how the empire should best 
approach these spaces.20  Thus, while the bulk of this chapter’s evidence comes from Roman 
battle narratives, our analytical target is not these battles as historical events, but as cultural 
constructs demonstrating Rome’s mindset towards broken ground. 
 Reconstruction of the Roman perception of rough terrain combat, as revealed in the topoi 
and internal logic of ancient battle narratives, matters in more than the philological abstract.  
Romans’ habits of writing and thinking about warfare on broken ground both reflected and 
shaped their habits of actually fighting over such terrain.  While not necessarily accurate for the 
specific battle narratives in which authors deploy them, topoi surrounding the dangers of defile 
ambushes, the difficulties of assaulting hilltop citadels, and the near-impossibility of corralling 
mountaineers into open combat reflect real facts of Roman military experience.21  Such stock 
descriptions resonate with a Roman audience precisely because they match the readers’ actual 
experiences and understanding of combat.  At the same time, shared cultural conceptions and 
                                                          
18 Lendon 1999, 275.  Cf. Koon 2010. 
 
19 This methodology underlies Lendon 2005. 
 
20 These are referred to in places as “general truths” (rather than details specific to any particular battle) in 
Lendon 2017a and 2017b.  van Gils, de Jong, and Kroon 2019 casts this distinction in terms of specific 
“historicity” versus generalized “realism.”  On the class-connection of Roman literary figures and 
political decision-makers, see Mattern 1999. 
 
21 Lendon 2017a; 2017b and see n. 20 above. 
24 
 
“rules” of warfare shaped the practices of the Roman army.  The idea of mountain combat’s 
difficulties and risks disinclined Roman commanders to engage on such terrain in the first place, 
and mental frameworks thus made themselves felt in military reality.  To return to John Lynn’s 
theoretical framework, the discourse and reality of Roman warfare existed in an interdependent 
and reciprocal relationship.22  We can thus use the literary structures of Roman military 
discourse, encapsulated in the topoi of ancient authors, to reflect on the real-world, systematic 
relationship between Roman force and the physical terrain. 
 Let us turn, then, to reconstruct the Roman understanding of combat on broken ground as 
reflected in ancient military literature.  We must begin with the strong current of discontent and 
anxiety that underlies descriptions of rough terrain and combat: in brief, with the Roman 
preconception that rough terrain was fundamentally undesirable as a space for military activity.  
 
Section One: “Descending to the Plain” and Roman Ideas of the Battlefield 
 
 In the view of ancient authors, battles should be fought (at least by default) on the plains.  
This is not to dispute that the Romans could triumph on rugged terrain (as in Livy’s account of 
the victories over Philip V at the River Aous or over Antiochus III at Thermopylae).23  Nor do 
our sources deny that the Romans themselves at times took advantage of broken ground, 
especially when outmatched by the enemy: in Livy’s heavily mythologized account of the Gallic 
sack of Rome in 390 BCE, it is only a redoubt on the Capitoline hill that preserves the city from 
                                                          
22 Lynn 2003, 331-341. 
 
23 In 198 and 191 BCE, respectively.  Livy, 32.5-12, 36.15-19.   
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complete annihilation.24  Yet on the whole, ancient authors display a marked discomfort with 
Roman military activity on rough terrain (indeed, whatever its tactical impact in practice, Livy 
emphasizes the broken ground at Aous and Thermopylae to magnify his Roman heroes’ 
achievements in the face of adversity).  As we will see below, this attitude was occasionally 
made explicit, but is most noticeably encapsulated in a common topos of Roman military 
literature in which armies descend to level ground in order to signal their willingness to fight.   
 Our sources are rarely forthright when it comes to the systemic relationship between 
rough terrain and military efficiency.  Within the genre constraints of Roman military literature, 
they hardly could be; we have no ancient handbooks on the practical mechanics of warfare, in 
the vein of the modern US Army Field Manuals.  Yet an antipathy to broken ground comes to the 
surface in the campfire banter of soldiers on the march.  Tacitus’ legionaries in Britain cast the 
island’s rolling landscape as their enemy, bragging of their victories over “the recesses of forests 
and mountains” without reference to any human opponent.25  Caesar has his troops express a 
similar sentiment during the Gallic Wars, as the men claim “that they were not afraid of the 
enemy, but feared the narrow passages and vast forests which lay between themselves and 
Ariovistus.”26  As Lendon notes, Caesar frequently refers to rugged terrain as locus iniquus, an 
“unfair” or “unfavorable place.”27  The same motifs appear in Livy, as he describes the Roman 
                                                          
24 Livy, 5.43.  Polyb. 18.22 implies that the rugged field of Cynoscephalae put the Romans at an 
advantage against Philip V’s ponderous phalanx.   
 
25 Tac. Agr. 25: ac modo silvarum ac montium profunda.  See also 17, 33. 
 
26 Caes. BGall. 1.39: non se hostem vereri, sed angustias itineris et magnitudinem silvarum quae 
intercederent inter ipsos atque Ariovistum,…timere dicebant. 
 
27 Lendon 1999, 288 (with references). 
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march towards Pydna in 168 BCE: “although the foe threatened [the Romans] from no direction, 
the roughness of the terrain harassed them like an enemy.28   
 A leery discomfort with warfare on broken ground similarly underlies the strategic logic 
which our sources impute to Roman commanders.  Narrating a Roman campaign against the Boi 
in 196 BCE, Livy explains how a Roman consul chose to withdraw along a longer route in order 
to avoid broken ground: “he led the army back by the same way he had come, and after a long 
roundabout march through country that was open, and therefore safe, he reached his 
colleague.”29  Caesar reports that he was willing to tolerate similar delay in order to avoid the 
risks of rough terrain.30  Similarly, when his men were eager to launch an uphill assault against 
Avaricum in 52 BCE, “Caesar pointed out what great loss, in the death of so many gallant men, a 
victory must necessarily cost,” and refused to attack.31 Later, chiding his men for recklessness, 
Caesar reminds them that at Avaricum “he had given up an assured victory in order that even 
slight loss in action might not be caused by unfavorable ground.”32 
 More common in ancient literature than explicit critique of broken ground is praise for 
plains as the natural spaces of military activity.  Livy writes of a battleground in Celtiberia that 
                                                          
28 Livy, 44.5: cum ab nulla parte hostis terruisset, locorum asperitas hostiliter vexavit. 
 
29 Livy, 33.37:  exercitum eadem via qua adduxerat reduxit et magno circuitu per aperta eoque tuta loca 
ad collegam pervenit. See also 34.28. 
 
30 Caes. BGall. 1.41.  For a similar decision, see 6.34.  Livy excoriates the Roman commander Manlius 
for failing to take such precautions and risking his army on broken ground in Thrace (35.28, 38.46). 
 
31 Caes. BGall. 7.19: Caesar…quanto detrimento et quot virorum fortium morte necesse sit constare 
victoriam.  
 
32 Caes. BGall. 7.52: exploratam victoriam dimisisset, ne parvum modo detrimentum in contentione 
propter iniquitatem loci accideret. 
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“the plain was entirely flat and suitable for fighting.”33  Appian similarly praises the terrain near 
Philippi: “the plain was admirably situated for fighting.”34  According to Tacitus, Germanicus 
sought to contradict his troops’ preference for level terrain, admonishing them (contrary to the 
evident stereotype) that “plains were not the only battlefield favorable to a Roman soldier.”35  
Roman preferences and perceptions about “suitable” spaces for combat are encapsulated 
in a common topos, in which our authors use a commander’s choice to take up a position on 
level ground as a symbol for confident belligerence.  When armies “go down to the plain” in 
ancient military literature, this action is synonymous with their willingness to attempt a decisive 
battle.  Thus in Appian, both Hannibal and the Romans signaled their readiness for the Battle of 
Cannae when “both armies came down to the plain.”36  Livy is even more explicit when 
describing the Second Punic War in Spain: “as though by agreement, the signal for battle was 
raised on both sides, and with all their forces they went down into the plain.”37  The same topos 
appears even in Plutarch—hardly our most militarily knowledgeable author, but attuned 
nevertheless to the perils of hill-combat—as well as in Polybius’ accounts of the first and second 
Punic wars.38  
                                                          
33 Livy, 40.30: Campus erat planus omnis et aptus pugnae.  See also 38.3. 
 
34 App. BCiv. 4.13.106: τὸ πεδίον ἦν ἐναγωνίσασθαι καλὸν. 
 
35 Tac. Ann. 2.14: non campos modo militi Romano ad proelium bonos. See also 2.5. 
 
36 App. Hann. 4.19: κατέβαινον ἐς τὸ πεδίον ἑκάτεροι. 
 
37 Livy, 23.29: velut ex composito utrimque signum pugnae propositum est atque omnibus copiis in 
campum descensum. See also 22.24, 22.30, 24.14, 25.33, 30.8. 
 
38 Plut. Cam. 41.3, Luc. 15.2, 26.2; Polyb. 1.19, 14.3. 
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In an inversion of this topos, one side signals its lack of confidence by refusing to give 
battle on the plains.  According to Appian, Antony and Octavian tried in vain to incite combat at 
Philippi, and saw cowardice in their enemies’ mountaintop fortifications.  Appian’s account of 
Antony’s speech to the troops reflects his own understanding of combat’s spatial logic: “It is the 
clearest proof of their defeat yesterday and of their lack of courage that, like those who have 
been vanquished in public games, they keep out of the arena…. they do not accept our challenge 
and come down from the mountain, but trust to their rocky fastnesses instead of their arms.”39  
Livy similarly uses hills and plains as metonyms, standing in for timidity and courage in war: 
when Metellus took the field against Hannibal: “the consul…pitched camp near Numistro, in 
sight of Hannibal on level ground, while the Carthaginian held a hill.  [Metellus] added the 
further appearance of confidence in being the first to lead out into battle-line.”40  At the same 
time, confidence could be misplaced, and Appian criticizes Curio’s leadership in the Civil Wars 
when he “very imprudently led his enfeebled army down to the plain.”41   
The symbolic logic of the “descent to the plains” topos was not restricted to the Romans; 
at least in the vision of Roman authors, it was commonly understood in the Mediterranean world 
that level fields were the natural site for combat.  In Livy’s (essentially fictitious) representation 
of the late 4th century Etruscan wars, Rome’s enemies were so aggressive that “not only did they 
                                                          
39 App. BCiv. 4.16.119: ὃ σαφεστάτη πίστις ἐστὶ τῆς ἐχθὲς ἥσσης καὶ φόβου, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς 
γυμνικοῖς ἀφιστῶνται τοῦ ἀγῶνος οἱ ἐλάττονες…ὅταν οὖν ἡμῶν αὐτοὺς προκαλουμένων μὴ δέχωνται 
μηδὲ καταβαίνωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀρῶν, ἀλλὰ ἀντὶ τῶν χειρῶν πιστεύωσι τοῖς κρημνοῖς… 
 
40 Livy, 27.2: consul…ad Numistronem in conspectu Hannibalis loco plano, cum Poenus collem teneret, 
posuit castra. addidit et aliam fidentis speciem, quod prior in aciem eduxit. For similar examples, see 
Caes. BCiv. 1.41; Plut. Fab. 5.2-5; Polyb. 1.39, 3.91.0    
 




move forward their camp, out of the woods, but even, in their eagerness for combat, came down 
into the plain at the earliest opportunity in battle formation.”42  The Samnites, Livy believed, 
operated under similar mental frameworks; upon failing to ambush a Roman column, “the 
Samnites—since it must ultimately come to an open trial of strength—likewise preferred to fight 
a regular engagement.  They accordingly descended to level ground, and committed their cause 
to fortune.”43  We need not worry whether Livy correctly understood the military mindset of 
Rome’s opponents, nor whether any of the examples cited above matches the reality of the 
specific battle it describes.  What matters for our purposes is the way that the underlying topoi in 
these narratives reflect a broader Roman logic of space and combat, in which on the one hand 
flat and open ground was where sufficiently strong and resolute armies went to wage war, and on 
the other hand rough terrain was a refuge of the weak and timid, fundamentally unsuitable for 
Roman combat.44 
Of course, descending to the plain was not universal in practice for ancient armies, 
Roman or otherwise; we have already seen examples where outmatched forces refused to offer a 
“fair” fight.  Nor was this discourse of morally superior plains combat the only strand in ancient 
military thought, even if it dominates in our historical literature.  Polybius recognized that 
battling in the plains on equal terms was, by his day, usually a relic of a more ethical past 
                                                          
42 Livy, 9.37: neque e silvis tantummodo promota castra sed etiam aviditate dimicandi quam primum in 
campos delata acies. 
 
43 Livy, 10.14: Samnites desperato improviso tumultu, quando in apertum semel discrimen evasura esset 
res, et ipsi acie iusta maluerunt concurrere. itaque in aequum descendunt ac fortunae se…committunt.  
Livy’s Carthaginians and Gauls share similar views: see 28.12, 34.46. 
 
44 In this sense, the Roman military worldview is not far different from that which Hanson 2009 
hypothesizes for the Greek city states. 
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(although he notes that it survived in practice among the Romans).45  Writing in the first century 
CE, Onasander’s discussion of suitable battlefields carries little of the moral baggage found in 
near-contemporary historians: the choice between fighting on level or broken ground is a simple 
matter of whether one’s army is stronger in cavalry (lethal against infantry in the plains) or 
infantry (superior to cavalry in the hills).46  By the fourth century, Vegetius not only agreed, but 
also strategically justified the unconventional warfare that some earlier writers called cowardice: 
“if [a general] recognizes that the enemy is stronger, let him avoid a pitched battle, because 
forces fewer in number and inferior in strength carrying out raids and ambushes under good 
generals have often brought back a victory.”47 
This alternate discourse, however, is not entirely incompatible with the broader Roman 
perception of plains as a “natural” battle-space.  Especially under the late republic and high 
empire, Rome’s army was usually superior to that of its opponents in pitched battle (as we will 
see below, this advantage did not hold as consistently in unconventional warfare).48  As they 
descended into the plain, Roman commanders could thus pride themselves on the virtuous 
emulation of their ancestors, secure in the knowledge that they were also making a tactically 
sound decision by engaging in an “even” fight.   
                                                          
45 Polyb. 13.3. 
 
46 Onas. 31.  On the weakness of cavalry in hills, cf. Veg. Mil. 2.1, 3.6. 
 
47 Veg. Mil. 3.9: Si vero adversarium intellegit fortiorem, certamen publicum vitet; nam pauciores 
numero et inferiores viribus superventus et insidias facientes sub bonis ducibus reportaverunt saepe 
victoriam. 
 
48 This was notably not as consistently the case in Vegetius’ day. 
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Roman distaste for combat on rugged terrain was not just a moral preference but a 
strategic calculation; to explain why, we must turn to the specific ways in which our literary 
evidence describes combat and campaigning over rough terrain.  Combining Goldsworthy’s 
interest in the mechanics of combat with the subtler handling of evidence advocated by Lendon 
and Lynn, we may find, within the persistent topoi of ancient battle descriptions, two basic 
“arguments” about the typically negative effects of rugged ground on the Roman military.49  
First, as already suggested, hills and mountains hindered the Romans’ “way of war,” making it 
more difficult to stage the decisive, heavy-infantry battles that were their traditional strength.  
Second, literary depictions of combat on broken ground indicate a belief among ancient authors 
that such terrain benefited the non- and pseudo-state opponents who formed the most common 
targets of Roman imperialism (at least after the destruction of Macedon, Carthage, and the 
Seleucid Empire).  In the view of our sources, while such opponents were markedly inferior to 
Rome in open combat, the potential which broken ground provided for defensive and guerrilla 
warfare increased their ability to win in the face of an otherwise indomitable Roman army.   
 
Section Two: Broken Ground, Heavy Infantry, and the Roman Way of War 
  
According to ancient authors, broken ground made it difficult for the Romans to fight in 
their preferred and most effective style.  It was antithetical to a Roman “way of war” which 
emphasized heavy infantry and decisive battle. 
                                                          
49 Goldsworthy 1996; Lendon 1999; 2005; Lynn 2003.  
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 To a substantial extent, this Roman “way of war” was a literary and cultural construct.  
We need not accept Victor Davis Hanson’s expansive and problematic view of the subject, 
developed in an ancient Greek context, but broadly applied to the Romans and to a long, 
undifferentiated line of “Western” descendants.50  While their legions of heavy infantry formed a 
traditional strength, Roman armies were highly flexible in their organization and armament, and 
could adapt their style of combat to meet a diverse range of opponents.51  The Roman “way of 
war” was not an unvarying rule, but a cultural perception: as John Lynn might put it, a discourse 
connected to (but not identical to) reality. 
 Nevertheless, our sources’ discussions of combat suggest that part of their general 
discomfort with broken ground stems from their view that heavy formations and their 
accompanying tactics often proved ineffective outside level, open battlefields.  Thus in his 
account of the Second Punic War, Livy describes how a Roman contingent struggled on broken 
ground against a light-armed force of Spaniards:   
“These [Spanish] troops were more used to mountains, and better suited to 
skirmishing amid rocks and crags, and being more agile and more lightly armed, 
they had no difficulty—thanks to the nature of the fighting—in getting the better 
of an enemy whose heavy armor and stationary tactics were adapted to level 
ground.  Thus the struggle had been far from equal, when they parted and made 
off for their respective camps.  Hardly any of the Spaniards had been hurt, but the 
Romans had lost a considerable number of men."52   
                                                          
50 Hanson 1989; 2002. 
 
51 See especially Polyb. 18.30-32.  This is a key argument in Goldsworthy 1996; see also Gilliver 1999.  
Cf. Wheeler 1979, whose reconstruction of the Roman battle-line against the Alani relies more on 
firepower and phalanx tactics than the typical fighting style of the cohortal legions.  
 
52 Livy, 22.18: ea adsuetior montibus et ad concursandum inter saxa rupesque aptior ac levior cum 
velocitate corporum tum armorum habitu campestrem hostem, gravem armis statariumque, pugnae 
genere facile elusit. Ita haudquaquam pari certamine digressi, Hispani fere omnes incolumes, Romani 
aliquot suis amissis in castra contenderunt. Cf. Plut. Fab. 7.1. 
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Writing in more general terms, Onasander concurs that light skirmishers fought at an 
advantage on rugged terrain: “for from the uneven ground they can more easily hurl their 
weapons and retreat, or they can very easily charge up the slopes, if they are agile.”53   
 Combat aside, broken ground seems to have presented obstacles to the mere 
movement of heavy infantry.  In his account of the war with Philip V, Livy depicts the 
Macedonian king withdrawing into the mountains away from his Roman foes, “choosing 
a road which he knew the Roman, with his heavy-armed column, would not take."54  
After Philip’s defeat at the River Aous, broken ground covers his retreat: “the narrow 
roads and the rough country hindered the [Roman] cavalry, the weight of their arms 
[hindered] the infantry.”55  The Romans could not follow “due to the unfavorable 
ground.”56  When Philip climbed the Haemus Mountains much later in his life, “it was 
generally agreed by all that there was no way for an army, but that with a few light troops 
[the mountains] could be climbed by a very difficult road.”57  Writing on wars in the East, 
Polybius comes to a similar conclusion: “it was not beyond the power of unburdened and 
light-armed troops to ascend over the bare rocks.”58 
                                                          
53 Onas. 18: ῥᾷόν τε γὰρ βαλόντες ὑποχωροῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν τραχέων, ῥᾷστά τε τοῖς ἀνάντεσιν 
ἐπαναθέουσιν, ἂν ἐλαφροὶ τυγχάνωσιν.  See also Polyb. 4.14, 5.52.  For the same topos in later Roman 
history: Amm. Marc. 14.2.4-6. 
 
54 Livy, 31.39: montes, quam viam non ingressurum gravi agmine Romanum sciebat, petit.  
 
55 Livy, 32.12: sed equitem angustiae locorumque asperitas, peditem armorum gravitas impediit. 
 
56 Livy, 32.12: ex iniquitate locorum. 
 
57 Livy, 40.21: cum satis inter omnes constaret viam exercitui nullam esse, paucis et expeditis per 
difficillimum aditum. Cf. App. Hann. 2.11. 
 




 The difficulties which broken ground imposed on heavy infantry were in part a matter of 
the physiological constraints of individual soldiers.  As Livy and Polybius indicate above, rough 
terrain amplified the physical difficulty of moving around a battlefield in heavy armor and bulky 
equipment, giving more lightly equipped troops a lethal advantage.  Yet beyond its challenges to 
the stamina and athleticism of individual soldiers, broken terrain also disrupted the close 
formations that made Roman heavy infantry so effective in combat.  In Dio’s account of the 
Pannonian revolt in the early first century CE, broken ground fragments Tiberius’ army as it 
advances over mountainous terrain.  “Drawn up in a dense square, [they] at first proceeded at a 
walk; but later they were separated by the steepness and unevenness of the mountain, which was 
full of gullies and at many points was cut up into ravines, so that some ascended more rapidly 
but others more slowly.”59  Appian similarly notes how broken ground could scatter close 
formations (although he illustrates this effect in reference to Rome’s opponents during the 
Mithridatic Wars): he writes how Sulla successfully compelled his opponent to fight “in a rocky 
region near Chaeronea…while Archelaus was hedged in by rocks which would in no case allow 
his whole army to act collectively, as he could not bring them together by reason of the 
unevenness of the ground.”60 
 The “typical” Roman soldier imagined by our sources—almost always the legionary as 
opposed to his lightly-armed, irregular comrades—was rendered particularly immobile on rough 
terrain by his heavy armament, while broken ground similarly negated the regimented formations 
                                                          
59 Dio Cass. 56.13: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν πλαισίῳ πυκνῷ συντεταγμένοι βάδην ἀνεπορεύοντο, 
ἔπειτα δ᾽ ὑπό τε τοῦ ὀρθίου καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας τοῦ ὄρους χαραδρῶδές τε γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἐς φάραγγας 
πολλαχῇ κατετέτμητὀ διεσπάσθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν θᾶσσον οἱ δὲ βραδύτερον προσανῄεσαν.  
 
60 App. Mith. 6.42: Ἀρχελάῳ δὲ κρημνοὶ περιέκειντο, οἳ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ εἴων ἐν οὐδενὶ κοινὸν ὅλου τοῦ 




in which he was so effective.61  Heavy infantry, the first pillar in the Roman “way of war,” thus 
began to crumble when dispatched to hilly and mountainous regions (especially if we also 
consider the limitations which rugged topography imposed on the sophisticated logistical 
systems that maintained large Roman armies in the field).62  In isolation, this phenomenon might 
have little impact on the Romans’ military success.  While our sources rarely pay them much 
attention, Rome could call upon the services of light troops (although Onasander could easily 
imagine a scenario in which heavy formations operated without skirmisher support).63 If nothing 
else, legionaries could unburden themselves of their armor and fight (perhaps uncomfortably) as 
light infantry.  Moreover, Roman troops were hardly impotent in individual and small group 
combat, as Polybius takes care to note.64  By the imperial period, these long-service professionals 
were better fighters, man-for-man, than their typical opponents.   
However, rough terrain also weakened a second component of Rome’s “way of war:” the 
ability to achieve decisive battle.  Rough terrain made it difficult to compel an unwilling enemy 
to fight, to close with a weaker opponent to deliver a decisive blow, and to turn success on the 
field into a devastating rout. 
                                                          
61 On Roman collective training, see especially Joseph. BJ 3.70-74.  While Bannard 2015 argues that 
collective drill was an innovation of the imperial period, Polyb. 6.19-42 suggests that even in its absence 
the Romans placed a premium on well-disciplined formation fighting.  Cf. Goldsworthy 1996, 171-247. 
 
62 On logistical challenges of mountain combat—an important topic, largely omitted here for reasons of 
space—see App. BCiv. 4.12.100; Caes. BCiv. 3.42; Polyb. 3.60.  On Roman logistics generally, see 
Erdkamp 1998; Roth 1999.  
 
63 Onas. 20. 
 
64 Polyb. 18.30-32. 
36 
 
With the topos of the descent to the plain, we have already seen how broken ground made 
it difficult to force decisive combat with an unwilling enemy.  This stock narrative presupposes 
that when an enemy refuses to descend to a “fair” battleground, his opponent cannot simply or 
painlessly defeat him on the hills where he stands.  To give one example, this strategic logic 
underlies Fabius Cunctator’s famous plan to defeat Hannibal in the Second Punic War, holding 
the high ground “at a moderate distance from the enemy, so as neither to lose touch nor yet come 
to blows with him.”65  Livy’s narrative makes sense only if the reader accepts the implicit 
premise that hills give a general who does not want to fight the option of simply avoiding battle.  
Even in the aftermath of his greatest triumph, Hannibal recognized that the risks of taking the 
battle to his unwilling opponent are unacceptably high. 
Even if battle could be joined, our sources recognized that rough terrain made it harder 
for the already ponderous Roman infantry to close with its opponents successfully, in particular 
when the enemy relied on skirmishers and missile troops.  Numerous authors give evocative 
stock-descriptions of the suffering of Roman soldiers, pinned down under harassing fire from 
lightly-armed foes.  Caesar, describing combat in Britain, writes, “it was clear that in all such 
fighting our infantry, by reason of their heavy armament, since they could neither pursue a 
retiring enemy nor venture far from the standards, were poorly matched with an enemy of this 
kind.”66  Cassius Dio reports similar peril for Caesar’s men fighting in Sicily against Sextus 
Pompey, whose light infantry and cavalry were content to harass Caesar’s men with missiles and 
                                                          
65 Livy, 22.12: Fabius per loca alta agmen ducebat, modico ab hoste interuallo ut neque omitteret eum 
neque congrederetur.  See similar examples in Polyaen. 1.38.2, 8.5.  
 
66 Caes. BGall. 5.16: nostros propter gravitatem armorum, quod neque insequi cedentes possent neque ab 
signis discedere auderent, minus aptos esse ad huius generis hostem.  Similar examples appear in 5.34-
35.  Cf. Livy, 22.18, 26.10, 44.4. 
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sudden charges, and then retreated before Caesar’s heavier formations could retaliate: “[Caesar’s 
soldiers] were suffering many injuries and could inflict none in return; for, in case they made a 
rush upon any of [the enemy], they would put them to flight, to be sure, but not being able to 
carry their pursuit to the end, they would find themselves in a worse plight during their retreat, 
since by their sortie they would become isolated.”67 
The tactical mismatch of heavy infantry and troops with ranged weapons need not be 
confined to broken ground (and indeed, neither of the examples above makes explicit reference 
to terrain).  Yet the obstacles which rough terrain imposed on heavy formations only exacerbated 
the threat posed by skirmishers.  Even the military neophytes among Roman authors must have 
known that elevated firing positions increased the range and lethality of missile weapons.68  
Livy, with the characteristic heroic exaggeration of his early books, reports how a citadel could 
suppress assaults from below: “from a height like this three men would be enough to keep back a 
multitude, however numerous...”69  On the other hand, without sufficient stores of ranged 
weapons, heavy troops on an exposed hilltop presented an easy target for archers below.  Caesar 
reports that as he attempted to fortify hilltops at Dyrrachium, “many of our men were wounded, 
and a great dread of the arrows gripped them."70  Livy records a similar dilemma for soldiers in 
the Macedonian Wars, when Perseus surrounded a detachment of Romans on an isolated hilltop: 
                                                          
67 Dio Cass. 49.6: κἀκ τούτου ἔπασχον μὲν πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἀντέδρων δὲ οὐδέν: εἰ γάρ που καὶ ἐπᾴξειάν 
τισιν, ἔτρεπον μὲν αὐτούς, πέρα δ᾽ οὐ δυνάμενοι διώκειν χαλεπωτέρους σφᾶς ἐν τῇ ἀναστροφῇ, ἅτε καὶ 
μονούμενοι ταῖς ἐκδρομαῖς, εἶχον. 
 
68 Veg. 3.13 is explicit on this point.  See also Polyaen. 1.1.2, 2.38.2; Polyb. 10.30. 
 
69 Livy, 9.24: hoc quidem ascensu vel tres armati quamlibet multitudinem arcuerint.  Cf. App. BCiv. 
4.16.125; Dio Cass. 36.48-49, 49.20; Front. Strat. 2.2.4; Livy, 9.35; Tac. Hist. 4.71. 
 




“A terrific threat surrounded the Romans, for when massed they could not thrust back those who 
were struggling up the hill, and whenever they broke ranks by charging forward, they were 
exposed to javelins and arrows.”71   
As our sources imagine it, broken ground made it difficult or impossible for heavy 
infantry formations to close with and destroy lighter skirmishers.  At the same time, it reduced or 
eliminated the role of cavalry, and thus robbed the Romans of their best defense against such 
opponents.72  Our sources frequently assume that hills and mountains were fundamentally 
unsuitable for Roman and non-Roman cavalry alike: as noted above, both Onasander and 
Vegetius make this factor central to the proper choice of battlefield.73  Livy is similarly explicit 
on this point; before the Battle of the River Trebia, he has the Romans “moved their camp onto 
higher ground, where hills made it more difficult for cavalry to operate.”74  In Frontinus, a 
similar assumption underlies Agesilaus’ ruse against the Persians, when he “pretended to make 
for Caria, as though likely to fight more advantageously in mountain districts against an enemy 
strong in cavalry.”75  In Dio’s account of the aftermath of Carrhae, the Persians hesitate to enter 
the mountains against the retreating Crassus, because “the higher ground…was inaccessible to 
                                                          
71 Livy, 42.65: Ingens Romanos terror circumstabat; nam neque conferti propellere eos qui in tumulum 
conitebantur poterant et, ubi ordines procursando solvissent, patebant iaculis sagittisque. Cf. 38.19-21, 
38.26. 
 
72 Onas. 6.7-8 directly recommends cavalry screens, especially on terrain likely to conceal an ambush. 
 
73 Onas 31; Veg. Mil. 2.1, 3.6.  See also Plut. Luc. 15.3-4, Crass. 19.2, 22.3; Polyaen. 4.6.6 (though note a 
contrary example in 4.3.21); Polyb. 1.30, 1.32, 1.84.  Strabo refers to horses specially trained for 
mountain warfare: 3.4.15. 
 
74 Livy, 21.48: iam in loca altiora collesque impeditiores equiti castra movet. See also 21.57, 32.12, 
38.26, 43.21, 44.5. 
 
75 Front. Strat. 1.8.12: Cariam se petere simulavit, quasi aptius locis montuosis adversus hostem equitatu 
praevalentem pugnaturus. See similar strategic logic in 1.1.6, 2.5.18, 4.7.21. 
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horses.”76  Tacitus sees Roman cavalry falter on broken ground at the Battle of Mons Graupius, 
and notes in the Histories that Vespasian’s army chose to base itself in Verona, “because there 
are open plains about it suited to the operations of cavalry, in which their chief strength lay.”77  
In short, in our sources’ topographic imagination, hills and horses do not mix, and without 
screening forces of cavalry, Roman heavy infantry could be left at the mercy of lighter 
opponents.78 
The removal of cavalry support on broken ground not only left Rome’s heavy infantry 
with limited options to ward off enemy skirmishers, but made it difficult or impossible to 
effectively pursue and annihilate beaten opponents.  By casting off weapons and armor, a 
defeated opponent could outpace Roman pursuers on foot; it was thanks to horsemen that 
“mopping-up” operations in the aftermath of battle typically generated the most casualties among 
the defeated army.79  As we will see later in this chapter, the topos of beaten opponents melting 
away into the mountains in part reflects the advantages that such terrain gave to fleeing natives 
familiar with the local topography. 
On the whole, stock descriptions of ancient combat reveal their authors’ belief that 
broken ground disrupted Rome’s preferred methods of fighting.  Whatever irregulars the empire 
might press into service, broken ground defanged the heavy infantry which formed the core of 
                                                          
76 Dio Cass. 40.26: ὁ Σουρήνας, καὶ φοβηθεὶς μὴ μεταστάντες ποι αὖθίς σφισι προσπολεμῶσι, 
προσβαλεῖν μὲν πρὸς τὰ μετέωρα ἄφιππα.  See also 48.41, 49.19. 
 
77 Tac. Agr. 36, Hist. 3.8: Verona potior visa, patentibus circum campis ad pugnam equestrem, qua 
praevalebant. See also App. Mith. 6.42, 12.80-81. 
 
78 Caesar’s successful use of cavalry on the hills at the Battle of Ilerda is an exception, though even here 
Caesar’s commentary suggests that this action was unusual and impressive.  Caes. BCiv. 1.45-46. 
 
79 Sabin 2000.  For a vivid description of cavalry riding down a defeated foe (in this case, Regulus’ 
Romans, routed by Xanthippus in Africa), see Polyb. 1.34.   
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the Romans’ military strength.  It also prevented decisive victory by reducing Rome’s ability to 
corral its opponents into open combat, to get close enough to break their spirit with the 
disciplined brutality of heavy infantry, and to run down retreating foes in order to destroy their 
ability to regroup and resist.  Crudely put, rugged terrain usually made the Roman army worse at 
fighting.  It also made the typical targets of Roman violence better; equally important in 
explaining Rome’s discomfort with hill and mountain warfare, this perception is the subject of 
the next section.  
 
Section Three: Home Field Advantage: Broken Ground and Evening the Odds 
 
 Regardless of its effects on Rome’s own soldiers, ancient authors believed that broken 
ground increased the military capacity of the Romans’ most common opponents during their 
wars to expand and maintain the empire.  Though incapable of defeating the Romans on the 
“fair” battlefield of the plains, these enemies nonetheless reaped an important “home field 
advantage” when defending rugged homelands against imperial invasion.  It was one that, under 
the right topographical conditions, allowed them not only to survive Roman incursions, but also 
to inflict staggering losses on their would-be rulers.    
 In particular, ancient authors recognized how broken ground worked against the Romans 
in what I will refer to as “imperial warfare:” military action (under the republic and principate 
alike) meant to extend or maintain control over foreign peoples and territories.  Such imperial 
warfare was not the type of conflict that most interested our sources, who typically preferred the 
grand drama of civil wars and foreign invasions.  Yet for our purposes here, wars in which Rome 
sought to exert its authority over foreigners naturally take center stage. 
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 In the military worldview of our sources, Rome suffered from two disadvantages in 
imperial warfare, both of them exacerbated by broken ground, and both stemming from the fact 
that Rome’s mission in such wars was fundamentally offensive.  For all the sophistication of 
Romans’ defensive architecture, the imposition of control frequently required Roman soldiers to 
project military force outwards from their garrisons into hostile territory, traveling as aggressors 
to their battlefields.  In this scenario, enemies fighting in or near their own homelands typically 
had superior local knowledge, as well as better opportunity to seize ideal defensive positions in 
advance of the Romans’ arrival. 
 Let us begin with the issue of local intelligence, in particular the understanding of the 
physical space in which a campaign or battle was to be waged.  While not exclusive to warfare 
on broken ground, local knowledge was especially significant there, given that the undulation of 
the landscape can conceal any number of pitfalls, and a commander who wanders into an ambush 
may see his army annihilated without a chance to defend itself.80  To be sure, the Romans could 
sometimes obtain local intelligence by purchase or coercion.81  In Livy’s account of the Battle of 
the River Aous, the Romans are shown a way to outflank Philip V’s forces by a shepherd who 
“said he had been accustomed to pasture his flocks in the valley which the king's camp then 
occupied, and knew all the tracks and paths of those hills.”82  Appian has Lucullus execute a 
similar maneuver in his war with Mithridates: “he found a hunter in a cave who was familiar 
                                                          
80 For example, in the Roman disaster at the Caudine Forks (Livy, 9.2-3). 
 
81 Despite the examples of success below, locals could mislead the Romans either through ignorance (e.g. 
Strabo, 11.13.4; Veg. Mil. 3.6) or through treachery (Plut. Crass. 21.2, 22.4; Strabo, 16.4.23).  
 
82 Livy, 32.11: is se in eo saltu, qui regiis tum teneretur castris, armentum pascere solitum ait omnes 




with the mountain paths. With him for a guide he made a circuitous descent by rugged paths over 
Mithridates’ head.”83   
 Nevertheless, local intelligence was primarily the preserve of Rome’s foes in imperial 
warfare.  Caesar, describing his wars in Germany, demonstrates a clear understanding of just 
how dangerous guerrilla opponents could be when they fought on their own, rough terrain: “Each 
man had settled where a hidden valley or a wooded locality or an entangled morass offered some 
hope of defense or security. These localities were known to the dwellers round about, and thus 
the matter required great care, not for the protection of the army as a whole…but for the 
preservation of single soldiers.”84  A similar imbalance in local knowledge plagues Gauis 
Manlius’ forces in Livy’s account, where a Roman army marching through the mountains of 
Thrace is ambushed by locals, and “betrayed by the unfavorable ground, since the barbarians 
charged them over familiar paths…”85 
Where Caesar and Livy see spatial knowledge magnifying locals’ capacity to strike over 
broken ground, in Tacitus the same knowledge enables flight in the face of a superior foe (a topic 
I return to in the next section).  Although victorious in the Maritime Alps, Otho’s troops were 
                                                          
83 App. Mith. 12.80: ηὗρεν ἐν σπηλαίῳ κυνηγὸν ὀρείων ἀτραπῶν ἐπιστήμονα, ᾧ χρώμενος ἡγεμόνι κατὰ 
ὁδοὺς ἀτριβεῖς περιῆλθεν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τοῦ Μιθριδάτου… The Romans were not the only army to rely 
on local guides to help direct military operations: see similar tactics used by Hannibal in Livy, 22.13, and 
by the Aetolians in Livy, 31.42. 
 
84 Caes. BGall. 6.34: Vbi cuique aut valles abdita aut locus silvestris aut palus impedita spem praesidi aut 
salutis aliquam offerebat, consederat. Haec loca vicinitatibus erant nota, magnamque res diligentiam 
requirebat non in summa exercitus tuenda (nullum enim poterat universis a perterritis ac dispersis 
periculum accidere), sed in singulis militibus conservandis. 
 
85 Livy, 38.40: Romanos iniquitas locorum barbaris per calles notas occursantibus…prodebat.  See also 




unable to take prisoners, “since the people were fleet of foot and familiar with the locality.”86  
Without such local knowledge, Roman troops could expect to be less fortunate if defeated.  In 
Agricola’s speech before the Battle of Mons Graupius, he reminds his men that defeat on foreign 
soil means disaster: “we have neither the same knowledge of locality, nor the same abundance of 
supplies; but we have our hands and swords, and therein we have everything.”87  As our sources 
see it, inferior topographic knowledge was a price that the Romans and similarly expansionist 
powers paid for their imperial ambition.88  Imperial wars were fought, for the most part, in 
spaces which the local enemy understood better than the distant empire intent on subduing them.  
*** 
 Local knowledge forms the first facet of the “home field advantage” which our sources 
ascribe to the opponents of imperial rule.  It also contributed to the second: not only did Rome’s 
enemies understand the physical nature of their battlefields better, but they also usually arrived in 
these spaces before the Romans, and thus had the opportunity to translate their knowledge of the 
ground into a prepared defense.  In the military imagination of our literary sources, the enemy 
was generally waiting when the Romans arrived; on broken ground, they held the hilltops, 
ridgelines, and passes.  From these positions, even relatively weak opponents posed a serious 
threat. 
                                                          
86 Tac. Hist. 2.13: nec capi poterant, pernix genus et gnari locorum. The Fidenates make a similar escape 
in Livy, 4.19. 
 
87 Tac. Agr. 33: neque enim nobis aut locorum eadem notitia aut commeatuum eadem abundantia, sed 
manus et arma et in his omnia. 
 
88 Hannibal’s enemies possessed superior local knowledge during his crossing of the Alps (Livy, 21.33).  




  While they are rarely explicit on questions of tactics and strategy, our ancient sources 
nevertheless possessed a clear set of “rules” governing uphill and downhill combat, expectations 
that naturally favored prepared defenders on the heights rather than their attackers below.89  Livy 
provides an evocative description of a Thracian assault downhill: “without hurling a weapon 
from their higher position, and merely flinging their naked bodies down, they could have 
overwhelmed us.”90 Dio describes a similar phenomenon during Caesar’s Gallic Wars; 
entrenched on the heights of Gergovia, the Gauls “could both safely remain in position, and, if 
they charged down, would usually have the advantage.”91 Caesar ascribes this basic topographic 
logic—that high ground confers advantages on those who hold it—to the Gauls themselves, who 
“supposed that, because of the disadvantage of [the Roman] position, since they themselves 
would charge down from the heights into the valley and hurl their missiles, not even their first 
onset could be withstood.”92 
By the same token, our sources recognize the difficulties of attacking a hilltop position 
from below.  In his own account, even Caesar could not dislodge the Gauls from Gergovia, and 
                                                          
89 Vegetius is our most direct author on this point: Veg. Mil. 3.6, 3.13.  See also Polyaen. 1.1.8, 4.3.27, 
4.17; Polyb. 2.3, 4.12, 18.25. 
 
90 Livy, 38.46: ut non tela ex superiore loco mitterent, sed corpora sua nuda inicerent, obruere nos 
potuerunt.  The expectation of a similar advantage drives the young men of Thaumaci to launch a reckless 
downhill assault against the Romans during the war against Antiochus in Livy, 36.14. 
 
91 Dio Cass. 40.36: καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι πέριξ αὐτὸ πάντα τὰ μετέωρα κατειληφότες περιεφρούρουν, ὥστε καὶ 
μένειν αὐτοῖς κατὰ χώραν ἀσφαλῶς ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐπικαταθέουσι πλεονεκτεῖν τὰ πλείω. 
 
92 Caes. BGall. 3.2: tum etiam, quod propter iniquitatem loci, cum ipsi ex montibus in vallem decurrerent 
et tela coicerent, ne primum quidem impetum suum posse sustineri existimabant.  On the tactical 
advantage of downhill charges for Rome’s enemies, see also Caes. BGall. 7.85; Dio Cass. 39.3; Livy, 




fell back with heavy casualties.93  Appian similarly uses the advantages of a prepared opponent 
on broken ground to explain a Roman detachment’s defeat by Antiochus III at Thermopylae, 
when it is repulsed assaulting the hills which overlook the famous pass.94  For Livy, attacking 
uphill is the sign of a foolish commander, and likely to lead to military disaster.  When the 
armies of Veii occupy the Janiculum hill, the Roman consul “was so reckless as to lead his army 
up the Janiculum to the enemy's camp, and after suffering a more disgraceful repulse than he had 
administered the day before, owed his own rescue and that of his army to the arrival of his 
colleague.”95  Indeed, our sources make avoiding uphill combat the mark of a prudent 
commander, as in Caesar’s narrative of his siege at Avaricum, and in Frontinus’ account of the 
Sertorian war.96  The difficulty and futility of uphill assaults is most poetically captured by Livy 
in the semi-mythical Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks (ostensibly in 321 BCE).  In the shadow 
of overhanging hills held by the Samnite army, the Romans lament: “So long as these ridges 
shall tower over you, how shall you come at the enemy?  Armed and unarmed, the brave and the 
cowardly, we are all alike captured and beaten men.  The foe will not even draw his sword on us, 
that we may die with honor; he will end the war by sitting still.”97 
                                                          
93 Caes. BGall. 7.48-51. 
 
94 App. Syr. 4.18. 
 
95 Livy, 2.51: temere adverso Ianiculo ad castra hostium aciem erexit, foediusque inde pulsus quam 
pridie pepulerat, interventu collegae ipse exercitusque est servatus. Livy uses the difficulties of uphill 
assaults to explain similar Roman defeats in 22.28, 28.16, 32.10, 33.7, 33.9. 
 
96 Caes. BGall. 4.23, 7.19.  See also Caes. BCiv. 3.85, where Caesar refuses to attack uphill against 
Pompey before the Battle of Pharsalus. A similar narrative appears in Front. Strat. 2.5.31. 
 
97 Livy, 9.3: dum haec imminebunt iuga, qua tu ad hostem venias? armati inermes, fortes ignavi, pariter 
omnes capti atque victi sumus; ne ferrum quidem ad bene moriendum oblaturus est hostis; sedens bellum 
conficiet. See also 27.27, 27.48.  Our authors did not restrict the difficulty of uphill assaults to the 




This same logic surrounding the defensive advantages of hill-combat appears in the 
common literary topos of the “impregnable” citadel, a stock image that alternately provides a 
rhetorical example of the Romans’ indomitable will to win and an explanation for defeat and 
compromise in the face of local resistance.  In the former case, hill and mountaintop 
fortifications serve in numerous accounts as trials for Roman determination and ingenuity.  The 
Romans were masters of relentless siege-craft, and authors highlight their tenacity with 
narratives such as Augustus’ conquest of the Dalmatian fortress at Promona, Tiberius’ victory 
over the Pannonians at Andetrium, or the Roman triumph over the last Jewish rebels at 
Masada.98  Similarly common is the topos of the fortified city that falls through a combination of 
its own overconfidence in its elevated position and the daring of Roman soldiers (in particular 
the auxiliaries and irregulars).  Thus in one of Frontinus’ stratagems from the Jugurthine Wars, 
Marius captures a city when an auxiliary forager finds a path up a cliff face, seemingly so 
impassable that the enemy left it unguarded.99  Scipio (later Africanus) launched a similar attack 
against the rebellious Spanish city of Illiturgi, sending a band of deserters against the citadel 
“from the side on which it appeared to be impregnable.”100  This stock narrative reappears in 
Livy’s account of the Gallic sack of Rome, where Gauls and Romans alike assume (as it 
happens, incorrectly) that the steep sides of the Capitoline could not be scaled.101  The fact that in 
each of these cases the “impregnable” citadel fell to siege or assault need not distract from the 
                                                          
98 Respectively, App. Ill. 5.25-26; Dio Cass. 56.12-14; Joseph. BJ  7.280-406.  For other examples of 
successful assaults on mountainous cities and citadels, see Livy, 3.18, 9.24, 31.27, 43.19.  
 
99 Front. Strat. 3.9.3.  See also 1.5.21. 
 
100 Livy, 28.19-20: ab ea parte qua inexpugnabilis videbatur. Appian BCiv. 4.7.56 gives a very similar 
story from the fighting against Sextus Pompey’s forces in North Africa. 
 
101 Livy, 5.46-47.  See also Plut. Cam. 25.2; 27.1; Polyaen. 4.3.29 
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shared belief in our sources that such fortifications were very difficult to seize.  Our authors find 
these incidents so noteworthy precisely because they defy the normal expectations surrounding 
the security of elevated citadels. 
Indeed, while our sources are typically loath to admit limitations on Roman power, in 
numerous places they recognize that strongholds on rough terrain altered the strategic calculus of 
force and control, allowing rebels and malcontents to improve their bargaining position with 
imperial authorities, or to hold out by driving up the costs to subdue them by siege.102  While it is 
difficult to disentangle what proportion of these fortresses’ defensive capabilities came from the 
natural terrain, as opposed to its modification by military architecture, it is clear that the 
combination was lethal to Rome’s imperial ambitions (and the soldiers tasked with fulfilling 
them).  Cassius Dio describes how the Cantabri and Astures of Spain temporarily foiled 
Augustus’ expansionist designs: “these peoples would neither yield to him, because they were 
confident on account of their strongholds, nor would they come to close quarters…”103  Appian 
similarly imagines the impact of mountain strongpoints on successful resistance: he describes 
how Roman conquests at Numantia, Carthage, and the Iapydian capital of Metulum were all 
delayed thanks to the fortification of broken ground, while a 2nd century BCE assault against a 
Dalmatian stronghold was called off entirely when the city’s elevated position prevented the 
Romans from bringing up siege engines.104 
                                                          
102 They were only helped in such negotiations by the typical poverty of mountainous regions, which 
correspondingly reduced the rewards of military intervention.  I return to this subject briefly at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
103 Dio Cass. 53.25: …καὶ ἐπειδὴ μήτε προσεχώρουν οἱ ἅτε ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐρυμνοῖς ἐπαιρόμενοι, μήτε ἐς 
χεῖρας…ᾖσαν… 
 
104 Respectively, App. Hisp. 13.76, Pun. 19.130, Ill. 2.11, 4.19. 
48 
 
Livy similarly testifies to the ways in which broken-ground fortifications enabled 
relatively weak defenders to avoid or delay defeat, and to strike favorable bargains with their 
opponents.105  While in his most telling examples it is Rome’s allies who benefit in their 
struggles with the likes of Carthage and Macedon, these stories nevertheless reveal Livy’s 
broader attitude about the relationship between fortification, terrain, and control.106  In his 
account of the Punic Wars, Livy makes the political impact of mountain strongpoints explicit 
when the Italian city of Croton holds out against the Bruttians and their Carthaginian allies: 
thanks to the impenetrability of its elevated stronghold, the Crotonians are able to negotiate their 
surrender on favorable terms.107  Later, the Aetolians holed-up in Thaumaci are able to preserve 
their security and independence against Philip precisely because they can defend themselves 
from an elevated fortress, driving up the cost of victory beyond what their opponent is willing to 
bear.  “The city [Thaumaci] is defended both by its lofty site and by the fact that it lies on cliffs 
with steep descents on all sides.  These difficulties, together with the fact that it was scarcely a 
due reward for so much effort and risk, induced Philip to abandon [the siege].”108  
                                                          
105 I return to this theme below, in Chapter Three’s discussion of Vespasian’s war in Galilee. 
 
106 Note, however, Livy’s accounts of mountain citadels holding out (at least temporarily) against Roman 
aggression: 10.9-10, 24.34, 32.18. 
 
107 Livy, 24.3. 
 
108 Livy, 32.3: nec altitudine solum tuta urbs, sed quod saxo undique absciso rupibus imposita est. hae 
difficultates et quod haud satis dignum tanti laboris periculique pretium erat, ut absisteret incepto 
Philippus, effecerunt.  The Romans themselves directly benefitted at times from mountain fortresses; see 
Livy, 5.43, where the height of the Capitoline enables early Rome’s survival against invading Gauls, and 
24.37, where the lofty citadel of Henna in Sicily allows the Roman garrison holding it to wage an 
effective counterinsurgency against an uprising in the city below. 
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In his discussions of cities (even fortified ones) located in the plains, Livy casts the 
strength of broken-ground fortifications into stark relief.109  His writings reflect the belief that 
without the protection of rough terrain, urban settlements were ripe for imperial exploitation.  
Livy thus explains Rome’s easy conquest of the towns of Luceria (a Roman army “captured the 
city—situated as it was in a plain—at the first attack”) or Oricum (“that city, situated in a plain 
and not strong either in walls or armed men, had been taken by assault).”110 He ascribes the same 
strategic logic to Antiochus III, who believed that the cities of Asia, “either because they were 
situated on level ground, or because they did not trust their walls or their weapons or their 
fighting men, would readily accept his yoke.”111 While the conquest of plains cities did not 
always prove so easy, despite the expectations of would-be conquerors, what matters here are the 
assumptions Livy makes about the impact of terrain on combat.112 In the strategic logic of the 
commanders who appear throughout his narrative, locations in the plains are seen as readily 
accessible to military force.  On the other hand, fortified sites on broken ground are less 
accessible, less vulnerable, and therefore less likely to bend to imperial will.113 
*** 
                                                          
109 See for instance Livy, 39.2, 39.53.  
 
110 Respectively, Livy, 9.26: haud procul inde exercitus Romanus erat, cuius primo impetu urbs sita in 
plano capitur.  24.40: eamque urbem, sitam in plano neque moenibus neque viris atque armis validam, 
primo impetu oppressam esse.  See also 25.14. 
 
111 Livy, 33.38: aut quia locis planis positae erant aut quia parum moenibus armisque ac iuventuti 
fidebant, haud difficulter videbat iugum accepturas. 
 
112 Livy, 23.45, 25.11, 27.39.  
 
113 For similar calculations of vulnerability and resistance in the Hellenistic world, note Polyb. 5.62. 
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To recap, in the military worldview of our ancient sources, broken ground provided local 
defenders with significant advantages by rewarding their superior local intelligence and prepared 
defensive positions.  To put it simply, local defenders knew where to go, and tended to get there 
first.  That this combination could be tactically decisive is particularly evident if we turn to two 
of the most common topoi from which ancient authors constructed their battle narratives: the 
battle in the pass and the broken-ground ambush.  In each case, our sources envision how the 
combination of prepared and knowledgeable defenders with the topographical possibilities of 
hills and mountains could prove lethal to Roman soldiers and Roman authority alike.  
The battle in the pass is a stock narrative (without doubt based on a frequent military 
strategy) in which an outnumbered or outmatched force uses a mountain pass to its defensive 
advantage.  In some cases, defenders deployed along a narrow front, protecting their flanks and 
negating the advantages of their numerically superior foes.  Thus, in battle with Caesar’s legions, 
the broken ground surrounding Ilerda gave its Pompeian defenders a distinct advantage, as the 
battlefield “extended only so far in width as just to give room for three cohorts drawn up in battle 
array, so that supports could not be sent up on the flanks nor could cavalry be of any use if the 
men were in difficulties.”114  In other cases, defenders could strike at an enemy in the pass from 
the surrounding heights, pinning them down with ranged weapons as they attempted to march 
through the defile.  The Jewish victory over Rome at Beth Horon, to which I return in Chapter 
Three, indicates the dangers which such a tactic could pose.  
                                                          
114 Caes. BCiv. 1.45: praeruptus locus erat utraque ex parte derectus, ac tantum in latitudinem patebat, ut 
tres instructae cohortes eum locum explerent, ut neque subsidia a lateribus submitti neque equites 
laborantibus usui esse possent. Scipio’s troops take similar advantage of a narrow and rugged battlefield 
fighting the Second Punic War in Spain.  Livy, 28.33.  This tactic is especially frequent among 
Polyaenus’ stratagems:  1.1.3; 1.1.49; 2.1.24; 2.1.25; 2.3.9; 3.9.33; 4.2.8; 4.2.14; 4.3.21; 4.3.27; 4.9.5; 
4.14; 5.10.3; 5.16.1; 7.15.5; 7.27.1; 8.23.2.    
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In either case, the motifs of the battle in the pass had their roots in a basic reality of the 
military landscape, well understood by ancient authors: movement over broken ground was 
difficult and sometimes impossible, and, as a result, rugged terrain channeled the movements of 
armies in predictable ways.115  In the context of Roman imperial warfare, such landscapes 
allowed enemies to anticipate the Romans’ movements, to occupy narrow passes and their 
surrounding heights in advance, and thereby to force Roman armies either to fight at a severe 
tactical disadvantage or to abandon their objectives.116 
Such stock-combat appears frequently in our sources, usually to the Romans’ 
disadvantage.  The most famous Roman battle in the pass ended in disaster at the Caudine 
Forks.117  Livy’s narrative here is no less valuable for its heavily fictionalized content; it reflects 
the idea, deeply rooted in Rome’s military mythology, that the dynamics of warfare on broken 
ground did not favor the aggressors.118  Similarly, in Livy’s tale of the 2nd century BCE war in 
Aetolia, a Roman force abandons its march against Chalcis, “when [the commander] saw that the 
pass was held by the enemy.”119  Later, during the war against Antiochus III, a Roman army 
turns back from an assault on Naupactus when the enemy blocks the naturally fearsome pass at 
Mt. Chorax.120   Against Perseus, the Romans avoid Macedonian-controlled passages by a brutal 
                                                          
115 There are countless references to this phenomenon in ancient military narratives—Hannibal’s 
miserable crossing of the Alps is perhaps the best known: App. Hann. 1.4; Livy, 21.29-37.   
 
116 On the dangers presented by such a tactic to Roman ambition, see especially Onas. 7.1. 
 
117 Livy, 9.2-3. 
 
118 Onas. 11.3 outlines a theoretical, stock type battle closely resembling the Caudine Forks. 
 
119 Livy, 35.50: qui, postquam ab hostibus obsessas fauces vidit, omisso ad Aulidem itinere Delium 
convertit. 
 
120 Livy, 37.4.  See also 36.30. 
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march across the mountains, only to find their forces divided and trapped by the enemy.121  
When Dio narrates Antony’s disastrous campaign in Armenia, the triumvir finds himself 
hemmed in when “the barbarians seized the passes in advance of their approach, blocking some 
with trenches, others with palisades…”122  In famous cases such as the Battle of the River Aous 
and the Romans’ own battle at Thermopylae against Antiochus III, victory came only through 
successful flanking maneuvers, not through forcing the narrow passes themselves.123  And 
indeed, Frontinus recognized seizing occupied defiles as such a systemic military problem that 
he presented a series of stratagems to overcome it.124     
Like the battle in the pass topos, the stock narrative of the broken-ground ambush reflects 
a Roman awareness that rugged terrain, and particularly the way it channeled movement into 
easily defensible defiles, expanded the military capabilities of otherwise outclassed enemies, 
enabling them to better defend their homelands against Roman military force and political 
subjugation.  In the military worldview of our sources, broken ground was one of the most 
important elements that allowed for ambushes and increased their lethality (particularly when 
                                                          
121 Livy, 44.4-6.  According to Livy, the Roman army escapes disaster only because Perseus panics and 
flees.  Brutus and Cassius attempt a similar tactic with greater success in App. BCiv. 4.13.102-104. 
 
122 Dio Cass. 49.28: οἱ βάρβαροι τὰ στενόπορα αὐτῶν προκαταλαμβάνοντες τὰ μὲν ἀπέσκαπτον τὰ δὲ 
ἀπεσταύρουν.  For further examples of the strategic importance of passes, valleys, and defiles, see App. 
Hann. 2.9, Pun. 6.36, BCiv. 1.10.90, 4.11.87, 5.3.20, 5.12.116; Caes. BGall. 1.6, 1.9, 3.1, BCiv. 1.65-66; 
Dio Cass. 37.2, 55.34; Livy, 9.43, 22.13, 22.15, 23.33, 26.17, 26.25, 27.46, 31.23, 31.28, 32.5-6, 33.15, 
35.4, 35.11, 35.28, 42.54; Tac. Hist. 3.1-2, 3.35, 3.50, 3.55, 4.55, 4.70. 
 
123 On the River Aous, see Livy, 32.9, 32.21.  On Thermopylae, see App. Syr. 4.17; Livy, 36.15-16.  
While we do possess some examples in which Rome wins a “battle in the pass” through frontal assault, 
these are the exceptions, not the rule: Caes. BCiv. 1.37; Dio Cass. 41.20, 48.41; Livy, 28.5, 31.39, 40.39.  
For a similarly exceptional example from Alexander’s campaigns in India: Polyaen. 4.3.21. 
 
124 Front. Strat. 1.4.3-7. 
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heavy vegetation provided additional concealment).125  To be sure, ambushes on rugged terrain 
were not solely the preserve of Rome’s “barbarian” opponents, and on numerous occasions we 
see surprise attacks working in the Romans’ favor.  Frontinus presents multiple stratagems where 
Roman troops concealed in “hidden valleys,” and “rough ground” spring upon their unsuspecting 
enemies with deadly result.126  According to Appian, while fighting on Sulla’s side in the first 
civil war, a young Pompey “fell upon [the enemy] from ambush in a defile, defeated them, killed 
a large number, and surrounded the remainder on a hill.”127  Livy relates numerous clashes where 
Roman commanders concealed ambuscades on broken ground; shortly before the Battle of the 
Metaurus River, for instance, a Roman commander hid several cohorts behind a ridge, from 
which they attacked Hannibal’s rear and put his army to flight.128  
At the same time, ancient authors use the broken ground ambush to explain some of 
Roman’s greatest defeats.  At the River Trebia, Livy has Hannibal set a trap for the Romans in “a 
water-course, shut in by very high banks on either side and overgrown all round with marsh-
grass and the underbrush and brambles with which uncultivated land is usually clothed.”129  
                                                          
125 It is not always easy to disentangle within our sources the relative importance of rugged terrain and 
vegetation in concealing ambushes.  See in particular App. BCiv. 4.13.103-104; Dio Cass. 40.21; Front. 
Strat. 2.5.17, 2.5.33; Livy, 27.41, 38.41; Onas. 6.7-8; Polyaen. 8.23.7; Polyb. 3.71.  In practice, 
substantially broken ground and heavy vegetation would often have gone hand-in-hand, with hills and 
mountains remaining forested in antiquity because they were (usually) less productive to put under 
cultivation than the plains below. 
 
126 Respectively, Front. Strat. 2.5.37 and 2.5.35.  See also 2.3.14, 2.5.33-34. 
 
127 App. BCiv. 1.10.90: οἷς ὁ Πομπήιος ἐξ ἐνέδρας ἐν στενῷ προσπεσὼν τρέπεταί τε καὶ πολλοὺς 
διαφθείρας ἐς λόφον συνέκλεισε τοὺς λοιπούς. See a similar ambush in Pun. 6.36. 
 
128 Livy, 27.41.  See also 25.39, 28.13, 28.33. 
 
129 Livy, 21.54: rivus praealtis utrimque clausus ripis et circa obsitus palustribus herbis, et quibus inculta 
ferme vestiuntur, virgultis vepribusque. 
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Troops hidden in this ravine struck the fatal blow to the Roman rear, setting in motion their 
ultimate defeat.  In Livy’s account of the battle at Lake Trasimene, Hannibal found “a spot 
naturally designed for ambushes.”130 Concealing his soldiers in the mountains which overhang 
the lake, Hannibal trapped the Roman army along a narrow stretch of shore and annihilated 
them.  In Dio’s description of the Battle of Carrhae, “the Parthians confronted the Romans with 
most of their army hidden; for the ground was uneven in spots and wooded.”131  
The examples above feature battles between opponents relatively similar in type and 
scale, the conventional armies of agrarian empires; broken ground, in these cases, allows the 
strong to hide their strength until it is too late to avoid.  Perhaps more frequently, our sources 
recognize that broken-ground ambushes gave the weak an opportunity to strike their mightier 
opponents with greater force, and that in imperial warfare this advantage played a crucial role in 
evening the odds between Roman armies and their typically inferior foes.  Tacitus envisions this 
circumstance in the Histories, when German tribesmen use broken ground to cover a devastating 
surprise attack on the Roman legions.132  Appian turns to a similar narrative topos in his account 
of the Numantine War, when the Pallantioi “concealed a large force just below the brow of the 
hill,” and ambushed the Roman columns which unwittingly approached.133  In Dio’s narrative of 
Augustus’ Spanish wars, the emperor’s most difficult opponents resist and survive in part by 
“always seizing the higher ground whenever a maneuver was attempted, and lying in ambush for 
                                                          
130 Livy, 22.4: loca nata insidiis. 
 
131 Dio Cass. 40.21: οἱ Πάρθοι τὸ πλεῖον τοῦ στρατοῦ σφων ἀποκρύψαντες ἡ γὰρ χώρα ἀνώμαλός τέ πῃ 
ἦν καὶ δένδρα εἶχεν ἀπήντησαν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. 
 
132 Tac. Hist. 4.77. 
 




him in the valleys and woods.”134 In Livy, Histrians otherwise outmatched by their Roman 
opponents go so far as to seize a Roman camp by ambush, after they “took up a hidden position 
in a spot behind a hill, and thence over byways followed the line of march, prepared for any 
opportunity.”135   
These instances, among many others, indicate a general pattern in the way our sources 
think about imperial warfare, as broken ground and the surprise attacks it enabled balanced 
scales of military force otherwise heavily weighted in the Romans’ favor.  Indeed, our sources 
perceive the broken ground ambush as more characteristic of the empire’s enemies than of its 
own armies, with such tactics appearing most frequently in the arsenal of Rome’s opponents.136  
This discourse hardly presents an unvarnished fact; it is in part a case of cultural posturing, as the 
Romans cast concealment and ambush as duplicitous, cowardly, and unbecoming of their 
military manhood (as seen above, Roman armies were perfectly capable of such tactics).  Yet 
when it comes to the dynamics of imperial warfare, the topos of the broken ground ambush 
probably reflects certain realities of Rome’s experience pushing its frontiers forward.  The 
Romans were indeed vulnerable to hidden ambushes because they were on the offensive more 
                                                          
134 Dio Cass. 53.25: καὶ προσέτι καὶ πράγματα αὐτῷ πολλά, εἴ που κινηθείη, τά τε ὑπερδέξια ἀεὶ 
προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις τοῖς τε ὑλώδεσιν ἐνεδρεύοντες παρεῖχον, ἐν ἀπόρῳ παντάπασιν 
ἐγένετο. 
 
135 Livy, 41.2: ipsi post collem occulto loco consederunt, et inde obliquis itineribus agmen sequebantur, 
in omnem occasionem intenti.  
 
136 Among the many examples of broken ground ambushes, see: App. Hisp. 12.70, 14.88-89, Hann. 2.10, 
4.20, 7.41, Pun. 14.100, Ill. 4.18, Mith. 12.85, BCiv. 1.5.43, 1.6.44; Caes. BGall. 6.34, 6.36; Dio Cass. 
40.21, 53.25, 54.33; Front. Strat. 1.2.8, 2.5.17, 2.5.19, 2.5.22, 2.5.24; Livy, 6.24, 10.26, 21.32, 21.34, 
21.54-55, 22.4, 22.28, 22.41, 23.1, 24.14, 25.15, 27.12, 27.26-27, 28.1, 33.7, 35.4, 35.28-29, 38.40-42, 
38.49, 39.1, 39.30, 40.25, 41.2, 43.23; Onas. 6.7-8; Polyaen. 1.39, 2.10.1, 2.38.2, 4.8.1, 8.10.2, 8.23.7; 
Polyb. 3.52-53, 3.71, 4.19; Tac. Agr. 37, Hist. 4.77. 
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frequently than not, and typically they fought opponents with superior knowledge of local 
topography and the time to prepare a lethal welcome for their Roman invaders. 
When our sources think through the mechanics and tactical logic of combat on broken 
ground, they make it clear that such terrain gives a “home-field advantage.”  More so than the 
plains, regions of rough terrain reward their defenders: in the hills and mountains, local 
knowledge and time to prepare conferred significant, even decisive, military advantages.  The 
stock battle narratives which our sources draw on to describe combat on broken ground—the 
hilltop citadel, the battle in the pass, and the broken ground ambush—all rely on a shared 
military logic.  Our sources believe that rugged terrain evened the odds in imperial warfare, 
multiplying the military capabilities of the empire’s opponents, and providing options for 
victorious resistance to people who would otherwise have none. 
 
Section Four: Refuge: Broken Ground, Survival, and Imperial Control 
 
 The preceding sections have focused primarily on questions of tactics, using ancient 
combat narratives to reflect on our sources’ conceptions of space and battle.  We have seen a 
general antipathy to warfare on broken ground, explained by more specific assumptions that 
rough terrain typically hindered Roman soldiers while providing advantages to their enemies.  
This final section gradually turns from tactics to strategy, asking how our sources viewed broken 
ground’s broader impact on Roman imperial control. 
We may start with the common portrayal among Greco-Roman authors of broken ground 
as a refuge for the weak and defeated.  Previous sections have touched on this concept at the 
tactical level.  The topos of the descent to the plain presupposes that timid commanders reaped 
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some benefits by refusing to give battle on level ground.  Given the defensive advantages of the 
hills and mountains, such refusal appears not as cowardice but as shrewd calculation.137  
Similarly, Rome’s frequent failure in the hills and mountains to turn battlefield victory into 
political triumph reflects the ways defeated enemies could successfully retreat to such spaces.  
Livy casts retreat to rugged ground as a predictable tactic for a defeated force: in his account of 
the Volscian wars, when both the Romans and their enemies feared that they had lost after an 
indecisive battle, “the terror in each camp was such, in consequence of men's ignorance of the 
outcome, that both armies, abandoning their wounded and a good part of their baggage, retreated 
to the nearest hills, as though defeated.”138  Livy is not alone in his supposition that rugged space 
was the natural refuge for a beaten army: this is one of the most common topoi of Roman 
military literature, found not only in the histories of Appian, Polybius, Cassius Dio, and Tacitus, 
but also in Plutarch’s biographies, Polyaenus’ Stratagems, and Caesar’s Commentaries.139         
 In the view of our sources, rugged terrain also served as a refuge at the operational and 
strategic levels.  Dio sees the strategic retreat to mountain refuges as the frequent recourse of 
Rome’s opponents.  Thus the Morini and Menapii frustrate Caesar by falling back onto broken 
ground: “having no cities, and living only in huts, they conveyed their chief treasures to the most 
                                                          
137 Cf. Veg. Mil. 3.9. 
 
138 Livy, 4.39: tantusque ab imprudentia eventus utraque castra tenuit pavor ut relictis sauciis et magna 
parte impedimentorum ambo pro victis exercitus se in montes proximos reciperent.  Livy provides a 
wealth of further examples. For retreat by Romans to broken ground: 2.50, 3.42, 4.41, 5.18, 5.28, 22.6, 
22.18, 24.41. For non-Romans: 1.37, 2.30, 2.51, 2.65, 3.8, 4.9, 4.19, 4.39, 7.15, 9.35, 9.37, 9.43, 10.30, 
24.41, 26.46, 28.15, 28.16, 29.31, 29.32, 31.42, 32.12, 34.39, 39.31, 39.32, 40.58, 41.12.   
 
139 App. BCiv. 1.3.26, 1.8.71, 1.10.90, 2.7.45, 4.7.55, 4.15.113, 4.16.128-129, 4.17.130, 5.4.30, 5.9.86-87, 
Hann. 8.48, Ill. 5.26, Mith. 9.65, 12.79-81, Pun. 15.103; Caes. BGall. 1.51, 2.42, 3.95, 5.14;  Dio Cass. 
38.33, 39.5, 40.25-27, 43.2, 48.3; Plut. Cam. 18.7, 40.2, 41.1, Crass. 25.9-10, 26.1, 29.5, 30.4, Fab. 2.1, 
6.7, Luc. 14.4-5, Rom. 18.5; Polyaen. 1.2.10, 2.2.17, 4.17, 7.41.1; Polyb. 1.74, 2.25, 11.33, 18.21; Tac. 
Ann. 2.46, 12.33-35, Hist. 1.68, 4.78. 
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densely wooded parts of the mountains, so that they did the attacking parties of the Romans 
much more harm than they themselves suffered.”140  Similarly, “the Nervii voluntarily retired 
before [Caesar] from the level country, as they were no match for his forces, and betook 
themselves into the most densely wooded mountains.”141 When Caesar attempted to follow, the 
Nervii used the defensive advantages of broken ground to great effect, devastating much of his 
army with a downhill countercharge.  Falling back to broken ground was not always effective: 
for instance, when a hostile tribe near the Danube withdrew to a heavily defended cave, Crassus 
defeated them by blockade and starvation.142  Yet regardless of its ultimate success, withdrawal 
to broken ground makes strategic sense to Dio; because of how it affects the risks and prospects 
of combat, broken ground is a logical refuge for the weaker party in a military conflict.143 
 Livy presents a wealth of examples in which Rome’s weaker opponents rely on this same 
understanding of military space.144  In his description of the Asiatic Gauls’ strategy in 189 BCE, 
Livy gives remarkable insight into his own geostrategic thinking: 
“They had adopted this plan particularly for conducting the war—that, when they 
had occupied the highest peaks in the region, conveying everything there which 
would be sufficient for their use over however long a period, they would wear 
down the enemy by exhaustion; for the Romans would neither venture to climb 
over such steep and difficult ground, and, if they did attempt it, they could be 
                                                          
140 Dio Cass. 39.44: οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις ἔχοντες ἀλλ᾽ ἐν καλύβαις διαιτώμενοι, καὶ τὰ τιμιώτατα ἐς τὰ 
λασιώτατα τῶν ὀρῶν ἀνασκευασάμενοι, πολὺ πλείω τοὺς προσμίξαντάς σφισι τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐκάκωσαν ἢ 
αὐτοὶ ἔπαθον. 
 
141 Dio Cass. 39.3: Νέρουιοι οὖν τῆς μὲν πεδιάδος ῾οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν ἀξιόμαχοἰ ἑκόντες αὐτῷ ἐξέστησαν, ἐς δὲ 
δὴ τὰ ὄρη τὰ ὑλωδέστατα ἀνακομισθέντες. 
 
142 Dio Cass. 51.26. 
 
143 For further examples, see Dio Cass. 36.14, 36.47, 53.25, 55.30. 
 
144 In addition to the two episodes quoted here, see Livy, 1.27, 4.17, 9.43, 23.26, 24.16, 27.42, 28.8, 
31.33-41, 32.13, 36.17, 38.2, 38.19, 39.2, 39.53, 40.17, 40.22, 41.18. 
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stopped even by a small force or pushed back, nor would they sit quietly at the foot 
of cold mountains and endure chill and hunger.”145 
The Ligurians allegedly relied on similar tactics in 187 BCE, delaying Roman assaults by 
negotiation and then fleeing “at full speed through pathless country and over steep cliffs where 
an enemy could not pursue.”146 
As in Dio, these tactics are not always successful; indeed, the Asiatic Gauls were 
ultimately defeated by a Roman assault.147  Yet when it worked, Livy believed that withdrawing 
to the mountains could provide weaker opponents the ability to reject or negotiate imperial 
control.  Consider as a comparative example the revolt of Petra against the Macedonians in 181 
BCE.  Though forced to surrender by Philip V’s army, the proximity of nearby mountain refuges 
rendered Macedonian control short-lived: “after the army retired, forgetting the hostages they 
abandoned the city and fled to the fortified places and the mountains.”148 For the imperial powers 
of the ancient world, broken terrain enabled would-be subjects to flee in the face of military 
force, making wars of imperial control longer and costlier.149 
                                                          
145 Livy, 38.19: iis haec maxime ratio belli sumendi fuerat, quod cum montes editissimos regionis eius 
tenerent, convectis omnibus quae ad usum quamvis longi temporis sufficerent, taedio se fatigaturos 
hostem censebant: nam neque ausuros per tam ardua atque iniqua loca subire eos et, si conarentur, vel 
parva manu prohiberi aut deturbari posse, nec quietos in radicibus montium gelidorum sedentes frigus 
aut inopiam laturos.  
 
146 Livy, 39.2: ceterum effusi rursus, et pars maxima inermes, per invia et rupes deruptas praecipitantes 
fugerunt, qua sequi hostis non posset. 
 
147 See Livy, 40.41. 
 
148 Livy, 40.22: iidem, postquam exercitus recessit, obliti obsidum relicta urbe in loca munita et montes 
refugerunt. 
 
149 For further examples, see Livy, 1.27, 4.17, 9.43, 23.26, 24.16, 25.32, 27.42, 28.8, 31.33, 31.34-36, 
31.39, 31.41, 32.13, 33.15, 36.17, 38.2, 39.53, 40.17, 40.27, 40.41, 41.18, 42.16, 44.36. 
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 Other ancient authors broadly agree with Dio and Livy’s assessment of the role which 
broken ground played as a strategic refuge.  The Germans frustrate Caesar by secreting 
themselves “where a hidden valley or a wooded locality or an entangled morass offered some 
hope of defense or security.”150 Rather than risk his forces hunting down these dispersed 
opponents, “Caesar preferred to forgo some chance of doing harm...rather than to do harm with 
some damage to the troops.”151 In Appian, Spaniards fall back onto broken ground to escape 
Roman domination: “The rest of the barbarians collecting together from the fields took refuge—
some among inaccessible rocks, others in the most strongly fortified towns—carrying away what 
they could, and burning what they were obliged to leave.”152  Appian has the Illyrians, Galatians, 
and Cilicians all rely on the same strategy, though only the Illyrians hold out in practice against 
Roman arms.153  Frontinus depicts the Carthaginians using hills to safeguard their armies in both 
the First and Second Punic Wars, while against the Spartans, Thracian tribesmen “conveyed to 
the mountains all things necessary for their subsistence and were buoyed up by the sole hope that 
[Clearchus] would withdraw in consequence of lack of supplies.”154 
                                                          
150 Caes. BGall. 6.34: ubi cuique aut valles abdita aut locus silvestris aut palus impedita spem praesidi 
aut salutis aliquam offerebat, consederat. 
 
151 Caes. BGall. 6.34: ut in eiusmodi difficultatibus, quantum diligentia provideri poterat providebatur, ut 
potius in nocendo aliquid praetermitteretur, etsi omnium animi ad ulciscendum ardebant, quam cum 
aliquo militum detrimento noceretur. 
 
152 App. Hisp. 9.52: οἱ δ᾽ ἄλλοι βάρβαροι συνέθεον ἐκ τῶν πεδίων, οἱ μὲν ἐς τὰ ἀπόκρημνα, οἱ δὲ ἐς τὰς 
ὀχυρωτέρας πόλεις, συμφέροντες ἃ δύναιντο καὶ ἐμπιπράντες ὅσα λείποιεν. See also 12.71. 
 
153 App. Ill. 2.11, Syr. 7.42, Mith. 14.95.  See also Syr. 6.30, Mith. 13.87, 15.99. 
 
154 Respectively, Front. Strat. 2.2.11, 2.3.8, 3.5.1: Clearchus Lacedaemonius, exploratum habens Thracas 
omnia victui necessaria in montes comportasse unaque spe sustentari, quod crederent eum commeatus 
inopia recessurum… See also 1.10.3, 2.7.1, 3.15.5.  
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In many wars and for many authors, withdrawing to broken ground was a logical choice 
for an army that recognized its own weakness.  Of course, this strategy was not always 
successful: in numerous cases, our sources show defeated troops run down even as they try to 
escape to the hills, or cut off in their mountain sanctuaries and starved out.155  Yet the fact that 
this strategy sometimes failed does not invalidate the point that ancient authors thought it could 
succeed, and that in the military imagination of our ancient sources broken ground could serve as 
a refuge for Rome’s defeated foes.  Even if the advantages of defending broken ground were 
insufficient for Rome’s opponents to win victory, rough terrain could provide an opportunity for 
escape, and for continued resistance to Roman aggression. 
This strategic dynamic—the mountains as refuge—had political effects, shaping 
relationships of power and exploitation between Rome and its would-be subjects.  To return to 
the model of Roman imperialism laid out in the Introduction, military force was an important 
tool for generating political control, and Rome’s ability to compel obedience to its authority 
depended in large part on acts and threats of violence.  As we have seen, the Romans themselves 
believed that broken ground made it more difficult and costly to use force successfully against 
their opponents.  In turn, this disadvantage made it more difficult to threaten violence credibly: 
the confidence which Rome’s targets placed in the safety of broken ground indicates their 
hopeful belief that the Romans would not follow them onto such terrain, and that the Romans 
might be beaten if they did. 
Not only did broken ground raise the probable costs of Roman force, it also typically 
decreased the expected rewards.  While this dissertation takes the former phenomenon as its 
                                                          
155 App. Hisp. 6.31, 10.59, Pun. 10.72, BCiv. 1.14.120, 4.17.130; Caes. BCiv. 3.97; Front. Strat. 3.15.5; 
Livy, 3.8, 9.43, 10.30, 26.46, 28.15-16, 39.32 40.41; Tac. Hist. 1.68. 
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focus, we must not forget that, in most cases, the Romans found less to fight for in the hills and 
mountains of the Mediterranean world.  Though its historians were rarely so crass as to represent 
the empire in such terms, Rome was primarily an agrarian state concerned with monopolizing 
agrarian resources: caloric energy, as well as the labor to exploit and expand it.  While there are 
cases where mineral wealth or political value drew Rome’s attention to the hills—as in the gold 
mines of the upper Baetis river in Chapter Two, and the religious significance of Jerusalem in 
Chapter Three—in most cases these spaces were secondary concerns for the empire, less 
militarily relevant in their own right than for the danger their inhabitants posed to the settled 
fields below.156 
According to our theoretical model, with the costs of military force raised and its benefits 
usually lowered, broken ground typically stood in a tenuous relationship with Roman authority.  
As Roman force weakened, the empire was forced to fall back on more cooperative levers of 
power, and to accept a shallower level of control over rugged space.  Because they felt less 
threatened by the prospect of military intervention, inhabitants of the hills and mountains were 
more likely to resist imperial dictates, or to drive harder bargains in return for their acquiescence. 
 We need not rely on theory alone to predict this interaction of rough terrain and imperial 
control under the Roman Empire.  Though our ancient authors would not put it in such formal 
terms, they are well aware of the ways in which regions of broken ground served as systemic 
incubators of resistance.157  Livy frequently constructs a dichotomy between broken terrain and 
                                                          
156 Cf. Braudel 1995 (orig. 1949), 43; Shaw 1986, 82.  Strabo frequently describes mountainous regions as 
impoverished, and blames these regions’ endemic brigandage on their economic misfortune: 3.1.2, 3.3.5, 
4.6.9, 7.5.12, 11.13.3, 12.3.18. 
 
157 Polyaen. 4.3.31 is particularly explicit on the difficulty of controlling mountainous territory. 
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plains, in which the former falls outside the established political order.  As he imagines the early 
history of Rome as a city-state, “the Gauls came down from the Alban hills, having been unable 
to endure the sharpness of the winter, and ranging over the plains and sea-coast, laid waste the 
country.”158  Livy similarly describes the Samnites, “who in those days dwelt in villages among 
the mountains, [and] used to ravage the regions of the plain and coast, despising their cultivators, 
who were of a softer character, and one that—as usually happens—resembled their country, 
while they themselves were rude highlanders.”159  Narrating the war between Syphax and 
Masinissa in Africa, Livy is relatively explicit in casting rough terrain as an incubator of 
resistance.  After losing to Syphax, Masinissa retreats with a few followers to a remote fortress.  
“The mountain which the fugitives had occupied is well supplied with grass and water and being 
suitable for the support of cattle, it was quite capable of sustaining men also who lived on flesh 
and milk.  From it they rendered all the surrounding country unsafe, first by stealthy raids in the 
night and later by open brigandage.”160  Livy tends to put the threat of mountaineers in 
ethnographic terms: this approach is shared by Strabo (and to a limited extent, as seen at the 
beginning of this chapter, by Braudel).161  Yet his ultimate conclusion that rugged terrain 
produced unruly and hostile bandits is not without basis in political and military reality.  
                                                          
158 Livy, 7.25: Galli ex Albanis montibus, quia hiemis vim pati nequiverant, per campos maritimaque loca 
vagi populabantur. 
 
159 Livy, 9.13: nam Samnites, ea tempestate in montibus vicatim habitantes, campestria et maritima loca 
contempto cultorum molliore atque, ut evenit fere, locis simili genere ipsi montani atque agrestes 
depopulabantur. 
 
160 Livy, 29.31: quem ceperant exsules montem herbidus aquosusque est; et quia pecori bonus alendo 
erat, hominum quoque carne ac lacte vescentium abunde sufficiebat alimentis. inde nocturnis primo ac 
furtivis incursionibus, deinde aperto latrocinio infesta omnia circa esse. 
 
161 For further examples, see Livy, 1.4, 9.36, 21.37, 21.43, 21.60, 27.39, 34.16, 36.14, 40.38.  For Strabo, 
see especially 3.3.8, but also 3.3.5, 7.5.4, 11.14.14.  Braudel 1995 (orig. 1949), 29.  
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Mountains and broken ground tend to house raiders in part because these spaces often lie beyond 
the reach of easy and effective military retribution from state authorities.   
 Appian takes a less anthropologized and rather more sophisticated view of broken ground 
as an incubator for resistance against state control.  Fighting a guerilla war in Spain under Junius 
Brutus in 131 BCE, Roman armies attack their enemies’ homes, hoping to draw them into open 
combat.  However, the presence of nearby mountains foils the Romans’ design: “some, however, 
of the inhabitants fled to the mountains with what they could carry, and to these, when they 
asked pardon, Brutus granted it.”162  As Appian imagines the scenario, the presence of broken 
ground allowed an enemy that might otherwise have been annihilated to prolong its resistance 
and ultimately negotiate terms.  In his account of Augustus’ Alpine wars, the mountain-dwelling 
Pannonians reap even greater benefits from their physical environment, and Appian is explicit 
that the mountains themselves are the root of Pannonian power: they inhabit “the higher Alpine 
mountains, a range difficult of access, the paths being narrow and hard to climb.  For this reason 
they had not only preserved their independence, but had levied tolls on those who passed through 
their country.”163  Though they are finally subdued after a two-year siege, the Pannonians 
quickly threw off the imperial yoke, “and gaining possession of the mountain passes, they 
mocked the forces that Augustus sent against them, which were unable to accomplish anything 
                                                          
162 App. Hisp. 12.71: εἰσὶ δ᾽ οἳ καὶ ἐς τὰ ὄρη μεθ᾽ ὧν ἐδύναντο ἀνεπήδων καὶ αὐτοῖς δεομένοις 
συνεγίγνωσκεν ὁ Βροῦτος, καὶ τὰ ὄντα ἐμερίζετο.   
  
163 App. Ill. 4.17: οἳ κορυφὰς οἰκοῦσι τῶν Ἄλπεων, ὄρη δύσβατα, καὶ στενὴ δίοδός ἐστιν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὰ καὶ 
δυσχερής: δι᾽ ἃ καὶ ἦσαν αὐτόνομοι, καὶ τέλη τοὺς παροδεύοντας ᾔτουν. Cf. Strabo, 11.13.6. 
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of importance.  Thereupon Augustus, anticipating a war with Antony, acknowledged their 
independence and allowed them to go unpunished for their offenses.”164 
We see a similar vision of terrain, force, and control in Tacitus.  In reference to Corbulo’s 
Armenian war, Tacitus explicitly outlines the relationship between defensive terrain and self-
confident belligerence: “the Mardi, well-practiced bandits and secured against invasion by 
mountains, harassed [Corbulo’s] march along their frontier.”165  Similarly, when the Thracians 
rebelled in 26 CE, they attempted to negotiate with the Romans using their defensive terrain as a 
bargaining chip: “they pointed to their strongholds perched upon the cliffs…and threatened a war 
intricate, arduous, and bloody.”166  Like Appian, Tacitus saw mountains as a space typically 
isolated from imperial authority by their defensive terrain.   
A similar logic underlies the tools of warfare and statecraft which the Romans used to 
rule, however tenuously, over rugged terrain.  Well aware that difficult topography sapped their 
control, they sometimes brought overly-confident locals to heel by resorting to exemplary 
violence, targeting otherwise insignificant mountain settlements in order to strike fear into their 
neighbors.  Reporting on the war in the Bosporus, Tacitus writes that, “the destruction of the 
inhabitants of Uspe struck dismay into the rest of the country, with nothing being considered 
                                                          
164 App. Ill. 4.17: καὶ τὰ στενὰ κρατυνάμενοι τοὺς ἐπιπεμπομένους σφίσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Καίσαρος διέπαιζον, 
οὐδὲν δρᾶν μέγα ἔχοντας. ὅθεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Καῖσαρ, προσδοκωμένου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀντώνιον πολέμου, συνέθετο 
αὐτονόμους ἐάσειν, καὶ ἀκολάστους τῶν…πραχθέντων.  For other examples in which Appian casts 
broken ground as an incubator of resistance, see Ill. 3.15, 4.18, Pun. 16.107, Mith. 14.92. 
 
165 Tac. Ann. 14.23: illum finis suos praegredientem incursavere Mardi, latrociniis exerciti contraque 
inrumpentem montibus defensi.  As it happened, Corbulo successfully invaded the Mardi.  Here as 
elsewhere, natural defenses did not necessarily guarantee security. 
  
166 Tac. Ann. 4.46: castella rupibus indita…ostentabant bellumque impeditum arduum cruentum 
minitabantur.  Note similar examples in Polyb. 5.8, 5.62. 
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safe, when armies and fortifications, high or difficult ground, rivers and cities, failed equally to 
withstand the enemy.”167  Cicero employs the same logic when he requests a triumph after the 
fall of Pindenissus: “I thought it of importance to the prestige of the empire to suppress their 
audacity, in order that there might be less difficulty in breaking the spirits of all such as were 
anywhere disaffected to our rule.”168 
 Perhaps the best evidence that ancient authors saw broken ground as a fundamental 
problem for imperial control comes when they describe efforts by the Roman authorities to 
forcibly resettle restive foes from their mountain strongholds to less defensible sites on the 
plains.  When the Romans defeat the Ligurians in Livy’s account, the consul “subdued them all, 
took away their arms and transferred the population from the hills to the plains.”169  Later, the 
Romans see a different group of Ligurians as utterly intractable unless they are robbed of their 
natural defenses.  “First consulting the senate by letter, Cornelius and Baebius determined to 
move [the Ligurian Apuani] down from the mountains to lands on the plains, far from home, that 
there might be no hope of return, thinking that there would be no end to the Ligurian war until 
this was done.”170  In Cassius Dio, after Agrippa defeats the Cantabri, he “deprived [them] of 
                                                          
167 Tac. Ann. 12.17: excidio Vspensium metus ceteris iniectus, nihil tutum ratis, cum arma, munimenta, 
impediti vel eminentes loci amnesque et urbes iuxta perrumperentur. 
 
168 Cic. Fam. 15.4.10: ad existimationem imperi pertinere arbitratus sum comprimere eorum audaciam, 
quo facilius etiam ceterorum animi, qui alieni essent ab imperio nostro, frangerentur. 
 
169 Livy, 39.2: omnes Aemilius subegit armaque ademit et de montibus in campos multitudinem deduxit. 
 
170 Livy, 40.38: eos consulto per litteras prius senatu deducere ex montibus in agros campestres procul 
ab domo, ne reditus spes esset, Cornelius et Baebius statuerunt, nullum alium ante finem rati fore 
Ligustini belli. Another potential example appears in 38.28, though the importance of broken terrain is 




their arms, and forced them to come down from their fortresses and live in the plains.”171  
Elsewhere, Caesar sets resettlement as the terms for peace with the Lusitanians: “he proceeded to 
the Herminian Mountains and ordered the inhabitants to move into the plain, in order, as he 
claimed, that they might not use their fastnesses as a base for marauding expeditions, but really 
because he well knew that they would never do what he asked, and that as a result he should 
have some ground for war.”172  Appian witnesses similar policies in Spain, where the Romans 
“also removed Termes, a large city always insubordinate to the Romans, from its strong position 
into the plain, and ordered the inhabitants to live without walls.”173 
It is ultimately Appian who provides our clearest example of the Roman belief that 
brigands could be subdued by depriving them of natural defenses.  When the Cilician pirates 
abandon their mountain citadels to Pompey in hope of leniency, he resettles them in sites which 
we can securely locate in the plains.  “Those pirates who had evidently fallen into this way of life 
not from wickedness, but from poverty consequent upon the war, Pompey settled in Mallus, 
Adana, and Epiphaneia, or any other uninhabited or thinly peopled town in Cilicia Tracheia.  
Some of them, too, he sent to Dyme in Achaia.”174  Pompey justifies his tactic in economic 
                                                          
171 Dio Cass. 54.11: καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς τά τε ὅπλα ἀφείλετο καὶ ἐς τὰ πεδία ἐκ τῶν ἐρυμνῶν κατεβίβασεν.    
 
172 Dio Cass. 37.52: πρὸς τὸ ὄρος τὸ Ἑρμίνιον ἐτράπετο καὶ ἐκέλευσε τοὺς οἰκήτορας αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ πεδινὰ 
μεταστῆναι, πρόφασιν μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρυμνῶν ὁρμώμενοι λῃστεύωσιν, ἔργῳ δὲ εὖ εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐκ 
ἄν ποτε αὐτὸ ποιήσειαν, κἀκ τούτου πολέμου τινὰ ἀφορμὴν λήψεται. 
 
173 App. Hisp. 16.99: Τερμησὸν δέ, μεγάλην πόλιν ἀεὶ δυσπειθῆ Ῥωμαίοις γενομένην, ἐξ ἐρυμνοῦ 
κατήγαγεν ἐς τὸ πεδίον, καὶ ἐκέλευσεν οἰκεῖν ἀτειχίστους. See also 10.59-60, and Hann. 8.54 in which 
Hannibal adopts a similar strategy of forced resettlement. 
 
174 App. Mith. 14.95: τοὺς δὲ πειρατὰς οἳ μάλιστα ἐδόκουν οὐχ ὑπὸ μοχθηρίας ἀλλ᾽ ἀπορίᾳ βίου διὰ τὸν 
πόλεμον ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἐλθεῖν, ἐς Μαλλὸν καὶ Ἄδανα καὶ Ἐπιφάνειαν, ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο πόλισμα ἔρημον ἢ 
ὀλιγάνθρωπον ἦν τῆσδε τῆς τραχείας Κιλικίας, συνῴκιζε.  The Barrington Atlas places all four named 
cities in the plains: BA 67 A3 Mallos, BA 66 G3 Adana, BA 67 C3 Oeniandos/Epiphaneia, BA 58 B1 
Dyme.   
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terms—settled on agricultural land, the Cilicians can have an occupation other than piracy—and 
this is surely part of his motivation.  But Romans and Cilicians alike would have recognized how 
the balance of power shifted when the former brigands were transported from their mountain 
strongholds.  Without broken ground to protect them from Roman force, they had few options to 
resist imperial control.  In the mountains, the Cilicians were a threat worthy of the grotesque 
constitutional overreach that was Pompey’s naval command.  In the plains, they would be meek 
and unproblematic subjects to Roman authority.  As our sources saw it, broken ground was not 





This chapter has analyzed the Roman discourse surrounding warfare on broken ground, 
focusing on the topoi and stock descriptions which ancient authors used to describe battles on 
rough terrain and to explain their results.  As noted in the opening pages, this discourse is not 
identical to Rome’s military reality; as Adrian Goldsworthy argues, the actual experience of 
Roman combat over the centuries of its imperial dominance was more varied than both our 
sources and many works of modern scholarship reflect.175  At the same time, the military 
imagination of our sources is not disconnected from the practicalities of warfare: the basic 
military logic of ancient literature needed to made sense to its audience, much of which had 
some familiarity with combat and campaigning.  Moreover, the topoi surrounding broken ground 
combat exerted their own influence on the real-world behavior of Roman commanders: operating 
                                                          
175 Goldsworthy 1996. 
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within a literary culture that feared rough terrain, we should not expect many generals to 
embrace the perils of the hills and mountains unless circumstances compelled them to do so. 
The chapters that follow move from discourse to reality, examining the behavior of 
Roman armies and their opponents on rugged terrain in the contexts of conquest, 
counterinsurgency, and garrisoning.  As we will see, Rome did not adhere dogmatically to its 
preference for warfare in the plains.  Roman decision-makers proved flexible and adaptable in 
response to local conditions and strategic priorities.  Yet the concerns of broken ground were not 
confined to ancient literature: mapping Roman force and violence reveals a wariness on the part 
of commanders to risk their forces on rough terrain.  As cultural discourse met the practical 
realities of life on mountainous frontiers, the Romans struck a delicate balance in their approach 
to broken ground, and the strategic calculus which governed relationships between rulers and the 







TAKING CONTROL: BROKEN GROUND IN THE ROMAN CONQUEST OF SPAIN 
(218-179 BCE) 
 
 We turn now from the analysis of an important set of literary topoi to their practical 
application in the historical study of Roman imperialism.  Thus far, this dissertation has 
demonstrated that in the perception of Roman writers and commanders, broken ground presented 
a formidable military obstacle, giving advantage and refuge to opponents who would otherwise 
be unable to resist Roman force.  In Rome’s military mindset, mountains and similarly rugged 
terrain were best avoided, and generals who entered them did so with special care and significant 
risk.  This chapter and the following two move from the general Roman discourse surrounding 
hill and mountain warfare to the specific realities of violence on broken ground, asking how the 
relationship between terrain and military activity can help historians think through broader 
questions of imperial priorities, decision-making, and control.  
 Spain provides the first of three regional case studies.1  Surveying operations in the 
Iberian peninsula from 218-179 BCE, this chapter takes “conquest” as its central theme: at issue 
is the relationship between the physical environment and the initial imposition of Roman 
authority over provincial space.2  In Spain, as elsewhere, Roman conquest was not a one-time 
event; rather, this region’s transition from independence to subjection was a centuries-long mix 
                                                          
1 By Spain, I refer to the Iberian peninsula as a whole, including modern Portugal: as Leonard Curchin 
puts it, “I am referring to Hispania, not España.” Curchin 1991, 1. 
 
2 Unless otherwise noted, all dates in this chapter are BCE. 
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of diplomacy, insurgency, and acculturation.  By mapping military activity in the early decades 
of this process (for which our evidence is notably better than later periods), we can see the 
strategic evolution of Roman warfare in response to local circumstances, as well as the physical 
environment’s impact on the tenuous balance of terror and respect which kept newly-conquered 
Spain within the Roman fold. 
Even if it is difficult to cite a precise moment when Spain fell fully and irrevocably under 
Roman control, the military narrative of the peninsula’s conquest and integration is reasonably 
clear.  In part a Carthaginian possession with close ties to the Barca family, Spain was a crucial 
source of revenue and manpower for Hannibal, and so a natural target for Roman operations in 
the Second Punic War.  From 218-206, Rome fought continuously in Spain, ultimately driving 
out the Carthaginians.3  As John Richardson shows in his influential monograph Hispaniae, 
Rome’s expansion into the resulting power vacuum was halting and uncoordinated, and the 
Spaniards did not submit quietly to Roman rule.4  The new Spanish provinces saw frequent 
fighting not only down to Tiberius Gracchus the Elder’s campaigns in 179 (this chapter’s closing 
point) but also in the general conflagration of 155-133, when the Lusitanians revolted under 
Viriathus and the Celtiberians made their famous stand at Numantia.5  While resistance seems 
more subdued thereafter (in part due to the worsening quality of our sources), anti-Roman 
sentiment motivated many of the Spaniards who fought in the civil wars of the dying republic, 
                                                          
3 Curchin 1991, 24-28; Richardson 1996, 9-40; Edwell 2011, 320-24; Owens 2017. 
 
4 Richardson 1986, 172-80 and passim. 
 
5 Simon 1962; Dyson 1987, 186-219; Keay 1988, 29-42; Harris 1989, 118-42; Curchin 1991, 28-39; 




most notably under Sertorius between 80 – 72.6  The military pacification of the Iberian 
peninsula was only completed (at least nominally) under Augustus and Agrippa at the end of the 
first century.7 
The physical and chronological characteristics of the Spanish wars make this an 
especially productive case study on imperial conquest.  As Maps 2.1 and 2.2 indicate, the 
Spanish landscape is starkly divided between broad plains and river-valleys and forbidding 
mountains and their foothills.  Roman commanders had a choice in Iberia between lowland and 
broken ground warfare, and their decisions reveal important patterns in the empire’s 
environmental preferences and military priorities.  Moreover, this conquest was a drawn-out 
affair, allowing us to distinguish changes in Roman strategy over time.  Finally, Roman activity 
in Spain is well documented in our literary evidence (especially in the late 3rd and early 2nd 
centuries BCE where this chapter focuses).  As a result, the early conquest of the Iberian 
peninsula provides an ideal opportunity to test the connection between the geographic topoi of 
ancient military historians and the realities of Roman warfare. 
 Spain also provides fertile historiographic ground for reexamining the relationship 
between force and imperialism in the Roman world.  As Richardson recognized, Roman 
expansion in Spain provided a crucial proving ground for the forms and structures of imperial 
rule.8  Nevertheless, the most influential works on the systemic relationship between military 
                                                          
6 Curchin 1991, 42-46; Richardson 1996, 95-104. 
 
7 Syme 1970, 79-107; Jones 1976; Curchin 1991, 52-53; Richardson 1996, 133-34. 
 
8 Richardson 1986. 
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force and imperial control have focused on Rome’s later frontiers in the north and east.9  While 
military historians of ancient Spain have produced outstanding work, most of this scholarship 
either presents narrowly focused reconstructions of individual campaigns or broad narrative 
overviews of Hispano-Roman relations over the course of centuries.10 
 Analytical histories connecting the capacity of the Roman army with the depth of Roman 
control in Spain are relatively rare and, despite their substantial quality, increasingly out of date.  
The best work in this category comes from Robert Knapp and Stephen Dyson.  Both synthesize 
long-term Roman military activity in Spain, elucidating broad patterns in the nature of Roman 
force and control.11  Both authors’ works are thoroughly researched and thoughtfully written, and 
neither author lacks geographic knowledge: later in his career, Knapp oversaw the production of 
the Barrington Atlas’ Iberian maps.  However, Knapp and Dyson adopt a very modern 
perspective when it comes to the spatial dynamics of Roman expansion in Spain: especially in 
Knapp’s work, the military history of the conquest is described in terms of advancing frontier 
lines.12  Zones of control and diplomatic relationships emanate outwards from a firmly Roman 
core across the well-defined and defensible military frontier and into semi-independent tribal 
space.13  While neither work makes a full-throated case for a Roman “Grand Strategy,” in this 
                                                          
9 Among many others: Luttwak 1976; Mann 1979; Isaac 1990; Wheeler 1993a, 1993b, 2007; Whittaker 
1994. 
 
10 In the former category: Syme 1970; Martínez Gázquez 1974; Corzo Sanchez 1975; Astin 1978, 28-49; 
Lazenby 1978; Knapp 1980. In the latter: Simon 1962; Keay 1988, 25-46; Curchin 1991, 24-54; 
Richardson 1996; Varga 2015; Owens 2017. 
 
11 Knapp 1977, 15-57; Dyson 1987, 174. 
 
12 See especially Knapp 1977, 33-35. 
 
13 Knapp 1977, 56-57; Dyson 1987, 230-31. 
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vision of Roman power they share a great deal with Edward Luttwak’s much-debated 1976 
classic. 
 As I show below, Knapp and Dyson oversimplify the spatial nature of Roman 
imperialism in Spain.  It was impossible to draw a clear line in the Iberian peninsula between 
Roman and tribal territory; our literary evidence gives no indication that Roman commanders 
attempted to draw or enforce such a boundary, and they may well have found the very concept 
foreign and irrelevant.  Moreover, to the extent that there were amorphous “front-lines” of 
Roman expansion, we need to think about them in three-dimensions (thanks to GIS, an 
exponentially easier task in the 2010s than the 1970s and 80s).  This chapter argues that the most 
important historical change in Rome’s military policy and political authority in the Spain was the 
shifting concentration of force into rugged space.  To be sure, between 218 and 179, the Romans 
generally preferred to wage war on the level terrain of Spain’s coasts and river-valleys, enacting 
into military reality the negative topoi surrounding mountain combat.  However, this geospatial 
preference was not static over time: as our narrative moves from warfare against Carthaginians in 
the late 3rd century to warfare with the Spaniards in the early 2nd, Rome proved more and more 
willing to advance its forces into the Spanish hills in response to changing local conditions and 
strategic priorities. 
 Geospatial reconstruction not only reveals this trend in Rome’s military activity, but also 
suggests an explanation for the strategic shift.  Lowland warfare was effective in driving the 
Carthaginians out of Spain, but it proved unable to control the peninsula.  Winning major coastal 
and river-valley battles did little to overawe the hill tribes of the Spanish interior: immediately 
following the expulsion of Punic forces, “Roman” Spain was beset by decades of rebellion and 
brigandage.  While Rome never abandoned its preference for level, agrarian battlefields, the 
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spatial and strategic requirements of its new mission gradually drew commanders up-country 
into wars of pacification over increasingly difficult terrain.  Spain’s narrative is thus one of 
tension between fundamental Roman concepts of military space and the practical requirements of 
widely dispersed imperial warfare.  A geographic reconstruction of the wars of 218-179 speaks 
not only to the Romans’ ingrained preference for level terrain, but also to their strategic 
flexibility and capacity to learn in the face of failure. 
 The remainder of this chapter develops this argument over four sections.  The first 
considers the methodological challenges of reconstructing Roman military activity in Spain; it 
discusses the reliability of our sources (especially Livy) when it comes to the geography of the 
early Spanish wars, before briefly outlining some digital mapping techniques and principles that 
help to compensate for the inevitable ambiguity of our data in this and future chapters.  Sections 
Two and Three reconstruct the Roman conquest of Spain in two phases, the former discussing 
the victory over Carthage between 218-206, the latter covering the first generation of Spanish 
rebellions between 205-179.  After briefly looking forward to events after 179, Section Four 
concludes by considering some implications of my argument for the military history of Spain, as 








Section One: Sources and Challenges 
  
Let us begin by turning to our literary sources themselves.14  For the period from the 
Second Punic War down to the treaties of Tiberius Gracchus (father of the famous tribune), Livy 
provides our most important and geographically detailed evidence, though supplementary 
material comes from Polybius (himself an important source for Livy) and Appian’s Iberika.15  
We can supplement these authors with brief references to Spanish affairs in an array of minor 
sources, though these rarely expand upon the geographic information of their more voluminous 
counterparts.  These include Diodorus Siculus, the geographic works of Pliny the Elder and 
Strabo, collections of stratagems and military virtues by Frontinus and Valerius Maximus, and 
later epitomes by Florus, Orosius, and Eutropius. 
 Provided that historians ask the right sort of questions, there is good reason for 
confidence in the geographical data provided by these sources, and in particular in the impressive 
volume of place-names recorded in Livy.  To be sure, Livy and our other sources do not preserve 
all (or even most) locations of Roman violence in the Iberian peninsula.16  Nor is their 
understanding of Spanish geography unimpeachable.17  Yet we know that Livy drew on earlier 
                                                          
14 For summary and analysis of the available literary evidence, see Bane 1976; Richardson 1996, 319-29; 
Varga 2015, 5-7. 
 
15 Unfortunately, Brian McGing’s new translation of Appian in the Loeb Classical Library appeared too 
late for consideration in this chapter. 
 
16 Ancient authors make passing reference to hundreds of unnamed (and therefore unlocatable) sites 
which were captured by the Romans or surrendered to them.  See Livy, 34.16, 40.49; Oros. 4.20; Plut. 
Cat. Mai. 10.3.  
 
17 For instance, Livy’s geography is internally inconsistent in 26.20, when he places Hasdrubal’s forces 
near Saguntum upon Scipio’s arrival in Spain, yet reports that Scipio then marched unopposed from 
Tarraco to Carthago Nova.  Cf. Polyb. 10.7.  Livy’s usefulness to military historians is roundly criticized 
by Walsh 1958, 1961; Livy receives more favorable treatment in Hoyos and Yardley 2009, Koon 2010, 
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authors with substantial military experience in Spain, such as Cato the Elder (consul for 195 in 
Hispania Citerior) and Silenus, a companion of Hannibal whose work was transmitted to Livy 
via Coelius Antipater.18  Even the late annalists such as Valerias Antias and Claudius 
Quadrigarius, from whom Livy likely drew many of his Spanish place names, are more reliable 
on such details than their generally poor reputation would imply.19  In all likelihood, the 
pontifical records from which these authors drew much of their material included lists of 
conquered cities and surrendered tribes.20  Whatever their penchant for fabrication, when it 
comes to such toponyms the annalists probably lacked the motive and imagination to 
substantially distort the historical record.21   
 While we should not pretend that Livy and our other sources can support a 
comprehensive map of Rome’s Spanish Wars, or even that their information is correct in every 
specific instance, I would argue that the geographic information in these works preserves in 
broad outline Rome’s perceptions and priorities in the conquest of the Iberian peninsula.  The 
toponyms which survive from the Spanish war reflect, however hazily, the “hot-spots” of Roman 
                                                          
and Levene 2010.  Appian is generally regarded as even more problematic (see Janni 1984, 114; 
Richardson 2000, 6).  He badly misunderstands the location of Saguntum at Hisp. 7 and later conflates the 
town with Carthago Nova (Hisp. 12, 19). 
 
18 Badian 1966, 16; Briscoe 1981, 63-66; Cornell 2013, 1.256-63.  Von Ungern-Sternburg 2015, 169 
 
19 For critique of the first century annalists, see Badian 1966, 18-23; Oakley 1997, 89-93.  For somewhat 
more positive treatments, especially of Valerius Antias, see Cornell 1986; 2013, 1.288-304; Rich 2005. 
 
20 Oakley 1997, 62-63.  Rawson 1971 argues to the contrary that the annalists did not make use of 
pontifical records.  See also Frier 1979. 
 
21 Oakley 1997, 63 makes this argument even in reference to the older material of Livy’s second pentad.  
On the subject of obscure place names supplied by the annalists, he writes: “To argue that they are bogus 
is to imply that the annalists had both the time and the patience to discover and work into their narratives 
numerous references to places of no consequence, some of which were hundreds of miles from 
Rome.  This seems improbable." 
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attention and military activity during the conquest of the region.  For a place name to be 
preserved in the historical record, it needed sufficient significance not only to be recorded in the 
first instance (probably in the pontifical tables), but also to be selected by our ancient authors for 
inclusion in their texts.  While it is impossible to know for sure the motives driving each instance 
in this process of remembrance and re-remembrance (and we must therefore be particularly 
careful in discussing the significance of any specific site), in aggregate the places named in the 
historical record had outsized political and military importance.  They were the focus of more 
frequent, intensive, and significant Roman military activity, and the broad patterns in their 
geographic distribution reflect the geographic foci of imperial force projection and control.  In 
short, while our sources may remember the geography of the Spanish conquest incompletely and 
(in the case of some specific details) incorrectly, they do not remember it randomly.   
 Bearing this in mind, we may turn to the challenges of historical geography, and the task 
of associating the toponyms in Livy and other authors with positions on a map.  Here, too, there 
is reason for confidence, thanks to over a century of investigation into the geography of Roman 
Spain.  German scholars provided much of the early foundation, and the work of Adolf Schulten 
(most famous for his excavations at Numantia) is particularly important.22  Antonio Tovar’s 
volumes in the 1970s and 80s were a major step to synthesize and build upon earlier 
knowledge.23  More recently, contributions from the Iberian volumes of the Tabula Imperii 
                                                          
22 Schulten 1914-1929; 1933; 1935; 1937.  On Numantia, cf. Dobson 2007. For a historical survey of 
German archaeology in Spain, see Blech 2006.   
 
23 Tovar 1974; 1976; 1989. 
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Romani, the Barrington Atlas, and the Pleiades Gazetteer have dramatically expanded the range 
and accessibility of Spanish geographical data.24 
 Like the ancient sources on which it is based, Spanish historical geography is not without 
its pitfalls and shortcomings.  As will be clear in Sections Two and Three, there are some Roman 
operations that we simply cannot locate; in other cases, debates continue to rage over the correct 
siting of a battle or siege.  Even where we know the approximate location for Roman military 
activity, our knowledge is rarely detailed enough to support tactical reconstructions and “battle 
history” in the vein of Kromayer and Veith’s Antike Schlachtfelder.25  Yet on the whole, the 
combination of our surviving literary evidence and generations of meticulous research 
corroborating ancient names with modern locations is sufficient to set Roman strategy against 
the physical backdrop of the Iberian peninsula. 
This is particularly true thanks to GIS technology’s ability to generalize and average data.  
Taking advantage of this capability, the analysis in this chapter (as well as Chapters Three and 
Four) uses a pair of techniques to generate a healthy margin of error, acknowledging and 
addressing the inevitable shortcomings of our geographic knowledge.  The first, “generalized 
positioning,” compensates for the small errors that results from the imprecision of our sources: 
the fact that Livy and other authors rarely locate battles in terms more specific than a 
surrounding region or nearby town.  The second technique, “accuracy in aggregate,” adds a 
                                                          
24 TIR Porto 1991; TIR Caesaraugusta 1993; TIR Lisboa 1995; TIR Tarraco 1997; TIR Valencia 2002; 
Talbert 2000; <https://pleiades.stoa.org/>. Though largely peripheral to this chapter’s survey of textual 
evidence, archaeological reports (including important work on Roman fort construction and military 
activity) continue to be published at a steady rate: Keay 2003; Abad Casal, Keay, and Ramallo Asensio 
2006; Morillo and Aurrecoechea 2006. 
 
25 Kromayer and Veith 1903-1931. 
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degree of safety to our analysis by focusing on average trends over large datasets, rather than the 
sometimes debatable specifics of any given data-point.  
 Generalized positioning refers to the practice of evaluating the relationship of force, 
control, and terrain based not on specific sites (point features, in GIS terms) but on larger areas 
around those sites (polygon features).26  The quantitative tools of GIS software can capture the 
general, physical character of these larger features in a way that on-site autopsy or the use of 
traditional contour maps cannot.  Crucially, we can calculate the average TRI statistics for the 
area surrounding a putative battle-site (a TRI score, for short), and use this statistic as an 
indicator for the military difficulties of the local environment.  This practice of generalized 
positioning captures the uncertainty of ancient battlefields, and builds in a comfortable margin to 
accommodate errors that may result.  Shifting the proposed location for a battle or siege, even by 
a matter of miles, will have less dramatic effects on the average statistics for its surrounding 
polygon. 
 Accuracy in aggregate represents a larger-scale approach to the ambiguities of historical 
geography.  In this chapter, Sections Two and Three explore the long-term relationship between 
Roman force projection and rugged terrain, focusing on aggregate trends in the dataset, rather 
than on the proposed location and statistics of any individual battle or siege.  The uncertainty of 
any individual site thus disappears into the full geographic roster of Roman military activity.27  
                                                          
26 In this chapter, the default polygon feature is a circle with a 10 km radius surrounding each site of 
military activity attested in ancient literature.  The default radius for other chapters varies based on the 
security of our data and the type of warfare under consideration. 
 
27 This principle depends on the assumption that scholarly hypotheses on ancient geography are not 
systematically skewed in relationship to the physical environment.  While this is impossible to prove 
definitively, I have been unable to find a clear and consistent bias in the placement of ancient sites with 
respect to terrain. 
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Take, for example, the hotly debated location of Scipio’s victory at Ilipa: whether we place this 
battle at its conventional location of Acalá del Rio, or at Appian’s Carmo, or somewhere 
between the two, we will see minimal change in its TRI statistics, and essentially no impact on 
the averages across the data as a whole.28  Even in examples where locational information is 
even less secure, as in the case of Publius and Gnaeus Scipio’s defeat in 211, accuracy in 
aggregate still provides a level of insurance: an error in the specific placement of this event will 
not significantly skew broader trends in the relationship between terrain and force projection.29  
While this approach does not eliminate the need for careful scrutiny of proposed geographic 
identifications, in cases where one or more plausible locations can be determined for an ancient 
site, accuracy in aggregate allows us to move forward even in the face of uncertainty.30  
Starting from the hypothesis that the named sites of military action in our sources 
represent the foci of Roman military efforts, the next two sections construct a spatial narrative of 
Roman warfare in Spain, focusing on the strategic relationship between military force and 
rugged terrain.  While this narrative cannot entirely break free of “histoire éventuelle” and 
specific assertions about the locations of Roman violence, every effort is made to indicate where 
our geospatial data is less than certain, and to corroborate the broad, structural outlines of the 
Spanish conquest through quantitative analysis.  In this way, generalized positioning and 
                                                          
28 Livy, 28.12-16; Polyb. 11.21-24.  Cf. Frontin. Str. 2.1.1, 2.3.4; Polyaenus, Strat. 8.16.1.  For a modern 
summary of the campaign and battle: Curchin 1991, 28.  For debate over the location: Scullard 1936; 
Walbank 1967, 296; Millán León 1986; Keay 1988, 29. 
 
29 Livy, 25.32-36, 28.19-20; Plin. HN 3.9; cf. App. Hisp. 32; Flor. 1.33.6.  On the debate over location, 
see among others TIR Valencia 83; Tovar 1989, 165; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 663. 
 
30 As will become clear, there are no universally applicable criteria to distinguish plausible and 
implausible locations.  Operating on a case-by-case basis, I have attempted to exclude as few proposed 
locations as possible, doing so only in the rare cases when a proposed site would directly contradict 
securely established information.  See, for example, the case of Cartala/Althaia, below. 
82 
 
accuracy in aggregate provide a historical GIS methodology that is tolerant of the unavoidable 
ambiguity of our data, and that can confidently trace major trends in the environmental history of 
Roman warfare. 
 
Section Two: The Spanish Front During the Second Punic War (218 – 206 BCE)  
 
Mapping Roman violence in the early conquest of Spain reveals Rome’s evolving 
relationship with broken ground, as its opponents and objectives in the peninsula changed over 
forty years of near-ceaseless combat.  When Roman armies initially arrived in this theater in 218, 
they brought from Italy a longstanding antipathy to warfare on rugged terrain, a preference that 
was only reinforced by the priorities of their Carthaginian foes.  In the Spanish campaigns of the 
Second Punic War, we see Chapter One’s literary topoi surrounding military space put most 
clearly into practice.  The sites where our sources record Roman military activity in this period 
predominantly sit on level terrain, the coastal plains and river valleys where the Roman army—
and, we should expect, their Punic opponents—preferred to fight.31  This geographic pattern 
provides an important counterpoint to triumphalist Greco-Roman narratives of the Spanish 
conquest.  While Rome’s strategy was well adapted to challenge the Carthaginians in Spain, 
upon closer examination the hegemony which it won there proved thin and illusory.  The 
Romans beat the Carthaginians, but that was all: between 218 and 206, the geographic 
                                                          
31 Dyson 1987, 175-76.  Given the nature of ancient agriculture, these spaces were not only tactically 
suitable for Roman warfare, but also typically wealthier and more capable of provisioning Roman armies 
than the neighboring hills and mountains.  
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disposition of Roman violence did little to win deep and extensive control over Spanish 
territory.32 
Carthage naturally looms large in the story of Rome’s seizure of the Iberian peninsula.  
Whatever Rome’s underlying motives of greed and glory, the Second Punic War was the 
proximate cause for its entry into Spain, and Rome first wrested the peninsula not from its 
inhabitants, but from the Carthaginians.33  To a significant extent, the Romans in Spain inherited 
approaches to terrain and control from the peninsula’s previous conquerors.  We should start, 
therefore, by briefly reviewing what the Romans knew (or thought they knew) about Punic rule 
in Iberia.  As can be seen in Map 2.3 and Tables 2.1 and 2.2, what little our Greco-Roman 
sources preserve about the geography of Carthaginian forces in Spain suggests that the Barcid 
governors typically centered their power on level ground and coastal sites, moving into higher 
and more rugged terrain only late in their rule. 
 Carthage’s imperial project in Spain began in earnest in 237 with the campaigns of 
Hamilcar Barca (Hannibal’s father).34  With its power in the central Mediterranean crippled by 
the First Punic War and subsequent mercenary revolts, Carthage turned its attentions west.35  
Diodorus Siculus records Hamilcar’s conquest of Gades (modern Cádiz), his foundation of Akra 
                                                          
32 On the distinctions between extensive and intensive control, see especially Landers 2003.  For 
comparative perspectives on conquest as a political and military process, see Day 2008; Lee 2020 
(forthcoming). 
 
33 Richardson 1986, 31-35; 1991, 9-40; Curchin 1991, 24-28.  On broader motivations for Roman 
expansion, see Harris 1979; Champion 2004; Eckstein 2005; 2008  
 
34 Richardson 1996, 16-18.  For locations of Carthaginian military activity between 237 and 218, refer to 
Maps 2.3 and 2.4. 
 
35 Polyb. 2.1.  On the motivations for Hamilcar’s campaign: Keay 1988, 25; Curchin 1991, 24; 
Richardson 1996, 16-18. 
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Leuke on the Mediterranean coast, and his defeat and death in battle against the Orissi at nearby 
Helike in 229.36  The command in Spain passed to Hasdrubal (Hamilcar’s son-in-law), who led a 
retaliatory campaign against the inland home of the Orisssi, allegedly capturing a dozen 
unnamed cities.37  Of greater long-term significance was his foundation of Carthago Nova on the 
southeast coast, and the establishment of the “Ebro Treaty” of 226, which set the river as a 
tenuous divide between Roman and Punic spheres of influence.38    
 As shown on Map 2.3, to this point, all Punic activity important enough for our sources to 
locate (with the exception of Hasdrubal’s strike against the Orissi) was set on the Spanish coasts.  
Table 2.1 confirms that the early centers of Carthaginian force were uniformly on the level, with 
their local TRI statistics averaging to the 1st percentile compared to the Spanish landscape as a 
whole.  Even the Orissi were far from mountaineers: a loose approximation of their territory has 
a TRI profile only slightly above the Spanish average (see Table 2.2).39 
                                                          
36 On Gades: Diod. Sic. 25.10-12; BAtlas 26 D5 Gadeira/Gades; Pleaides 256177.  On Akra Leuke: Diod. 
Sic. 25.10-12; BAtlas 27 E3 Lucentum; Pleiades 265954.  On Helike: BAtlas 27 E3 Ilici/Helike; Pleiades 
265922.  The Orissi (probably the “Iberian Oretes” in Polyb. 3.33) are an alternate name for the Oretani.  
As Diod. Sic. 25.11 makes clear, they had gone on the offensive from their homeland north of the Baetis 
river to raise the Carthaginian siege of Helike on the coast.  See Schulten 1935-1937 (hereafter, Schulten 
FHA) 3.12; Tovar 1989, 29-30;  BAtlas 27 B3 Oretania; Pleiades 265989.  Pleiades entries are listed by 
their ID numbers and are available at pleiades.stoa.org. 
 
37 Diod. Sic. 25.12. 
 
38 On Carthago Nova: Diod. Sic. 25.12.  Cf. Livy, 21.5, 21.21., 26.42; Polyb. 3.33, 10.8-9.  BAtlas 27 E4; 
Pleiades 265849.  On the Ebro Treaty: Livy, 21.2.  The exact terms of the Ebro Treaty are unclear.  
Whatever its putative effects on Carthage, it clearly did not stop Rome from expanding its diplomatic ties 
to Saguntum, well south of the Ebro.  Richardson 1986, 20-30; Curchin, 1991, 25. 
 
39 The TRI statistics for tribal areas are calculated based on a 50 km radius surrounding their label as 
drawn in the Barrington Atlas; TRI scores for areas are calculated in terms of TRI per square kilometer, 
in order to compensate for regions of differing sizes.   
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Hasdrubal was assassinated in 221.  His successor, by popular acclaim within the army, 
was Hannibal Barca, son of Hamilcar and (allegedly) an unswerving enemy of the Romans.40  
According to our literary evidence, Hannibal launched a series of campaigns more aggressive 
and geographically extensive than those of his predecessors.  Using Carthago Nova as a base, 
Hannibal invaded the territory of the Olcades in 221, capturing their capital—Cartala in Livy, 
Althaia in Polybius—and extending Carthaginian force into the hills between the Tagus and 
Baetis rivers.41  The following year, Punic armies invaded the territory of the Vaccaei along the 
Durius river, capturing the towns of Hermandica and Arbocola.42  Returning to Carthago Nova 
through the Spanish interior, Hannibal successfully fought a major battle against the Carpetani 
somewhere along the Tagus river.  Livy claims, with some exaggeration, that after this victory, 
“everything beyond the Ebro, except Saguntum, was in the hands of the Carthaginians.”43 
In 219, Hannibal took aim at Saguntum itself, provoking conflict between the city and the 
neighboring Turdetani.44  Hannibal’s motives are not entirely clear—the hostile Greco-Roman 
source tradition cannot help us—but he must have suspected that a move against Saguntum 
                                                          
40 Diod. Sic. 25.12; Livy, 21.3; Polyb. 2.36. 
 
41 Livy, 21.5; Polyb. 3.13.  On the Olcades: BAtlas 27 A2; Pleiades 265984.  Cartala/Althaia is left 
unlocated on Map 2.3: BAtlas 27 UNLOC; Pleiades 270296; TIR Valencia 128.  Sumner 1968, 216 
suggests the small town of Altea on the Mediterranean coast; this is rejected by Tovar 1989, 185, and is 
impossible given the positioning of the Olcades in BAtlas. 
 
42 Livy, 21.5; Polyb. 3.14.  On the Vaccaei: BAtlas 24 G3; Pleiades 236706.  On Hermandica (modern 
Salamanca): BAtlas 24 F4 Salmantica; Pleiades 236642; TIR Madrid 195.  On Arbocola: Tovar 1989, 
323; BAtlas 24 F3; Pleiades 236340. 
 
43 Livy, 21.5: et iam omnia trans Hiberum praeter Saguntinos Carthaginiensium erant. Cf. Polyb. 3.14. 
 
44 Livy, 21.6; The precise location of this tribe is unknown—contextually they must be neighbors of 
Saguntum, probably centered around the unlocated settlement of Turda (see Livy, 33.44) not the more 
famous Turdetani of the Baetis valley.  Knapp 1980, 47-54 (but cf. Astin 1978, 34). 
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would provoke a Roman response.45  Though Rome declared war, its assistance arrived far too 
late for the Saguntines, and Hannibal sacked the city before the end of 219.46  He followed his 
victory with the most aggressive moves yet against the rugged highlands of Spain.  According to 
Polybius, Hannibal attacked and subdued the Ilergetes, Bargusii, Arenosii, and Andosini.47  Livy 
(who uses Polybius as his main source here) records the first two tribes, and adds (presumably 
from one of the annalists) the Ausetani and Lacetani to the list of Hannibal’s victims, along with 
a cryptic reference to the town of Onusa.48 
Hannibal’s campaigns were territorially extensive, and far less focused on coastal bases 
than those of his predecessors.  We may see these campaigns as an effort to tighten Carthaginian 
imperial control over inland Spain, some 20 years after the initial establishment of littoral 
strongholds; Rome would follow a notably similar trajectory in its own conquest of the 
peninsula.  However, when it comes to military terrain, GIS analysis identifies Hannibal’s 
campaigns as a late and mostly moderate variation on previous patterns of Carthaginian warfare 
in the plains.  While more rugged than previous conquests, Hannibal’s inland prizes of Arbocola 
and Hermandica did not sit on particularly broken ground in absolute terms: their TRI averages 
                                                          
45 Polyb. 3.29-30; Richardson 1986, 28. 
 
46 App. Hisp. 12; Eutr. 3.7; Livy, 21.6-16; Polyb. 3.33. The slowness of the Roman response to Saguntum 
was later a point of criticism by wavering Spanish allies: see Livy, 34.11. 
 
47 Polyb. 3.35.  On the Ilergetes: BAtlas 25 F4; Pleiades 246432.  On the Bargusii (an alternate name for 
the Bergistani): Tovar 1989, 39-40; BAtlas 25 G4 Bergistani; Pleiades 246239.  On the Aerenosii: BAtlas 
25 F3; Pleiades 246164.  On the Andosini: BAtlas 25 G3 Andosinoi; Pleiades 246164. 
   
48 Livy, 21.22-23.  On the Ausetani: BAtlas 25 H4; Pleiades 246211.  On the Lacetani: BAtlas 25 G4 
Lacetania; Pleaides 246458.  Cf. App. Hisp. 13, which records a general outline of Hannibal’s campaigns 
in northeastern Spain without giving geographic specifics. On Onusa: Livy indicates without further 
expansion that Hannibal marched past this town on the way from Carthago Nova to the Ebro; given this 
description, it cannot be the Onuba of BAtlas 27 A4.  Following an early identification by Schulten, 
Tovar 1989, 476 tentatively identifies it with modern Peñíscola on the Mediterranean coast. 
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in the low 100s are unremarkable in the Iberian context, and probably caused slight but not 
overwhelming military difficulties.  The aggregate TRI score for Hannibal’s urban conquests 
only reaches the 16th percentile compared to Spanish terrain as a whole.  The evidence from 
tribal and regional toponyms (Table 2.2) is admittedly more ambiguous: in particular, the 
Aernosii and Andosini dwelt on extremely mountainous terrain.  However, the campaigns in 219 
are best understood as groundwork for Hannibal’s march against Italy, rather than a long-term 
effort at rule over the Pyrenees.  In aggregate, Punic military control in Spain (as understood by 
Greco-Roman authors) rested on the deployment of force over level ground.   
*** 
This geographic precedent, along with the Romans’ preexisting reservations about broken 
ground combat, shaped the early configuration of the Second Punic War in Spain.  Considering 
the geospatial patterns of Roman deployment during this conflict on Map 2.4 and Tables 2.3 and 
2.4, it becomes clear that Rome adopted Carthage’s longstanding (though not inflexible) focus 
on controlling narrow stretches of relatively level terrain, first on the Mediterranean coast, and 
later in the Baetis river-valley.  Under the command of two generations of Scipiones, the 
Romans’ primary mission was the defeat of the Carthaginian field armies; pacification of the 
Spaniards themselves was less important.   
Although the Roman Senate assigned Spain to the consul Publius Scipio in 218, initial 
fighting was directed by his brother Gnaeus Scipio as legate.49  From the start, according to Livy, 
Gnaeus’ mission was expansionist, but primarily concerned with Carthaginian power rather than 
                                                          
49 Richardson 1986, 31-37 notes the flexibility which Roman field commanders such as the Scipiones 
evidently enjoyed to modify arrangements of the Senate based on the conditions they found in provincia.  
On the historical significance of this decision for the Roman conquest of Spain, see Richardson 1996, 25. 
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local resistance: the Romans fought “with the object not merely of protecting old allies and of 
winning over new ones, but also of driving Hasdrubal out of Spain.”50  In the first months of 
warfare, Gnaeus successfully restored Roman hegemony in the northeast of the peninsula, 
though major operations and firm imperial control were limited to the coastal plain.51  The 
Romans initially landed at Emporiae in the far northeast; this Massilian colony was perhaps one 
of very few cities which remained friendly to Rome after Hannibal’s victories in early 218.52  
Moving south, Gnaeus reestablished diplomatic ties with Spanish tribes: only the Laeetani are 
named, though Livy claims that the Spanish coast as far as the Ebro returned to the Roman 
fold.53  While the actual exercise of force is not yet mentioned—Livy ascribes Gnaeus’ 
diplomatic successes to a reputation for clemency—the threat of violence certainly played a role.  
With the nearest Carthaginian garrison far away at Tarraco, the Spaniards must have found 
Gnaeus’ force of 20,000 quite persuasive.54 
The first direct clash between Roman and Punic forces took place at Cissis; Gnaeus 
defeated and captured the Carthaginian general Hanno, before taking the town itself.55  In the 
                                                          
50 Livy, 21.32: Cn. Scipionem fratrem cum maxima parte copiarum adversus Hasdrubalem misit, non ad 
tuendos tantummodo veteres socios conciliandosque novos, sed etiam ad pellendum Hispania 
Hasdrubalem. 
 
51 Curchin 1995, 21; Owens 2017, 29. 
 
52 Livy, 21.60; Polyb. 3.76.  It played a similar role for Scipio Africanus after the defeat of his father and 
uncle (Livy, 26.19), and for Cato the Elder against Spanish rebels in 195 BCE (Livy, 34.8-9).  On 
Emporiae: BAtlas 25 I3; Pleiades 246382. 
 
53 Livy, 21.60.  On the Laeetani: BAtlas 25 H4 Laeetania; Pleiades 246460; TIR Tarraco 97. 
 
54 Livy, 21.60.  On the size of Gnaeus’ army, Richardson 1996, 25-26. 
 
55 Livy, 21.60; Polyb. 3.76; Lazenby 1978, 126; Richardson 1976, 27; Owens 2017, 29.  On Cissa: BAtlas 
25 G4 Kissa/Cissis; Pleiades 246452.  Cf. Walsh 1985, 234; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 638. 
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aftermath, the main Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal fell back south of the Ebro, and the 
Romans established a garrison in Tarraco, which would serve as their primary base for the 
remainder of the war.56  However, Gnaeus was unable to press his advantage in late 218: issues 
of local control and native revolt pulled his attention north, giving Hasdrubal precious time to 
recuperate.  Bribed by the Carthaginians, the inland tribe of the Ilergetes rebelled, despite 
previously making a treaty and delivering hostages.57  Gnaeus subdued the Ilergetes and captured 
their capital of Atanagrus, but was drawn even further from the Carthaginian front by an uprising 
among the Ausetani and Lacetani in the southern foothills of the Pyrenees.58 
These early rebellions call into question the success of Gnaeus’ diplomacy earlier in 218, 
and highlight the strategic drawbacks of Rome’s race down the coast to engage the 
Carthaginians.  GIS analysis suggests that Gnaeus, in his haste to concentrate his forces against a 
conventional enemy in the plains around Cissis and Tarraco, failed to impose sufficient control 
on the more dispersed and rugged territories to his rear.  As Table 2.3 indicates, every Roman 
conquest in 218 that we can associate with a specific point-feature took place on very level 
terrain: concentrated at these sites, the Roman army was impossible to resist.  The tribal areas in 
                                                          
56 Livy, 21.61.  Hasdrubal was able to strike a blow, more symbolic than decisive, against disorganized 
Roman forces pillaging around Tarraco.  On Tarraco: BAtlas 25 G4 Col. Tarraco; Pleiades 246349. 
 
57 Livy, 21.61.  On the Ilergetes: BAtlas 25 F4; Pleiades 246432.  Lazenby 1978, 126 is dubious that this 
revolt occurred; Polyb. 3.76 makes no mention of it.  Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 633-634 argue that Livy’s 
narrative is broadly correct, but that the rebels were a coastal Ilergetes (centered perhaps on the modern 
town of Olerdola) rather than the inland Ilergetes of Barrington.  Map 2.4 tentatively marks Olerdola as 
an alternate center-point for the Ilergetes. 
 
58 Livy, 21.61.  Lazenby 1978, 126 continues his objection (see above) to Livy’s accuracy; Hoyos and 
Yardley 2009, 638 continue their support of the narrative.  On Atanagrus: Walsh 1985, 235 suggests that 
it is in the vicinity of Ilerda (BAtlas 25 F4; Pleiades 246431), the later capital of the Ilergetes.  Its 
positioning on Map 2.4 is tentative but plausible. On the Lacetani: BAtlas 25 G4; Pleiades 946458; TIR 
Tarraco 96-97.  On the Ausetani: BAtlas 25 H4; Pleiades 246211.   
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Table 2.4 were statistically more rugged in comparison with the Spanish average, and thus 
arguably more resistant to Roman authority.  As Roman columns flew toward Tarraco, the 
Ilergetes, Lacetani, and Ausetani may have supposed that a combination of defensive landscape 
and Rome’s evident focus on the Mediterranean littoral would protect them from serious 
retribution.59 
As it happened, these tribes were only partially correct.  Gnaeus successfully redeployed 
his army to put down their rebellions in late 218, and if the relatively rugged terrain of the 
Ausetani or Lacetani caused difficulties for Roman troops, Livy does not record them.  Yet even 
these campaigns were a stopgap measure, quick strikes before the Romans moved to winter 
quarters at Tarraco; they did not mark a significant change in geostrategic priorities.60  The 
Ilergetes would rebel again just a year later, and a major rebellion by the Ilergetes, Lacetani, and 
many of their neighbors in 206 suggests that Roman authority over Spain’s northeastern tribes in 
this early period was never particularly pervasive.61  While Gnaeus could evidently bring force to 
bear against rugged, inland space, such campaigns were risky and ultimately secondary to 
Rome’s primary mission in the coastal plain.  Driven by discomfort and interest, Roman control 
in the Spanish hills was accordingly tenuous.  
While Roman campaigns in 217 expanded beyond northeast Spain, GIS analysis indicates 
that this remained an essentially lowland, coastal war.  As in 218, the centerpiece of Livy’s 
                                                          
59 This phenomenon is explored in more detail in Chapter Three, where I argue that a similar perception 
of “safe” defensive terrain surrounding Jerusalem helped motivate the initial Jewish resistance to Cestius 
Gallus. 
 
60 Livy, 22.19; Polyb. 3.76, 3.95. 
 
61 See below, and App. Hisp. 37; Livy, 22.21, 28.24-34; Polyb. 11.25-30. 
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narrative is a conventional battle between the main Roman and Carthaginian armies: both sides 
combined their ground and naval forces, which moved in tandem along the coast to collide at the 
mouth of the Ebro river.62  Recognizing the superior size of the Carthaginian army, Cn. Scipio 
attacked by sea and caught Hasdrubal by surprise.  Roman crews captured twenty-five of the 
Carthaginians’ forty warships and forced the remainder ashore, effectively assuring Roman naval 
dominance over the Spanish coast for the remainder of the war.63   
The Romans followed up their victory on the Ebro with a string of successful operations, 
almost entirely confined to the plains of the Mediterranean coast: retaliation against the 
rebellious Ilergetes and a march to Castulo (potentially an anachronistic mistake on Livy’s part, 
but included nevertheless under the principles of accuracy in aggregate) are exceptions, but 
insufficient to disrupt the general trend. 64  Gnaeus first launched a series of raids well south into 
Carthaginian territory, taking the towns of Onusa and Longuntica and pillaging the island of 
Ebusus, although he failed to capture the city of the same name.65  An indecisive standoff against 
                                                          
62 Livy, 22.19.   
 
63 Livy, 22.20; Polyb. 3.96.  Perhaps cf. Frontin. Str. 4.7.9.  Curchin 1991, 25-26; Owens 2017, 29-31. 
 
64 On the Ilergetes: Livy, 22.21. Though Livy downplays its significance, the resurgence of the Ilergetes 
gives further evidence that the Roman focus on its Carthaginian opponent and the Mediterranean littoral 
came with costs for nominally pacified, inland territory behind the front lines.  On the march against 
Castulo in 217: Livy, 22.20.  For the strategic and chronological implausibility of this campaign, see 
Lazenby 1978, 127; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 642.  On Castulo’s later importance, see below, and App. 
Hisp. 16, 32; Livy, 28.12, 28.19-20; Polyb. 11.20.  On the location of Castulo: BAtlas 27 B3; Pleiades 
265855. 
 
65 Livy, 22.20.  Richardson 2000, 118 calls these raids “almost certainly fictitious,” preferring App. Hisp. 
15’s account of Gnaeus achievements (or, more precisely, his lack thereof).  However, both Hoyos and 
Yardley 2009, 642 and the usually skeptical Lazenby 1978, 127 find them plausible.  Tovar 1989, 463 
tentatively places Onusa at modern Peñíscola, following an earlier argument in Schulten FHA 3.55, 66-
67, 115.  On Longuntica: BAtlas 27 D4; Pleiades 265952; Lazenby 1978, 127; Tovar 1989, 165-66.  On 
Ebusus: BAtlas 27 G2; Pleiades 265884 (for the island) and Pleiades 265883 (for the city). 
92 
 
Hasdrubal followed in the territory of the Ilergavonenses near the mouth of the Ebro, and at the 
unlocated but probably coastal site of Nova Classis (“New Fleet”).66  When the Carthaginians 
fell back to suppress a revolt in Celtiberia, Gnaeus united with reinforcements under his brother 
Publius and marched to Saguntum, where they arranged for the betrayal of the city’s Spanish 
hostages in a major diplomatic windfall.67  As Table 2.3 indicates, none of these locations had a 
TRI score above the 5th percentile. 
 For the remaining years of P. and Cn. Scipio’s command, Livy’s narrative is problematic 
in terms of both chronology and geography, and it is difficult to make out more than general 
patterns with any confidence.68  At least in part, Rome continued to concentrate its forces on 
level ground, much of it along the Mediterranean coast.  In 216, Publius and Gnaeus’ combined 
forces fought perhaps the most strategically significant action of the Spanish wars somewhere 
near Hibera, defeating Hasdrubal in open battle and preventing him from marching to Italy with 
reinforcements for Hannibal.69  In subsequent years, Livy records Roman victories at Intibili just 
                                                          
66 Livy, 22.21.  Lazenby 1978, 127 is dubious on the historicity of this episode.  The Ilergavonenses were 
centered on the town of Dertosa, later known as Hibera Iulia Ilercavonia (BAtlas 25 F5; Pleiades 246369).  
Nova Classis is unknown, but based on its name and evident proximity to the Ilergavonenses, it is 
probably on the Mediterranean coast.  See TIR Tarraco 113; Tovar 1989, 467; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 
642-43.  Map 2.4 uses the site of Dertosa as a loose and tentative approximation for the abortive standoff 
in 217 between Cn. Scipio and Hasdrubal. 
 
67 Livy, 22.22; Polyb. 3.97-99.  Cf. Lazenby 1978, 128.  On the alleged camp of the Scipiones near 
Saguntum, see Curchin 1991, 25. On the Celtiberians: BAtlas 25 B4 Celtiberia; Pleiades 246322.  We 
may take this uprising as evidence that Carthage’s own longstanding emphasis on level ground caused 
similar problems for its control over the hills of the Spanish interior. 
 
68 Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 657-58. 
 
69 Livy, 23.28-29; Lazenby 1978, 128-29; Owens 2017, 50-53.  Hasdrubal would ultimately march to 
Italy in 208 after his defeat at Baecula, only to be defeated at the Battle of the Metaurus river before 




south of the Ebro and an indecisive action near Castrum Album (formerly the Carthaginian Akra 
Leuke).70 Roman forces also liberated Saguntum, their original casus belli, and enslaved the 
neighboring Turdetani (whose complaints were the excuse for Hannibal’s siege in 219).71 
Livy also relates a gradual shift west into the upper reaches of the Baetis valley, the 
beginnings of an offensive which Scipio Africanus would ultimately press to victory.  Though 
hardly a radical departure from their previous modus operandi of combat in the plains, these 
inland campaigns increasingly took the Romans into the Spanish hills, presaging later changes in 
imperial strategy.  Roman armies raised two Carthaginian sieges of Iliturgis and posted a 
detachment in the town; Castulo appears to have received a similar garrison in or shortly after 
214.72  In 214, according to Livy’s chronology, Gnaeus Scipio won a string of victories at 
Bigerra, Munda, and Orongis (here called Aurinx).73  While our locational data is uncertain for 
                                                          
70 Livy, 23.49, 24.41.  Cf. Frontin. Str. 2.3.1.  Note doubts about the historicity of both battles in Lazenby 
1978, 129.  On Intibili: BAtlas 25 F5 Indibilis; Pleiades 246439; TIR Tarraco 94.  On Castrum Album: 
Tovar 1989, 201-204; BAtlas 27 E3 Lucentum; Pleiades 265954.  Livy records that the Romans were 
driven from Castrum Album, and pulled back to Mons Victoria: its location is unknown, see Hoyos and 
Yardley 2009, 658.   
 
71 Livy, 24.42.  These Turdetani are unlocated, and distinct from the more famous tribe in Baetica. 
 
72 Livy, 23.49, 24.41.  For Castulo, cf. App. Hisp. 16.   Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 653, 658 doubt Livy’s 
geography on the first battle of Iliturgis (allegedly in 215), but accept the second in (in 214).  On Iliturgis: 
BAtlas 27 B4; Pleiades 265924. 
 
73 Livy, 24.41-42.  Bigerra in unlocated in Barrington: BAtlas 27 UNLOC, Pleiades 270306.  Cf. TIR 
Valencia 110-11.  However, Tovar 1989, 167 (following an argument by Müller) suggests a location near 
modern Becerra, where I have tentatively placed it on Maps 2.5 and 2.6.  On Munda: BAtlas 26 E4; 
Pleiades 356314.  Neue Pauly s.v. Munda places it somewhat to the west at modern Montilla, south of 
Corduba.  Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 658 are skeptical of a Roman advance so deep into Baetica—though 
Livy’s narrative seems at least internally consistent—and suggest that Munda is a mistake for Unda/Undi 
from Plin. HN 3.10 (for which, Tovar 1974, 140; BAtlas 26 UNLOC).  Aurinx/Orongis reappears in Livy, 
28.3-4 (and cf. Eutr. 3.16).  For the location, see Tovar 1989, 152-53; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 658, 682; 
BAtlas 27 B4 Aurgi/Orongis; Pleiades 265810. 
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both Bigerra and Munda, the aggregate trend towards somewhat more broken ground is clear at 
the bottom of Table 2.3. 
To the extent that we can speculate on their location, Publius and Gnaeus’ final, 
disastrous battles in 211 probably reflect this trend.74  The evidentiary problems are too thorny to 
address in full detail here.  Livy records Gnaeus’ defeat near Amtorgis, perhaps Iliturgis on the 
Baetis, which Livy later implicates in the death of the Scipios.75  Pliny places the disaster at 
Ilorcum: this can be plausibly identified with Ilugo in the upper Baetis valley, though an 
alternative argument puts the site at Ilorci near modern Mercia (both options are included on 
Map 2.4 and Table 2.3) .76  Appian claims that Publius and Gnaeus fell near Orso, Barrington’s 
Urso.77  He is probably mistaken, at least in detail—it seems inconceivable that the main Roman 
army could advance so far west without more fanfare surviving in our sources—yet Appian may 
preserve the hazy memory of some early Roman raiding into the lower Baetis valley, and under 
the principles of accuracy in aggregate we may tentatively include Orso as a fourth military site 
for 211.78  Of the four locations, Ilugo is significantly rugged (60th percentile), and Iliturgis is 
moderately so (25th).  Ilorci and Orso are somewhat more level (10th and 14th percentile, 
respectively), but still more rugged than most combat sites of earlier years. 
                                                          
74 On these defeats, cf. Polyb. 10.6-7, which does not name a location. 
 
75 Livy, 25.32-36, 28.19-20 and cf. App. Hisp. 32; Flor. 1.33.6.  TIR Valencia 83; Tovar 1989, 165; 
Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 663. 
 
76 Plin. HN 3.9.  Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 686 argue for Ilugo: BAtlas 27 B3; Pleiades 265929.  Tovar 
1989, 165 (following Schulten FHA 3.90) argues for Lorca, Barrington’s Ilorci: BAtlas 27 D3; Pleiades 
265927. 
 
77 App. Hisp. 16. On Orso: BAtlas 26 E4 Urso; Pleiades 256503. 
 
78 Cf. Richardson 1986, 41; 2000, 119.   
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 While the death of the Scipiones threw Rome’s position in Spain temporarily into crisis, 
their seven-year tenure in the Iberian peninsula was wildly successful on the whole.  Until 211, 
they never lost a battle significant enough to enter our historical record.  Map 2.4 speaks to the 
geographic scope of the brothers’ accomplishments: from a toehold in Emporiae, they extended 
Roman force to the Punic stronghold of Carthago Nova in the south, and began to threaten the 
Baetis valley in the southwest.  At the same time, this map and the accompanying tables reveals 
the flexible but ever-present environmental strictures on Roman campaigning: even accounting 
for their late push into the hills around the Baetis’ headwaters, Gnaeus and Publius made little 
penetration into truly rugged Spanish territory.  Between 218 and 211, the average site of Roman 
force projection had a local TRI score of 63.7 m (10th percentile of the Spanish average).  While 
the Romans doubtless made war on more rugged terrain, according to our surviving records the 
foci of violence were predominantly located in the Spanish plains.  Whether due to the Romans’ 
traditional antipathy to broken ground combat, or the fact that Carthage’s own strategic centers 
of gravity tended toward the coastal and riverine, Publius and Gnaeus Scipio showed 
comparatively little interest in Spain’s foothills and highlands, let alone the mountains 
themselves. 
*** 
With the events of 211, we enter a new phase of the Spanish war (for which, see Map 2.5 
and Tables 2.5 and 2.6).  After a brief interregnum under the command of Gaius Nero, Roman 
forces fought under Scipio Africanus down to 206 (I use the cognomen to distinguish him from 
his homonymous father, even though he did not earn it until 202).  From a narrative standpoint, 
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Scipio’s campaigns are well explored by modern historians.79  However, where these scholars 
focus on military geography at all, it is typically in pursuit of specific battle sites (most notably 
for the decisive Roman victory at Ilipa).80  If we take a broader geographic view, it is clear that 
whatever the ambiguities in the precise locations of Scipio’s actions, he extended the westward 
thrust of his predecessors’ later campaigns, but maintained their general preference for level 
ground (with corresponding consequences for Roman authority—or lack thereof—over the 
Spanish hill-tribes).   
Following Publius and Gnaeus’ death, Rome’s continued hold on northeastern Spain was 
ensured by Lucius Marcius, a junior officer of indeterminate rank and probably overblown 
reputation, who captured a pair of Carthaginian camps in a daring nighttime raid.81  This feat 
perhaps occurred near the Ebro, but we receive no specifics.82  By 210, the Senate dispatched 
Gaius Nero to Spain with substantial reinforcements; he made landfall at Tarraco, still the hub 
for Roman forces on the Spanish front.83  According to Livy, Nero successfully trapped 
Hasdrubal’s army at Lapides Atri “in the country of the Ausetani, between the towns of Iliturgis 
                                                          
79 Scullard 1930; Lazenby 1978; Richardson 1996; Edwell 2011, 320-324; Owens 2017. 
 
80 Corzo-Sanchez 1975, 134-140; Millán León 1986.   
 
81 Livy, 25.37-39, 26.2.  Cf. Val. Max. 2.7.11 (which identifies Marcius as a military tribune); Cic. Balb. 
34 (which has him as a centurion).  On Marcius’ exaggerated reputation, see Lazenby 1978, 131; Owens 
2017, 82. 
 
82 See Livy 25.37, in which L. Marcius restores the Roman army after retreating north of the Ebro. Cicero, 
Balb. 34, alleges that Marcius made a treaty with the people of Gades: this seems thoroughly improbable, 
and in all likelihood retrojects Marcius’ attempts to arrange Gades’ defection in 206 to an earlier and 
better-known phase of his career. 
 
83 Livy, 26.17. 
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and Mentissa,” before Hasdrubal escaped by a ruse during feigned negotiations.84  Livy’s 
geography is confused here: Iliturgis (Ilugo) and Mentissa lie north of the Baetis’ headwaters, 
while the Ausetani are far to the northeast near Emporiae.85  Perhaps Livy or his sources 
conflated multiple reports of combat in both regions.  As seen on Tables 2.5 and 2.6, the 
locations associated with C. Nero’s campaigns are notably more rugged than the Spanish 
average: combat here suggests that in the aftermath of Publius and Gnaeus’ shocking defeat, it 
was these regions that broke most quickly and decisively from Roman authority, requiring 
unusually direct intervention on broken ground.   
We return to firmer evidence and more familiar patterns of Roman force projection with 
Scipio Africanus’ arrival in Spain in late 210 or early 209.86  Livy, Polybius, and Appian all 
agree that, after consolidating his forces in Emporiae and Tarraco, Scipio’s first major action was 
a daring strike on Carthago Nova, long a bulwark of Punic control over the south.87  With three 
Carthaginian armies (under squabbling commanders) distributed across the Iberian peninsula, 
                                                          
84 Liv. 26.17: Hasdrubal Hamilcaris ad Lapides Atros castra habebat; in Ausetanis is locus est inter 
oppida Iliturgim et Mentissam.  Richardson 2000, 120 rejects this episode entirely, preferring Appian’s 
account in Hisp. 17 which denies any notable Roman successes before Scipio Africanus’ arrival.  
Lazenby 1978, 132 is unsure whether Livy’s account is entirely factual, but deems that it is certainly 
possible. 
 
85 The Auesetani have already appeared as victims of Hannibal and rebels against Cn. Scipio, while 
Iliturgis on the Baetis has been discussed as a focal point for P. and Cn. Scipio’s later campaigns.  On 
Mentissa: BAtlas 27 C3 Mentesa; Pleiades 265969.  Rather than the Ausetani, Livy may have meant the 
Oretani, whose territory was near Mentissa and Iliturgis; see Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 668.  For an 
alternate proposed location well to the east, superseded by better material in BAtlas and Pleiades, see 
Lazenby 1978, 132 (following Scullard 1930, 50). 
 
86 On the chronology, Lazenby 1978, 132-133.  Livy, 26.41.  App. Hisp. 17 paints a grimmer picture, 
claiming that upon Scipio’s arrival nearly all of Spain had slipped from Rome’s control.  There is no 
reason to prefer Appian’s narrative on this point. See Curchin 1991, 26. 
 
87 Livy, 26.19, 26.41.  
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Scipio made a rapid march along the Mediterranean coast and took the stronghold by assault.88  
With this victory, he not only cut off a major naval lifeline connecting Spain with Carthage, but 
also secured a diplomatic coup by releasing the Spanish hostages held in Carthago Nova, the 
guarantors of local loyalty to Punic rule.89  Scipio garrisoned Carthago Nova and established it as 
a center for weapons production, before returning to winter in Tarraco, where he received 
emissaries from countless (and unnamed) Spanish tribes promising to join the Roman cause. 
With the Carthaginians routed from the Mediterranean coast, Scipio (like his father and 
uncle) turned his attentions to the Baetis valley, which would host most of the combat recorded 
by our sources for the remainder of the war.  The most significant engagement of 208, the battle 
of Baecula, took place in the same area of the upper Baetis where the Romans had now been 
fighting for several years.90  By Livy’s account, broken ground was a tactical factor in this battle: 
Hasdrubal’s army retreated to a defensible hilltop, pinning their hopes “upon position, not upon 
courage or arms.”91  Scipio made a daring assault uphill, routing his Carthaginian foe.  Yet our 
maps and tables highlight the discrepancy between the tactical significance of these hills 
                                                          
88 App. Hisp. 19-23 (who confuses Carthago Nova and Saguntum); Frontin. Str. 3.9.1; Livy, 26.42-46; 
Polyb. 10.10-15. Owens 2017, 93-98.  Livy (26.42) and Polybius (10.9) claim that Scipio marched from 
the Ebro to Carthago Nova in six days, flatly impossible given the distances involved.  See Lazenby 1978, 
135.  
 
89 Livy, 26.49-50; Polyb. 10.18-19. 
 
90 Appian may refer to this battle in Hisp. 24, though he refers to a clash near the city of Baetica.  See 
Richardson 2000, 126.  Appian also mentions earlier combat between Scipio and Hasdrubal near the town 
of Lersa: the site is unlocated and the battle is unconfirmed by any other source.  Richardson 2000, 126 
argues that Lersa is either an authorial error or textual corruption.  For an alternate, geographically 
improbable argument that reads Lersa as an error for the Ilergetes, see Goukowsky 1997 and Schulten 
FHA 3.127.  
 
91 Livy, 27.18: Scipio circumvectus ordines signaque ostendebat hostem, praedamnata spe aequo 
dimicandi campo captantem tumulos, loci fiducia, non virtutis aut armorum stare in conspectu…  cf. 
Polyb. 10.37-39. Owens 2017, 98-99. 
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(perhaps little more than a standardized battle topos in this instance) and the broader 
topographical character of Scipio’s operational environment: the area around Baecula is not 
entirely level, but it pales in comparison to the rugged heights to the north, east, and south.  
Whatever the details of this battlefield (its precise location remains unknown), it fell into a larger 
strategic context of lowland warfare over the relatively flat Baetis valley. 
We may productively pause to reflect on the aftermath of Scipio’s victory at Baecula, 
which suggests crucial drawbacks to Roman strategy: as Gnaeus found in the northeast in 218, 
the geographically narrow concentration of force brought a correspondingly narrow fragment of 
Spain under Roman control.  Defeated in open battle, Hasdrubal retreated north, tracing the 
course of the Tagus river before crossing the Pyrenees via an unspecified pass.92 By 207, he had 
made his way into Italy, inspiring terror in Rome itself.93  If we follow John Richardson’s 
assessment that the primary purpose of the Roman war in Spain was to prevent Carthaginian 
reinforcements from reaching Italy, the tactical victory at Baecula thus appears to be a strategic 
defeat.94  Scipio found that despite impressive victories against lowland Carthaginian 
strongholds, and despite the professed loyalty of the Spaniards in the aftermath of these 
triumphs, the Romans’ incipient imperial control in the peninsula did not stretch much further 
than the immediate striking range of their field army and garrisons.  It certainly did not extend 
into the more rugged ground that Hasdrubal must have crossed on his march northeast: here, the 
Carthaginian army was able to move unimpeded among peoples who Livy claims were 
                                                          
92 Livy, 27.19-20; Polyb. 10.39-40. 
 
93 It was only by a daring ruse that the Romans defeated Hasdrubal at the Metaurus river, dashing his 
hopes of reinforcing Hannibal in the south.  Livy, 27.36-39, 43-51; Polyb. 11.2-3.  Owens 2017, 105-109.   
 
94 Richardson 1996, 26-27. 
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nominally subject to Roman authority.95  Livy’s geographically vague approximation of these 
tribes, “nearly all the peoples dwelling on this side of the Ebro…and many also from the farther 
province,” reflects their tenuous relationship with the Roman state.96  When Scipio famously 
refused to be hailed as king after Baecula (preferring to be called imperator) he knew how little 
either title meant outside the limited, level spaces under intensive Roman military domination.97   
It was perhaps with this problem in mind that Scipio launched a punitive expedition into 
the hills of Celtiberia (a move which paralleled Gnaeus’ strikes against the Ilergetes, Lacetani, 
and Ausetani in 218).98  The Celtiberians had been a questionably loyal source of mercenaries for 
both sides, and Hasdrubal certainly passed through their territory in his march along the Tagus; 
Scipio may well have hoped to intimidate the tribe into more trustworthy allegiance, in addition 
to driving the Carthaginians from their lands.99  As both Map 2.5 and Table 2.6 show, this 
campaign certainly took the Romans onto more rugged ground, and Livy’s description of their 
victory against a joint Carthaginian and Celtiberian army is set on rough terrain.100  After the 
Romans’ initial success against their enemy’s concentrated forces, however, we hear nothing of 
wider attempts to punish the Celtiberians and pacify their territory.  With the battle lost, they 
                                                          
95 Livy, 26.51, 27.17. 
 
96 Livy, 26.51: et cuncti fere qui cis Hiberum incolunt populi, multi etiam ulterioris provinciae 
convenerunt. 
 
97 Livy, 27.19; Polyb. 10.40. 
 
98 Livy, 28.1-2. 
 
99 App. Hisp. 24; Livy, 22.21-22, 24.49, 25.33, 26.50.  Cf. Dio Cass. 16.42-43; Frontin. Str. 2.11.5; Polyb. 
10.19. 
 
100 Livy, 28.1-2. 
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“melted away into the nearby forests and then scattered to their homes.”101  They would rise in 
revolt the following year, suggesting that even this atypical Roman advance into Spain’s 
challenging highlands was too brief and narrowly focused to impose lasting imperial control.102 
Indeed, Scipio’s remaining actions in the war for Spain largely reverted to the lowland 
norms of Roman force projection.  To be sure, an abortive campaign in 207 through the Baetis 
valley drove the Carthaginians from Orongis, a hub for “making raids against the tribes of the 
interior” and the only military site of this period with a TRI score above the Spanish mean (see 
Table 2.6).103  Yet the decisive campaign of 206 was set on low and level ground, and Livy 
deploys standard topoi of set-piece combat: with their forces swelled by local recruits, the two 
Carthaginian commanders “established themselves in open plains, resolved not to refuse a 
battle.”104  Scipio advanced from Tarraco through Castulo, and after a skirmish at Baecula 
confronted the Carthaginians at Ilipa (Appian gives Carmo, somewhat to the east).105  The 
Carthaginians were defeated in the field and deserted by their allies; Scipio cut off their retreat 
                                                          
101 Livy, 28.2: Celtiberi…in proximas dilapsi silvas inde domos diffugerunt. 
 
102 Livy, 28.24. 
 
103 Livy, 28.3: ea arx fuerat Hasdrubali ad excursiones circa mediterraneos populos faciendas.  Orongis 
is identical to Aurinx, site of a Roman victory in Livy, 24.42.  See Richardson 1986, 50; Tovar 1989, 152-
153; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 658, 682. 
 
104 Livy, 28.12: ibi super campos patentes duo duces Poeni ea mente ne detrectarent certamen 
consederunt. 
 
105 App. Hisp. 25-26; Livy, 28.12-16; Polyb. 11.21-24.  Cf. Frontin. Str. 2.1.1, 2.3.4; Polyaenus, Strat. 
8.16.1.  Owens 2017, 109-112.  Castulo and Baecula are both sites of earlier engagements, and Livy’s 
inclusion of them may reflect their broader significance rather than the operational details of Scipio’s 
march.  For debate on the site for the decisive clash in 206: Wallbank 1967, 296; Corzo Sanchez 1975, 
234-240; Millán León 1986; Keay 1988, 29; Curchin 1991, 28; Richardson 2000, 127.  As noted above, 
the exact location of this battle is not particularly important for my purposes, and I have marked both Ilipa 
and Carmo on Map 2.5.  For Ilipa: BAtlas 26 E4 Ilipa Magna; Pleiades 256222. For Carmo: BAtlas 26 
E4; Pleiades 256058.  
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and surrounded the surviving Punic troops on a barren hill, while their commander escaped by 
sea to Gades.106  There would be some desultory fighting later this year before the Carthaginians 
withdrew even from this final refuge.  Yet as far as Livy was concerned, the war for Spain ended 
at Ilipa, on the same level terrain that had occupied most of Rome’s attention for the previous 
fourteen years.107  
 With the end of the Carthaginian threat, Rome began to modify its geostrategic priorities 
and patterns of force projection.  In quantitative terms, the changes in late 206 were admittedly 
slight: the aggregate TRI data does not look drastically different in the months after Ilipa than it 
did in the years before, and we continue to receive reports of Roman activity in the coastal 
plains.  Scipio’s lieutenants tightened their grip around the Straits of Gibraltar, fighting a naval 
engagement at Carteia and seizing Gades after the Carthaginian position there proved 
untenable.108  Scipio himself dealt with a mutinous garrison at low-lying Sucro, evidently one in 
a string of forts along the Mediterranean coast between Tarraco and Carthago Nova.109  He also 
                                                          
106 Livy, 28.15-16.   
 
107 Livy, 28.16.  Livy counts inclusively, and dates the war from the official declaration in 219 BCE, 
rather than Gnaeus’ invasion the following year. 
 
108 For Carteia, see Livy, 28.30; Tovar 1974, 70-72; Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 688; BAtlas 26 E5; 
Pleiades 256063.  For Mago’s raid on Carthago Nova and the defection of Gades, Livy, 28.36-37.  Cf. 
Cic. Balb. 39; Flor. 1.33.7; Badian 1954.  App. Hisp. 37 records simply that Mago chose to abandon 
Gades to recruit an army in Liguria. 
 
109 Scipio deceived the mutineers with a show of clemency, then publicly executed their ringleaders: App. 
Hisp. 34-36; Livy, 28.24-32; Polyb. 11.25-30.  On Sucro: Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 687; BAtlas 27 E2; 
Pleiades 266052.  Note the obvious confusion about Sucro’s position in Livy, 28.24, which incorrectly 
places it north of the Ebro.  Richardson 2000, 132. 
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secured the mouth of the Baetis river with the foundation of Italica, before departing to wage the 
final, African stage of the Second Punic War.110 
 However, the extremely low TRI scores for these four sites stand in contrast to a cluster 
of towns in the southern Spanish hills, wracked by widespread rebellion in late 206.  With Scipio 
in Numidia laying the diplomatic groundwork for his African war, Iliturgis and Castulo launched 
an insurrection against the Romans.111  Scipio crushed the former by assault—this was either 
Iliturgis on the Baetis or an alternate name for nearby Ilugo—and Castulo surrendered in the face 
of a siege.  The Romans proceeded against the bandit haven of Astapa to the south, where 
slaughter and mass-suicide terrified the region into at least temporary obedience.  As the 
statistics in Table 2.5 indicate, these three targets (regardless of which location is correct for 
Iliturgis) sat on moderately rugged terrain.  The Romans had not entirely abandoned their 
distaste for broken ground combat: Map 2.5 reveals no major activity in the truly mountainous 
heights south of the Baetis river, or the jagged hills around the upper Tagus.  Instead, we see the 
beginnings of a subtle shift in Roman priorities to encompass troublesome local communities 
along outskirts of the Baetis Valley, a willingness to overawe these towns and their neighbors 
through the calculated use of overwhelming violence.  With Carthage out of the strategic picture, 
the Spanish hills would fall ever further into the Roman cross-hairs; as Livy puts it, “[previously] 
                                                          
110 App. Hisp. 38.  Richardson 1986, 53 argues for its military significance: “though Appian…describes it 
as intended for the wounded, there can be little doubt that a Roman settlement so far west was meant to 
establish a permanent Roman presence.”  For Italica’s location: Keay 1988, 26; BAtlas 26 D4; Pleiades 
256231. 
 
111 Livy, 28.19.  App. Hisp. 32 gives Ilurgia and Castax.  Hoyos and Yardley 2009, 686 argues that this is 
Ilorcum/Ilugo (a possible location for Publius and Gnaeus’ disaster) rather than Iliturgis on the Baetis. 
This is tentatively marked as an alternate site on Maps 2.4 and 2.5.  Iliturgis and Ilugo are relatively close 
by and sit on broadly similar terrain, and the choice between the two thus makes little difference in my 
overall analysis.   
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vengeance upon those states would have been deserved but not expedient…in a time of peace the 
moment for exacting the penalty seemed to have arrived.”112    
We see similar advances towards broken ground warfare in the northeast, where Scipio’s 
untimely illness in late 206 revealed the fragility of Roman authority.  A serious uprising began 
under Mandonius and Indibilis, kings of the Ilergetes.  One-time allies of the Romans, the pair 
raised their own tribe in revolt along with the Lacetani and Celtiberians, invading the still-loyal 
Suessetani and Sedetani.113  The geospatial circumstances of this war are uncertain, and Livy 
tells us only that the decisive combat occurred somewhere along the Ebro itself.  Map 2.5, along 
with Table 2.6, suggests that (as in the upper Baetis) Roman troops in this region would have 
found a landscape more rugged than they liked but far less severe than the worst Spain had to 
offer.  Scipio was ultimately successful against the Ilergetes and their fellow insurgents.  Yet 
Livy’s narrative speaks to his ambivalence towards a widespread campaign of pacification over 
partially broken ground: the Romans offered generous terms to their defeated foes in 206, an act 
Scipio’s successors would come to regret when Indibilis renewed hostilities in 205. 
The spatial configuration of Roman violence immediately following the Battle of Ilipa 
reveals a fundamental tension between old missions and new, between traditional antipathy to 
warfare on broken ground and the hard-won knowledge that such campaigns were necessary if 
Rome was to consolidate its military triumphs into lasting rule over Spain.  For a decade, Roman 
commanders had fought the Carthaginian field army, for the most part in the Spanish plains, 
shifting their attention to local hill-tribes only when revolt made this absolutely necessary.  
                                                          
112 Livy, 28.19: merito magis quam utiliter saevitum foret; tunc iam tranquillis rebus quia tempus 
expetendae poenae videbatur venisse… 
 
113 Livy, 28.33-34.  For an earlier Roman alliance with the Sedetani, see Polyb. 10.34-35.  On their 
location: Fatás Cabeza 1971; BAtlas 25 E4 (S)Edetani; Pleiades 246633; TIR Tarraco 143-144. 
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Within the context of inter-state war with Carthage, this strategy had proved wildly successful, 
and in 206 Scipio could claim before the Senate that “he had left not a single Carthaginian in that 
country.”114  What Scipio did leave behind were the Spaniards themselves: fickle subjects to the 
Carthaginians, they proved no more eager to accept Roman dominion. 
As our maps and tables thus far have indicated, the Spaniards’ recalcitrance should come 
as no surprise.  With their focus on narrow corridors of advance over mostly level, 
topographically homogenous ground, the Romans had not projected serious force against most of 
the Spanish landscape (at least not in ways significant enough for our sources to record).  In a 
series of wars lasting to 179, Scipio’s successors would gradually modify the geographic foci of 
their campaigns, following a trajectory suggested by Scipio himself after Ilipa.  Even as the 
urbanized plains of the Baetis and Mediterranean coast became the cores of two new provinces, 
Roman armies would push upland into the Spanish meseta.  Yet the geographic priorities and 
preconceptions discussed in Chapter One would continue to exert their influence: Rome would 
make little effort to control the most broken Spanish terrain, and the geospatial analysis of 
intensive force projection shows a continuing correlation between Roman military activity and 





                                                          
114 Livy, 28.38: neminem Carthaginiensem in iis terris reliquisse.  
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Section Three: The First Generation of Roman Spain (205-179) 
 
 Most modern narratives of the early decades of Roman provincial rule over Spain are 
dominated by the campaigns of Cato the Elder in 195.115  While Cato is far from the only 
commander who merits our attention, his wars mark an inflection point in the spatial narrative of 
Roman violence.  While Rome remained notably unwilling to engage with the most challenging 
Spanish terrain, in 195 and the years that follow we see a significant increase in the projection of 
Roman force against rugged targets, depicted in Map 2.6 and Tables 2.7 and 2.8.   
 Although finally uncontested by the Carthaginians, Roman rule in Spain began on a sour 
note in 205, with the renewed rebellion of Indibilis, Mandonius, and the Ilergetes.116  Livy 
ascribes the revolt to the withdrawal of Scipio’s best troops for the African campaign, and to the 
rebels’ “contempt for other generals [which] sprang from admiration for Scipio.”117  We may 
cast some blame upon Scipio’s desultory retaliation the previous year, which evidently did little 
to inspire terror or obedience among the Spaniards.  Livy records that the Ilergetes were joined 
by the Ausetani and several other neighboring tribes, and mustered an army “in the territory of 
the Sedetani” along the Ebro; it is unclear whether the Sedetani were turncoats themselves, or if 
they paid the price for loyalty to the Romans (as they did in 206).118 
                                                          
115 Among others, see Keay 1988, 29-32; Curchin 1991, 29-33.  Dyson 1987, 186-98 provides a notably 
broader and more balanced account.  Cato has inspired a rich catalogue of military histories: Del Pozzo 
1921; Martínez Gázquez 1974; Astin 1978, 28-49; Knapp 1980. 
 
116 App. Hisp. 38; Livy, 29.1-3.  
 
117 Livy, 29.1: per admirationem Scipionis contemptu imperatorum aliorum orto. 
 
118 Livy, 29.1: in Sedetanum agrum.  See also 28.33-34.  Smith 1993, 16-17 suggests the Cessetani, 
Iacetani, Lacetani, and Ilergaones as the unnamed neighbors to rise in rebellion, and argues that the 
Sedetani probably remained loyal to Rome.  
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Scipio’s two successors, Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus, united their 
forces in the northeast and marched their army “through the Ausetanians’ country: a hostile one 
treated with clemency as though it were pacified,” before confronting and defeating the Ilergetes’ 
coalition at an unspecified location.119  Indibilis fell in battle, and Mandonius was delivered to 
the Romans by his countrymen as the price for peace.120  Livy’s geography is disappointingly 
vague on this incident, but Map 2.6 and Table 2.8 nevertheless suggest the topographic logic to 
Rome’s actions.  The decision not to devastate Ausetanian territory was hardly an act of mercy, 
but a strategic imperative: dispersing Roman soldiers to pillage across this rugged stretch of the 
Spanish countryside would be time-consuming at best and fatal at worst (and, at least in 
economic terms, unprofitable regardless).  With the enemy concentrated into a conventional 
army somewhere in the plains of the Ebro, the Roman commanders were naturally eager to 
confront their foes on level and convenient ground.  Even as the Ilergetes’ affront to Roman 
authority required a strike inland from the coastal plain, a fundamental aversion to broken 
ground continued to shape patterns of force projection. 
 We hear little more of fighting in Spain until 197, though Lentulus’ ovatio in 200 
suggests that his five years in Iberia were not entirely quiet.121  The year 200 saw renewed 
warfare and another Roman victory among the Sedetani.122  For 199, we receive mention of at 
                                                          
119 Livy, 29.2: ipsi exercitibus per agrum Ausetanum hostico tamquam pacato clementer ductis militibus.  
A march through Ausetanian territory makes geographic sense if the Roman forces initially mustered at 
Emporiae, rather than Tarraco.  This is perhaps unusual given the prominence of the latter city as Scipio’s 
northern base, but far from impossible. 
 
120 Livy, 29.3. 
 
121 Livy, 31.20. 
 
122 Livy, 31.49.  Again, it is unclear whether this was a victory over the Sedetani or a victory over other 
tribes that took place in Sedetanian territory. 
108 
 
least a small Roman garrison in Gades: the Romans probably withdrew their prefect from the 
city this year, a sign of confidence that this coastal space was securely under Roman control.123  
But while some nominal autonomy may have been restored to Gades, Rome showed no interest 
in abandoning its hard-won position in Spain: for 197, two praetorian provinces (out of a newly 
increased six) were designated for Hispania Citerior and Ulterior.124    
 It was perhaps this signal of permanent Roman dominion that sparked a series of major 
revolts across the Iberian peninsula.  Livy identifies a serious uprising in Ulterior, naming the 
cities of Carmo and Baldo as rebel strongholds, and suggesting the potential for an even wider 
conflagration: “on the coast the Malacini and Sexetani and all Baeturia and other states which 
had not yet disclosed their intentions would soon rise to join the revolt of their neighbors.”125  
The spatial distribution of anti-Roman resistance speaks to the shallow and geographically 
contingent nature of Rome’s control over Spain at this date.  As Map 2.6 indicates, the Malacini 
and Sexetani were isolated from the Roman garrisons along the Baetis by a formidable mountain 
range; Baeturia was similarly protected to the north by the Sierra Morena.126  Moreover, if we 
                                                          
123 Livy, 32.2; cf. Cic. Balb. 34, 39.  I follow the argument of Badian 1954, which argues that the 
Gaditanians received a Roman garrison around 206 under the terms of their treaty, and petitioned for its 
removal in 199.  
 
124 MRR 333-334; Richardson 1986, 75-79. 
  
125 Livy, 33.21: in maritima ora Malacinos Sexetanosque et Baeturiam omnem et quae nondum animos 
nudaverant ad finitimorum motus consurrectura. Cf. App. Hisp. 29.  Briscoe 1971, 290 argues for Livy’s 
reliability in these passages.  We have seen Carmo already as Appian’s site for the decisive Roman-
Carthaginian battle of 206 BCE (Hisp. 25-27).  On Baldo: BAtlas 26 E5 B(a)elo; Pleiades 256005; PECS 
s.v. Baelo.  Contra Briscoe 1971, 291.  
 
126 The Malacini were centered around modern Malaga: Briscoe 1971, 291; BAtlas 27 A5 Malaca; 
Pleiades 265963.  The Sexetani were centered on Sexi: Briscoe 1971, 291; BAtlas 27 B5 Sexi/Saxentum; 
Pleiades 266038.  Map 2.6 indicates these sites as tentative not because their locations are unknown, but 
because I am using point features as approximate indicators of more geographically dispersed tribes.  On 
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reflect on the geographic reconstruction of Section Two, these areas had not yet seen serious 
exertions of Romans force.  The rebels in 197 were thus unlikely to be overawed by the threat or 
memory of Roman violence.  Notably, Livy gives no further specifics on the revolt in Ulterior; 
its governor, Lucius Stertinius, returned to Rome in 196 with substantial treasure, but “without 
hope of a triumph.”127  While the rebellion in the south was evidently unsuccessful in restoring 
de jure local independence, it was not suppressed with sufficient vigor to impress either our 
historical sources or the Roman Senate, and we may suspect that diplomacy and compromise 
were necessary to restore a semblance of order. 
 A second revolt, better documented and evidently more serious, broke out in Hispania 
Citerior at nearly the same time.  In 197 or 196, a Roman army was massacred, and its praetor 
killed in action.128  The Senate diverted troops from its consular armies and rushed new praetors 
to the Iberian peninsula; in late 196, it went so far as to name Hispania Citerior a consular 
province, sending Cato the Elder west with substantial reinforcements.  Both the operational 
details and broader significance of Cato’s campaigns are subjects of considerable modern 
debate.129  In the rebellion he faced, we may see the lingering effects of previous commanders’ 
limited geostrategic priorities.  
 To be sure, the situation in Spain was at least partially restored before Cato’s arrival by 
Quintus Minucius, who won a major victory over Spanish rebels near the town of Turda; we may 
                                                          
Baeturia: BAtlas 26 D3 Baeturia Celtica; Pleiades 256011; BAtlas 26 E3 Baeturia Turdelorum; Pleaides 
256012.  The label on Map 2.6 encompasses both territories. 
 
127 Livy, 33.27: ne temptata quidem triumphi spe… 
 
128 Livy, 33.25, and cf. 33.42. 
 
129 On Cato’s campaigns: Del Pozzo 1921; Martínez Gázquez 1974; Astin 1978, 28-49; Knapp 1980. 
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hypothesize a site somewhere near Saguntum.130  Nevertheless, Cato inherited a severely 
compromised Roman position, even on the long-secured coastal plains of the far northeast.  
Massing his forces at Pyrenaeus, the consul made an amphibious strike against Rhoda, before 
disembarking his troops at Emporiae.131  Although the Greeks of Emporiae were stalwart Roman 
allies, the Spaniards within and outside the city walls were in open rebellion.132  While Cato 
trained his forces on the coast, he received an urgent plea from the Ilergetes for assistance 
against the rebels; the ambassadors intimated that they would join the uprising if Roman aid was 
not forthcoming.133 Cato prevaricated, pretending to dispatch troops inland and recalling them 
after the ambassadors departed.134  While Frontinus cites this ruse as an example of shrewd 
command, it is indicative of a broader collapse of Roman control in Spain, and suggests that in 
most parts of the peninsula this control was marginal to begin with.135  When tested in the crisis 
of 195, Rome’s authority was once again restricted to the immediate striking range of its armies. 
Within that range, concentrated Roman forces remained highly effective, as Cato would 
soon prove.  He defeated the Spaniards near Emporiae (archaeological evidence suggests a 
battlefield at Ullastret) and restored peace to the region; as far as our sources record, this was the 
                                                          
130 This is the center of the Turdetani who allied with Hannibal against Saguntum in 219 BCE.  See 
Briscoe 1973, 333; Tovar 1989, 226.  The position in Map 2.6 is at Saguntum, and is extremely tentative. 
 
131 Livy, 34.8.  For Pyrenaeus: Astin 1978, 35; Knapp 1980, 28; Briscoe 1981, 67; Batlas 25 I3 Portus 
Veneris; Pleiades 246571.  For Rhoda: Astin 1978, 35; Knapp 1980, 26; Briscoe 1981, 67; Keay 1988, 
30; BAtlas 25 I3 R(h)oda; Pleiades 246588. 
 
132 App. Hisp. 30; Livy, 34.8-9. 
 
133 Livy, 34.11.   
 
134 Livy, 34.11-13. 
 
135 Frontin. Str. 4.7.31. 
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last reminder Emporiae would need of Roman force, and we hear nothing further of rebellion in 
the vicinity.136  Around the same time, Marcus Helvius (governor of Ulterior) won a major 
victory over the Celtiberians near a town Livy calls Iliturgi, Barrington’s Ildum.137  Proceeding 
down the Mediterranean coast towards his victorious colleague, Cato returned at least the 
appearance of order to the northeast: Livy writes that “by the time [Cato] reached Tarraco, all 
Spain on this side of the Ebro had been subdued.”138 
 We have good reason to doubt the thoroughness of this pacification: this was not the first 
time the Romans claimed suzerainty above the Ebro when their armies had barely penetrated past 
the Mediterranean littoral.  As Cato planned his next moves in Tarraco, Livy reveals a telling 
(and, from the Roman perspective, disturbing) psychological pattern among the recently subdued 
Spaniards.  Rumor spread through the hinterland of Tarraco that Cato had left the city to 
campaign in Turdetania.139  Trouble immediately arose among “the mountaineers of the outlying 
districts,” most notably the Bergistani (Table 2.8 confirms Livy’s appraisal of their terrain).140  
The fact that Cato suppressed this revolt without notable difficulty does not obviate its 
importance: at issue is not the tactical capabilities of a Roman consular army, but its ability to 
turn military victory into lasting control in the absence of standing forces.  Though they acted on 
                                                          
136 App. Hisp. 40; Livy, 34.13-16.  On Ullastret: Oliva Prat 1970, 44; Knapp 1980, 33; Keay, 1988, 31; 
BAtlas 25 I4 Puig de S. Andreu; Pleiades 246578.  Because our ancient sources only name Emporiae as 
this battle’s spatial context, Ullastret is not included on Map 2.6. 
 
137 Livy, 34.10.  On Illiturgi/Ildum: Astin 1978, 40; Knapp 1980, 40; Briscoe 1981, 70-71; BAtlas 27 F1 
Ildum; Pleiades 265920. 
 
138 Livy, 34.16: cum Tarraconem venit, iam omnis cis Hiberum Hispania perdomita erat. 
 
139 Its location is a major source of contention.  See below. 
 
140 Livy 34.16: devios montanos.  On the Bergistani: Astin 1978, 42; Knapp 1980, 35; Briscoe 1981, 79; 
BAtlas 25 G4; Pleiades 246239; TIR Tarraco 48. 
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incorrect information, the Bergistani and other inhabitants of the Pyrenean foothills took the 
putative departure of Cato and his army as license to reject Roman authority.  Cato was thus left 
with a strategic quandary: he could not carry his campaign forward without provoking renewed 
resistance to his rear.  
 As I have suggested, this was not a new predicament, but a structural consequence of the 
Roman way of war.  Cato’s response—the projection of force upcountry against rebel 
strongholds—was not novel in type but in extent.  Previous commanders had dabbled in warfare 
over rough terrain; in 195 and subsequent years, the Romans proved more consistently willing to 
fight on substantially (though still not severely) broken ground. 
 Having temporarily crushed the Bergistani revolt, Cato launched a wide-ranging 
campaign to cow the Spaniards of Citerior into obedience.  Parts of this advance struck against 
traditionally level targets along the Spanish valleys and coasts. Appian puts Cato’s movements 
near the Ebro; Segestica, according to Livy the major center of resistance, lay on the river.141  
Rome’s suppression of the Turdetanian revolt similarly took place on level ground, whether we 
locate this region on the lower Baetis or (following Robert Knapp) near Saguntum’s coastal 
plains.142  Yet as Tables 2.7 and 2.8 indicate, Cato ventured onto substantially more broken 
ground than most of his predecessors.  The war in Turdetania entangled Rome’s armies with the 
Celtiberians, 10,000 of whom had been hired as mercenaries by the enemy.143  For the first time, 
                                                          
141 App. Hisp. 41; Livy, 34.17. Cf. Frontin. Str. 1.1.1.  The location of Saguntia is controversial, but 
Knapp 1980, 38 identifies it with the archaeological remains near modern Azaila.  Cf. Briscoe 1981, 81.  
     
142 Livy, 34.19.  On the debate over location, see Knapp 1980, Briscoe 1981, 80; contra Astin 1978, 40-
42.  I center Turdetania around Turda, itself tentatively located somewhere near Saguntum on Map 2.6.  
For Turdetania on the lower Baetis: BAtlas 27 A4; Pleiades 266075. 
 
143 Livy, 34.17: omnium Hispanorum maxime imbelles habentur Turdetani.  Cf. 34.19. 
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Rome projected force into the hills around the upper Tagus river, and encountered substantial 
difficulties on this terrain. We hear of an inconclusive Roman strike on a rebel supply depot at 
Saguntia, and when the Celtiberians refused to give battle Cato was ultimately unable to compel 
them to fight.144 
 Returning with a portion of his army to northeastern Spain, Cato used drastic measures to 
put down the final throes of rebellion still raging in the Pyrenean foothills: his policies of 
disarmament earlier in the year proved inconsistently successful outside the alluvial plains of the 
Ebro.145  In addition to the low-lying Sedetani, the Suessetani and Ausetani provided auxiliaries 
to the Roman cause.  Both tribes had been previously chastised by Roman force, and their loyalty 
in 195 was the dividend of previous commanders’ tentative strikes into the Spanish hills.  Yet the 
Bergistani (according to Table 2.8, by far the most mountain-dwelling of Rome’s opponents) 
remained defiant, as did the Lacetani.  In the face of a determined governor and a multi-ethnic 
coalition of pro-Roman Spaniards, topography failed to protect either tribe.  Cato captured the 
chief town of the Lacetani—Livy leaves it unnamed—before moving against Bergium, the 
capital of the Bergistani.146  He arranged for the betrayal of the city by its chieftain, and enslaved 
the populace.147  If the probable location of this city at modern Berga (with a local TRI score in 
the 91st percentile) is correct, the Roman pacification of the Bergistani engaged with broken 
                                                          
144 Livy, 34.19. 
 
145 See above, and App. Hisp. 41; Livy, 34.17.  On the limited extent of the disarmament, see Knapp 
1980, 38. 
 
146 For the Lacetani, Livy, 34.20 and cf. Frontin. Str. 3.10.1.  On their location: Briscoe 1981, 83; BAtlas 
25 G4; Pleiades 246458; contra Fatás Cabeza 1971.  On Bergium: Livy, 34.21.  The location at Berga is 
supported strongly by Knapp 1980, 47, and tentatively by Briscoe 1981, 79 and TIR Tarraco 48.  BAtlas 
25 leaves the site unlocated. 
   
147 Livy, 34.16, 34.21. 
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ground to a degree unprecedented in the Spanish conquests.  Even if our location is mistaken, the 
aggregated outline of Cato’s wars suggest a newfound Roman interest in the Spanish highlands, 
and an awareness that peace and order in the Iberian peninsula would require the increased 
exercise of military force in these areas.  As Table 2.7 shows, sites of Roman force projection in 
the first decade after the Battle of Ilipa had an aggregate TRI score in the 1st percentile of the 
Spanish landscape.  In 195, this score jumps to the 29th percentile; it would continue to climb 
over the subsequent years.  Table 2.8 indicates a similar, albeit less dramatic trend for regions of 
force projection, with a growth from the 42nd percentile before 195 to the 55th during Cato’s 
campaigns. 
 Cato returned to Rome, claiming the Spanish revolts were at an end, and boasting of 
administrative rearrangements that would make the Iberian peninsula a lucrative contributor to 
the Roman treasury.148  While his claims to victory proved substantially overblown, Roman force 
projection over the next several years would primarily follow the new geographic patterns set in 
195.  In 194, we hear of widespread rebellions in both Citerior and Ulterior: the Lusitani are 
Rome’s only named opponent, and their defeat at Ilipa (after plundering far south from their 
homeland above the Tagus) is the only geographically specific reference to combat.149  The 
governor of Citerior, Cn. Scipio’s son, waged a campaign somewhere south of the Ebro, 
receiving 50 local settlements in surrender, but Livy gives us nothing in the way of mappable 
data.150  Geographic specifics abound, however, for 193: in Citerior, Gaius Flaminius fought in 
                                                          
148 Livy, 34.21. 
 
149 Livy, 35.1.  For the Lusitani: BAtlas 25 D4; Pleiades 236528. 
 




Oretania, taking the Spanish settlement of Inlucia and spending the winter in policing actions 
“against raiding parties of brigands rather than soldiers…”151  On the Tagus river, Marcus 
Fulvius Nobilior defeated an alliance of the Vaccaei, Vettones, and Celtiberi near Toletum 
(modern Toledo).152 
Both governors were prorogued for 192, and Flaminius took the town of Licabrum by 
assault: it is perhaps Igabrum, though this would put him well into his colleague’s territory.153  
Nobilior waged a far-reaching campaign, significant enough to receive extensive geographic 
documentation in Livy’s sources: the historian lists five towns (Vescelia, Helo, Noliba, Cusibis, 
and Toletum) among the Roman conquests.  Toletum was the most important prize and the only 
one we can securely locate; Helo was perhaps in the south near Ilipula Minor, Noliba and 
Cusibis were evidently somewhere within Oretania, and Vescelia is entirely unknown.154  
Finally, in 190 BCE, Livy preserves a brief episode in which the Lusitani routed Roman forces 
under Lucius Aemilius Paullus; the historian locates this battle near Lyco in Bastetania (its 
                                                          
151 Livy, 35.7: per hiemem proelia aliquot nulla memoria digna adversus latronum magis quam hostium 
excursiones vario tamen eventu nec sine militum iactura sunt facta.  On Oretania: BAtlas 27 B3; Pleiades 
265989.  Inlucia may be securely identified with Ilugo, in the hills near the Baetis headwaters: Briscoe 
1981, 154; BAtlas 27 B3 Ilugo; Pleiades 265929; TIR Valencia 289-290. 
 
152 Livy, 35.7.  On the Vaccaei: Briscoe 1981, 155; BAtlas 24 G3; Pleiades 236706.  On the Vettones: 
BAtlas 26 D2; Pleiades 256512.  On Toletum: BAtlas 27 A2; Pleiades 266066.  
 
153 Livy, 35.22.  TIR Valencia 199 and Briscoe 1981, 178 identify Licabrum and Igabrum, following 
Schulten FHA 3.197.  See contra Tovar 1974, 171-122.  The site is unidentified in BAtlas 26 and Pleiades 
260592, and its placement on Map 2.6 should be regarded as highly tentative. 
 
154 Helo can be located only very tentatively at or near Ilipula Minor: Briscoe 1981, 178; Schulten FHA 
3.197; BAtlas 26 A4 Ilipula Minor; Pleiades 256224; TIR Valencia 187 (and cf. Pleiades 260565). On 
Noliba and Cusibis: Briscoe 1981, 178; Tovar 1989, 184.  On Vescelia: Tovar 1974, 62; Briscoe 1981, 
178; BAtlas 26 UNLOC; Pleiades 260660; TIR Valencia 337.   
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specific location is unknown), indicating a considerable Roman advance into the highlands 
above Carthago Nova.155 
Whether we analyze the locations of Roman force in the late 190s visually (as in Map 
2.6) or quantitatively (in Tables 2.7 and 2.8), it is evident that the scope of Roman violence had 
expanded both laterally and vertically.  While the fighting at Ilipa in 194 indicates some 
continued activity on the well-trodden fields of the Baetis valley, Roman forces also pushed far 
into the high meseta around Toletum, and into Spain’s southern mountains around Inlucia, Helo, 
and Licabrum.156  Our topographic statistics show an intensification of Cato’s upland campaigns.  
From 194-190 (a convenient point of division, rather than a historical watershed in its own right), 
the aggregate TRI score for force-projection sites rises to the 40th percentile; with the exception 
of Ilipa, the ground around any of these sites was likely broken enough to present military 
difficulties.  The regions on Table 2.8 are similarly rugged: though TRI scores dip slightly after 
Cato’s war with the Bergistani, the statistics from 194-190 still exceed the Spanish mean. 
While accounts are patchy until the end of the 180s, general trends indicate that over this 
decade Rome continued its tentative shift into the Spanish hills (see Map 2.7 and Tables 2.9 and 
2.10).  Livy’s account of 186 features level-ground victories over the Celtiberians at Calagurris 
and against the Lusitanians at Hasta, triumphs that proved predictably unhelpful in bringing the 
                                                          
155 Livy 37.46, and cf. Oros. 4.20.  The Lusitanians were defeated, probably in the same region, in 189; 
see Livy, 37.57.  On Bastetania: BAtlas 27 C4; Pleiades 265822.  Briscoe 1981, 363 seems to envision a 
territory further west.  On Lyco: Briscoe 1981, 363; Tovar 1989, 157; BAtlas 27 UNLOC; Pleiades 
270342. 
 
156 While Livy records warfare against the Lusitani, Vaccaei, and Vettones, it remains unclear how far (if 
at all) Roman armies advanced into their territory. 
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hill-tribes back into allegiance.157  Roman forces shifted upcountry in 185, marching from 
Baeturia against Lusitanian forces in Carpetania.158  Defeated somewhere near Toletum, Rome 
reverted to its military topography of choice, destroying a joint Celtiberian and Lusitanian army 
in the plains somewhere along the Tagus river.  Further combat may have taken place to the west 
at Dipo.159  Again, however, the Spanish insurgency continued: as of yet, the relatively rugged 
homelands of the Celtiberians had been threatened only briefly by Cato, while we have no record 
of major Roman actions in Lusitania.  Once more, this persistence of the Spanish rebels drew 
Roman forces upcountry.  184 saw warfare against the Suessetani, Cato’s one-time allies in the 
Pyrenean foothills. 160  183 brought renewed conflict with the Celtiberians in the wilds of 
Ausetania, where Rome successfully seized a number of unnamed enemy strongholds.  In 182, 
the Romans besieged and captured Urbiaca, which we may tentatively locate on impressively 
rugged terrain near the headwaters of the Tagus.161   
 From 181-179, Rome continued its efforts to deny rugged terrain to the enemy, as the 
Celtiberians launched the last serious challenge to imperial control in the first generation of 
                                                          
157 Livy, 39.21.  On Calagurris: Briscoe 2008, 294; BAtlas 25 D3 Calagurris (Nassica) Iulia; Pleiades 
246279.  On Hasta: Taylor 2017, 142; BAtlas 26 D5 (H)Asta; Pleiades 256193.  Cf. ILS 15. 
 
158 Livy, 39.30, 39.42. 
 
159 Livy, 39.30-31.  Livy records the Roman defeat “not far from the towns of Dipo and Toletum” (haud 
procul Dipone et Toleto urbibus).  Unless there is an otherwise unknown Dipo near modern Toledo, Livy 
is certainly confused; the reference may preserve a separate, hazily remembered incident at It. Ant.’s Dipo 
far to the west.  BAtlas 26 UNLOC; TIR Emerita 74-75.  Dipo is placed tentatively on Map 2.7 based on 
the distances recorded in It.Ant. 418.3 and noted as tentative.  Cf. Briscoe 2008, 324-25. 
 
160 Livy, 39.42, which notes the capture of the unlocated town of Corbio: Tovar 1989, 41-42, 435; Briscoe 
2008, 357; BAtlas 25 UNLOC; TIR Caesaraugusta 106.  
 
161 Livy, 40.16.  Opinions vary on the identity and location of Urbiaca.  Map 2.7 tentatively follows the 
mileage for Urbiaca in It. Ant. 447.5.  See Richardson 1986, 100; Tovar 1989, 225; Briscoe 2008.  Note 
BAtlas 25 UNLOC; Pleiades 270381. 
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Roman Spain (and the last conflict within the chronological bounds of this chapter).  Against 
35,000 Spanish rebels (“a greater number, almost, than ever before”) the governor Fulvius 
Flaccus’ campaigns in 181 reflected an increasingly standard mixture of intensive combat in the 
plains and dispersed, hazily remembered activity in the highlands.162  The Romans defeated the 
main Celtiberian army at Aebura in the Tagus valley; while its position is uncertain, Livy notes 
that “the plain was entirely flat and suitable for fighting.”163  A second victory on more rugged 
terrain followed when the Celtiberians failed to challenge a siege at Contrebia, and the city fell to 
the Romans.164 
While neither of these actions took place in the most rugged sectors of Celtiberia, there 
are indications of less intensive but more geographically widespread campaigning across the hills 
of the region; Livy briefly summarizes Flaccus’ piecemeal victories over the Celtiberians, “all 
scattered in their forts and villages.”165  Appian records further combat in the mountainous 
territory of the Lusones, with combat centered on the city of Complega (perhaps in the vicinity 
of Chaunus M.).166  In a speech preserved by Livy, Tiberius Gracchus the Elder (who would 
                                                          
162 Livy, 40.30: ad quinque et triginta milia hominum, quantum numquam ferme antea, Celtiberi 
comparaverant. 
 
163 Livy, 40.30-32: campus erat planus omnis et aptus pugnae.  The location in Map 2.7 is drawn from the 
Rav. Cosm. 312.11, and is quite tentative; however, Livy’s account confirms that a level battle-site in 
Carpetania, presumably along the Tagus, is meant.  Cf. Tovar 1989, 235; Briscoe 2008, 486-487; BAtlas 
26 UNLOC Libora; Pleiades 260591.   
 
164 Livy, 40.33.  On Contrebia: Briscoe 2008, 490; BAtlas 25 D4; Pleiades 246355. 
 
165 Livy, 40.33: in vicos castellaque sua omnes dilapsi.  Cf. Livy, 40.35. 
 
166 App. Hisp. 42 and Tovar 1989, 340.  For the Lusones: see Richardson 2000, 139-40 and maps in 
Richardson 1996, 11; Keay 1998, 9.  On Complega: see Burillo Mozota 1986, 536-39 and TIR 
Caesaraugusta 101 for a tentative location near Mt. Chaunus (modern Moncayo; BAtlas 25 D4 Caius M.; 
Pleiades 246276).  See contra Richardson 2000, 140.  Diod. Sic. 29.28 puts this battle at the Cemeletae, 
unlocated and probably a textual error for Complega.    
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bring this revolt to a close in 179) reflected on the necessity for such fighting, and the geospatial 
dynamics of Roman control: “It is easier to talk about than to accomplish, this subjugation of a 
province fierce by nature and rebellious.  A few cities, as at least I hear, which the neighborhood 
of the winter-quarters kept most completely under control, have come under our rule and sway; 
the more remote are in arms.”167 
 Forty years after its entry into the Spanish peninsula, Rome continued to learn that battles 
in the plains did not win loyalty in the hills.  Gracchus’ Spanish campaigns (along with Flaccus’ 
final combat in 180) reflected this knowledge, and reaffirmed the commitment to warfare on 
broken ground evident since 195.  Flaccus began the year by ravaging “the remoter regions of 
Celtiberia;” he defeated the rebels in battle at the Manlian Pass (Manlianus Saltus), in the rugged 
mountains south of the Ebro valley.168  In 179, Gracchus coordinated offensives with his 
colleague in Ulterior (Postumius Albinus, who led a successful but poorly recorded invasion 
against the Lusitanians and Vaccaei), before capturing and garrisoning the city of Munda.169  As 
he marched across Celtiberia, 103 towns and numerous tribes fell under Roman authority: 
drawing on annalistic sources, Livy names Certima, Alce, and Ergavica as the most important 
prizes.170  While Alce sits on the plains of the upper Tagus, Ergavica and perhaps Certima were 
                                                          
167 Livy, 40.35: dictu quam re facilius est provinciam ingenio ferocem, rebellatricem confecisse. paucae 
civitates, ut quidem ego audio, quas vicina maxime hiberna premebant, in ius dicionemque venerunt; 
ulteriores in armis sunt. 
 
168 Livy, 40.39-40: educto exercitu ex hibernis ulteriorem Celtiberiae agrum, unde ad deditionem non 
venerant, institit vastare.  On the Manlian Pass: Briscoe 2008, 508; BAtlas 25 D4 Manlianus Saltus; 
Pleiades 246484; TIR Caesaraugusta 146-47. 
 
169 Livy, 40.47. Munda can be identified with modern Munébriga: Neue Pauly s.v. Munda.  Cf. Tovar 
1989, 224-25; Briscoe 2008, 535, for debate. 
 
170 Livy, 40.47-49. 
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highland strongholds (with considerable TRI scores: see Table 2.9).171  Some of Livy’s sources 
refer to further fighting in the Chaunus Mountains—certainly rugged and perhaps identical to 
Barrington’s Mons Caius.172 
To be sure, Gracchus projected power onto level ground as well: Appian records fighting 
at Caravis in the Ebro Valley, and the governor founded Gracchuris on the river itself to 
celebrate and secure his victories.173 But as the statistical analysis on Tables 2.9 and 2.10 
indicates, Tiberius Gracchus (and, to a lesser extent, his predecessors in the 180s) continued a 
shift in violence towards rugged terrain that began under Cato the Elder.  After decades of wars 
that, despite their successful prosecution, produced little in the way of lasting political control, 
the Romans were increasingly willing to alter the geographic disposition of their forces, a 
strategic shift captured in quantitative terms on Table 2.11.  Rome’s new approach balanced 
traditional antipathy to rough terrain against the hard-won knowledge that its control over Spain 




                                                          
171 On Alce: Tovar 1989, 216; Briscoe 2008, 536; BAtlas 27 B2 Alce(s); Pleiades 265790.  On Ergavica: 
Briscoe 2008, 539; BAtlas 25 B5 Ercavica; Pleiades 252200.  Cf. Plin. HN. 3.24; Ptol. Geog. 2.6.58.  
Certima can be placed only very tentatively based on early 20th century speculation by Schulten in RE 
16.558, who places it near modern Almazán on the upper Duero.  Cf. Briscoe 2008, 535.   
 
172 Livy, 40.50. The placement on Map 2.7 is based on the suggestion of Briscoe 2008, 539 of a 
connection with M. Caius (BAtlas 25 D4; Pleiades 246276).   
 
173 App. Hisp. 43.  Livy, Per. 41.2-4.  On Caravis: Richardson 2000, 140; BAtlas 25 D4; Pleiades 246292.  
Cf. It. Ant. 443.1.  On Gracchuris: BAtlas 25 D3 Ilurcis/Grac(ch)urris; Pleiades 246435.  
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Section Four: Sequels and Implications  
 
 Alongside L. Postumius’ less documented but equally triumphant campaigns against the 
Lusitanians, Gracchus’ victories brought a generation of relative peace to Spain.174  Appian 
rightly praises Tiberius’ diplomatic acumen: “he made carefully defined treaties with all the 
tribes, binding them to be the friends of Rome, and giving and receiving oaths to that effect.  
These treaties were often longed for in subsequent wars.”175  In light of this chapter’s geographic 
reconstruction, I would argue that Gracchus’ successful negotiations had as much to do with 
shifting patterns of Roman violence as with his own charisma.  By increasing the frequency of 
major operations on broken ground between 195 and 179, Rome demonstrated its commitment to 
expansive control, its willingness to engage with hostile terrain in order to deny its opponents a 
place of refuge.  By gradually shifting the foci of violence into the hills, Cato, Gracchus, and 
their colleagues had taught the Spaniards to fear the legions.  With fear a crucial component of 
Rome’s diplomatic toolkit, it should come as no surprise that Spanish tribes were more willing to 
accept and abide by Roman authority, now that this authority was backed by credible threats of 
devastating retribution.176 
                                                          
174 Curchin 1991, 33.  Livy’s record survives down to 167 BCE: he mentions a minor uprising by the 
Celtiberians in 174 (Livy, 41.26) and the Roman conquest of Margolica in 168 (Livy, 45.4; its location is 
unknown, see Briscoe 2012, 618).  Appian makes no mention of Spanish conflict between 179 and 153 
BCE.   
 
175 App. Hisp. 43: καὶ πᾶσιν ἔθετο τοῖς τῇδε συνθήκας ἀκριβεῖς, καθ᾽ ἃ Ῥωμαίων ἔσονται φίλοι: ὅρκους 
τε ὤμοσεν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἔλαβεν, ἐπιποθήτους ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον πολέμοις πολλάκις γενομένους.  Cf. Plut. Ti. 
Gracch. 5. 
 
176 Knapp 1977, 52. 
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 Peace would not last more than a generation, and from 155 to 133 Rome waged a series 
of bitter conflicts to re-impose control in the face of Lusitanian and Celtiberian rebellions.177  In 
the interests of space, this chapter will not attempt a detailed survey of these long and 
complicated wars, nor of the century of scantily documented conflicts that followed.  Upon 
preliminary analysis, however, some of the toponyms preserved in our sources down through 
Augustus’ Spanish campaigns indicate that Rome maintained and even intensified its projection 
of military force onto broken ground.  Numantia and Termantia, strongholds during the 
Celtiberian wars, were located in the imposing hills around the upper Durius river.178  In 60, 
Julius Caesar fought in the rugged Herminian Mountains (in central Portugal) so that the locals 
“might not use their strongholds as a base for marauding expeditions.”179  Finally, while the 
details of their geography are difficult to untangle, Augustus and Agrippa’s wars advanced 
Roman force even into the heights of the Cantabrian mountains.180  There is no reason to suspect 
that the Romans ever abandoned their well-attested leeriness towards broken ground warfare, 
and much military activity and civil development continued to be centered on level terrain.  Yet 
at least in some cases, the rewards of deep and expansive imperial control over the Iberian 
                                                          
177 The fullest account of this war is Simon 1962, though see also Keay 1988, 33-42; Curchin 1991, 33-
39.  Our major literary source is App. Hisp. 44-98. 
 
178 App. Hisp. 46, 76-77, 89-98. 
 
179 Dio Cass. 37.52-53: μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐρυμνῶν ὁρμώμενοι λῃστεύωσιν. 
 




peninsula outweighed the military risk of rugged environments, and the agents of Roman force 
marched up-country.181 
 A full GIS analysis of these later wars is a promising avenue for future research.  For the 
moment, however, let us pause to reflect on what the geospatial analysis of Rome’s early 
conquests in Spain adds to our historical understanding of warfare and imperialism in this region. 
 As noted at the outset, part of this chapter’s purpose is to revisit the military 
historiography of Rome’s Spanish wars, and in particular to nuance the over-simplified vision of 
the Roman conquest presented by Robert Knapp and Stephen Dyson. 182  As I have 
acknowledged, there is much to admire about both works.  Nevertheless, the geographic 
reconstructions of this chapter make it difficult to accept Knapp and Dyson’s narrative of steady 
Roman expansion, one which progresses along clearly defined fronts to well established borders.  
The concept of a Roman frontier sweeping forward across the Iberian peninsula overlooks 
mountainous regions where we have no literary evidence for intensive military activity, and 
where Roman authority rested on cooperation as much as compulsion.  This concept neglects to 
explain how Toledo and the central Tagus river, deep in the Spanish interior, fell under Roman 
control earlier and more completely than Lusitania or Celtiberia.  As this chapter has suggested, 
Roman force and control certainly advanced in Spain, but the most important pattern in their 
geographic shift was vertical rather than lateral.          
                                                          
181 Though our sources are never explicit on this point, we may perhaps implicate the broken ground 
combat of the Celtiberian War in Rome’s tremendous difficulties recruiting and motivating its Spanish 
armies.  See App. Hisp. 49; Livy, Per. 48.16; Polyb. 35.4. 
 
182 Knapp 1977, 15-57; Dyson 1987, 174. 
124 
 
 The existence of this pattern also allows us to revisit one of John Richardson’s central 
claims about the development of Roman rule in Spain, namely that this was a halting process 
without clear central coordination, its progress relying on the initiative of individual 
commanders.183  To be sure, I would argue that Richardson’s assessment of Rome’s Spanish 
wars has much to recommend it.  As this chapter’s spatial reconstruction has indicated, Roman 
decision-making varied year-to-year, even if we can perceive some trends over the long term.  
Within the parameters of his argument (more concerned with the relationship between the Senate 
and its generals than than that between these commanders and the Spaniards themselves), 
Richardson makes the persuasive case that Roman governors in provincia had substantial 
flexibility of action. 
 However, the analyses in this chapter suggest that, whatever their legal authority, Roman 
commanders tended to deal with space and terrain in a predictable way, and that Rome’s policy 
in Spain was more consistent than Richardson allows.  Rome’s preference for level ground was 
never expressed as doctrine.  The Romans lacked the institutional structures to do so, yet their 
most important battles tended to be fought in the plains nonetheless.  Even if Rome lacked the 
rhetorical forms we associate with modern strategy, its projection of military force shifted, 
haltingly but progressively, in response to its ultimate political goals in the Iberian peninsula.  
This is not the place for a semantic argument over whether the evidence supports a Roman 
strategy, grand or otherwise, in Spain.184  For the moment I will merely suggest that between 218 
and 179 BCE, cultural modes of thought and action surrounding broken terrain played an 
                                                          
183 Richardson 1986, 42-43, 55, 172-80. 
 




important role in shaping Roman deployment.  While such thought may never have been 
formalized to the level of “strategy,” the Roman military does appear to have possessed not just 
Chapter One’s modus cogitandi, but a practical modus operandi that shaped how it conceived 
and executed its mission over the physical landscape. 
 By way of conclusion, let us consider our Spanish case study’s broader implications for 
understanding Roman military imperialism.  First and foremost, geospatial analysis of Rome’s 
early wars in the Iberian peninsula indicates that the topoi of Chapter One had a practical impact 
beyond the Greco-Roman literary sphere.  When we analyze the sites of military activity, Roman 
warfare does relate to the physical landscape in consistent and predictable ways.  Ancient 
antipathy to broken ground is not a literary topos alone, but an important set of cultural and 
strategic preferences that shaped the real-world deployment of imperial violence.   
 Moreover, this chapter’s spatial narrative of the Spanish wars, and in particular the 
gradual migration of violence up-country in the face of continued insurrection, suggests an 
important corollary to the Roman preference for level-ground warfare.  As imperial forces 
preferred to project force on the plains, so local resistance was most likely to manifest itself on 
broken ground, where insurgents not only possessed the crucial defensive advantages discussed 
in Chapter One, but also where serious Roman retribution was less likely to occur.  Rome’s 
relationship with the hill-tribes of Spain, most notably the Bergistani, Lusitani, and Celtiberi, 
suggests that locals were well aware of Rome’s geospatial priorities and predilections: it was 
hardly a secret that Rome preferred not to launch major attacks far from level ground.  
Opportunistic locals took advantage of this knowledge to resist Roman authority over rugged 
terrain, driving a harder bargain for their quiescence and erupting more readily to violence at 
signs of Roman weakness.  It was this dynamic, played out through two generations of Roman 
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rule, that necessitated the gradual shift we see in Roman force projection: to rule the highlands, 
Romans had to present a credible threat of violence against them. 
In short, the dynamics of Roman force and control depended not merely on Rome’s 
military and political relationship with the physical environment, but also on local perceptions of 
that relationship.  If we shift our perspective from Rome to its potential opponents, we see that 
resistance was thus similarly conditioned by the physical landscape, and that environmental 
challenges to Roman force presented opportunities for rebellion.  The role of terrain in rebellion 
and the local rejection of Roman control is the subject of the next chapter, which examines 








































































































Table 2.11: TRI Averages by Period 







TERRAIN AND RESISTANCE IN THE FIRST JEWISH REVOLT (66-73 CE) 
  
 Among the revolts against Roman rule in the first century CE, the Jewish uprising from 
66 to 73 was perhaps the most serious.1  Like every other revolt of this period, it was also 
unsuccessful, and the Jews paid a staggering human and religious price for their insurrection.  As 
we saw in Spain, Roman antipathy to broken ground had its limits, and the hills of Judaea and 
Galilee ultimately proved to be inadequate bases for lasting rebellion.  It remains important to 
couch in relative terms the opportunities for resistance and insurgency which broken ground 
provided; as the surviving siege-works at Masada testify, there was little that the concentrated 
power of the Roman army could not accomplish, even on exceptionally hostile ground.   
 If, however, we shift our focus from the ultimate collapse of the Jewish revolt to the 
heady enthusiasm of its early days, we find in the initial outbreak clues to the broader patterns of 
space and violence which held the Mediterranean world under Roman rule.  This chapter argues 
that the geographical foci and strongpoints of the early Jewish revolt may be found 
predominantly on broken ground.  This war, recorded from the perspective of a (former) Roman 
enemy, confirms a trend glimpsed, however hazily, in the behavior of Chapter Two’s Spaniards: 
rugged terrain was not only a source of discomfort for the Romans but also a source of hope for 
its enemies, who shared in the Roman belief that hills and mountains might let weaker locals 
                                                          
1 Unless otherwise noted, all dates in this chapter are CE. 
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defeat stronger foreign foes.  Through GIS analysis of two case studies—the initial Jewish 
victory at Beth Horon, and Josephus’ subsequent mission to defend Galilee—we see broken 
ground in its role as an incubator of resistance.    
              The Jewish wars of the mid-first century CE provide a particularly promising focus for 
this dissertation’s questions of terrain, force, and control.  At the level of “battle history,” rough 
terrain is an unavoidable feature of the Jewish rebellion, a conflict bookended by two famous 
engagements in which rugged terrain played a crucial role.  The war began in earnest in 66 with 
the ambush of Roman forces at Beth Horon, a steep pass north of Jerusalem.  It came to a close 
in 73 (or perhaps 74) at Masada, today the most famous hill-fort from the Roman world and an 
important site in Israel’s national mythology.2  As this chapter will argue, however, historians 
can use the Levantine terrain not just as an explanatory device for tactical history, but as a 
strategic, structural factor which influenced both the outbreak of the revolt itself and broader 
patterns in Roman control over Judaea. 
Beyond the prima facie relevance of broken ground to the conflict, the Jewish revolt 
presents a uniquely appealing area of investigation because of the historical record provided by 
Flavius Josephus, whose Jewish War and autobiographical Life provide extensive coverage of 
the conflict.  Not only do these works provide the most detailed extant account of a rebellion 
against Roman rule, they are the only major source from this period written by an erstwhile 
enemy of the empire: a leader in the Jewish community, Josephus commanded forces in Galilee 
in 66 and 67, before being captured by Vespasian and ultimately joining the future emperor’s 
                                                          
2 Ben-Yehuda 1995.  On the date of the Roman siege, Cotton 1989, 157-62.  Note that while this 
chapter’s case studies do not address the role of Masada in the Jewish Revolt, the use of this base as 
refuge of last resort broadly supports my findings. 
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network of clients.3  To be sure, Josephus is not a simple author to decipher, nor is he always 
truthful.4  Yet with careful handling he provides unmatched insight into the dynamics of a 
provincial revolt: its motivations, factional divides, hopes for success, and ultimate failures.   
 While this is not the place for a full narrative of the Jewish War, a very brief historical 
overview will serve to establish context.  Judaea fell under Roman control with Pompey’s 
campaigns in the 60s BCE.  For half a century, it remained (for the most part) a loyal client 
kingdom under Hasmonean and then Herodian rulers.5  After an abortive revolt following the 
death of Herod the Great (4 BCE) and the intolerable reign of Archelaus, Judaea was turned into 
a province in 6 CE.6  The sixty years separating provincialization and revolt were also fraught 
with internal conflicts among the Jews themselves, as well as periodic clashes with their 
neighbors and the Roman authorities.7  Rebellion broke out in 66 during the procuratorship of 
                                                          
3 Despite his perspective as a one-time outsider to the Roman world, Josephus wrote primarily for a 
Roman audience; Mason 2016, 99. 
 
4 This chapter adopts a relatively positive approach to Josephus’ quality as a historian, but continues to 
treat his accuracy on a case-by-case basis.  For arguments against Josephus’ reliability, see: Weber 1921; 
Cohen 1979; Rappaport 1994, 279-89;.  For more charitable assessments of Josephus, see Rajak 1983; 
Miller 2001, 453-67; Curran 2007, 75-91; Mason 2016. 
 
5 Mason 2016, ch. 4.  Mason’s monumental analysis of the first revolt is now the definitive work on the 
subject. 
 
6 Millar 1993, 44.  Millar and Mason 2016, 240 disagree on the administrative status of Judaea, with 
Mason arguing that it was attached to the larger province of Syria.  Mason’s evidence is persuasive, 
though for our purposes the precise administrative configuration of the Roman Near East matters little; 
we can be confident that Judaea was overseen by either a Prefect or Procurator (who reported either 
formally or informally to the legate of Syria), and possessed an auxiliary garrison.  
  
7 Farmer 1956; Hengel 1961; Isaac 1992, 55.  On the contrary, Mason 2016, 214, 262, and ch. 4 passim 
argues that Romano-Jewish tensions in this period have been overstated. 
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Gessius Florus, when the priests of the Temple ceased sacrifices for the emperor Nero, and 
rebels besieged and massacred the auxiliary garrison of Jerusalem.8 
The first Roman response came from Cestius Gallus, governor of Syria, who marched 
south with 30,000 men in a show of force designed to cow the rebellious population.9  Gallus 
probably did not expect that the inhabitants of Jerusalem would refuse to surrender upon his 
arrival, or that the Herodian walls would stymie his unprepared army.10  Forced to turn back 
from the Judaean capital with little to show for his efforts, he and his men were ambushed during 
their descent back to the coast through the defile at Beth Horon.  By the time Gallus reached the 
safety of the plains, he had lost 6,000 men.11 
 The Jews’ victory at Beth Horon would mark the high point of their rebellion.  In 67, 
Vespasian invaded Judaea with an army twice the size of Gallus’ the year prior.12  Despite 
Josephus’ praise for his own preparations in the north, he was quickly outmatched by Vespasian, 
and Galilee fell to the Romans by the end of the year.13  Vespasian’s army then moved south into 
                                                          
8 Joseph. BJ 2.277-456. 
 
9 On the size and composition of Gallus’ army, see Gichon 1981, 44.  
   
10 This is the central argument of Mason 2016, ch. 5; cf. Joseph. BJ 2.499-539. 
 
11 Joseph. BJ 2.540-555.  Josephus lists 6,000 killed, a plausible 17% casualty rate if we follow Gichon’s 
estimates for the size of Gallus’ army.  According to Suet. Vesp. 4.5, Gallus also lost a legionary eagle in 
the battle, although Josephus makes no mention of this.   
 
12 On the size of Vespasian’s army (approximately 60,000, including three full legions), see Mason 2016, 
364. 
 
13 Mason 2016, ch. 6 minimizes the significance and difficulty of Roman military action in the Galilee.  
While his general conclusion that the Romans did not do much actual fighting in Galilee is correct, in the 
discussion below I refute the assumption that this reflects the dominance of Roman power in the region, 
and not Roman restraint, along with the tacit acceptance of a modus vivendi by the empire and potential 
militants.  For a reconstructed timeline of the Galilee campaign, see Mason 2016, 378. 
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Judaea proper, pausing in order to monitor the succession crisis in Rome that would ultimately 
make its commander emperor, as well as to allow warring factions in Jerusalem to exhaust each 
other.14  By 70, Vespasian’s son Titus had closed in on the Jewish capital.  After a harrowing 
siege, he sacked the city and burned the Temple.15  While the fall of Jerusalem brought most of 
Judaea back into the imperial fold, a handful of rebels held out in mountain fortresses, most 
notably Masada.  Yet even this stronghold ultimately fell to Roman determination and 
engineering skill, and by 73 or 74 the Jewish revolt was over.16 
 The Jewish War has generated a lengthy historiography (the bibliography of Steven 
Mason’s meticulously researched History of the Jewish War spans 37 pages), much of which 
focuses on the Jewish motives to revolt.17  Older arguments emphasized that the outbreak of war 
in 66 was driven by persistent religious animosity between Jews and Romans.18  More recent 
work has advanced disparate causes including socio-economic displacement and class tension, 
the inability of the Jewish ruling class to govern its countrymen, the weakness and incompetence 
of Roman provincial governors, and animosity between the Jews and their Greco-Syrian 
                                                          
14 Cline 2010, 118. 
 
15 Mason 2016, ch. 7-8. 
 
16 Joseph. BJ 7.280-401. 
 
17 Mason 2016, ch. 4 provides a thorough overview of the scholarly debate over the Jewish Revolt’s 
causes.  See also Goodman 2002, 15-24.  
 
18 Farmer 1956; Hengel 1961.   
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neighbors.19  Today, most historians agree that the Jewish uprising had multiple causes, and that 
individual participants had a wide range of overlapping motives for revolt.    
 Far fewer scholars have addressed the means of the revolt: once the Jews were 
sufficiently enraged to resist Roman control, what factors gave them confidence that they might 
succeed in rebellion (or, at the very least, survive the attempt)?  While the few military histories 
of the Jewish revolt make substantial contributions in their own right, they tend to focus on how 
the Romans defeated their Jewish opponents, largely overlooking questions of why the Jews 
expected the outcome to be different.20  If we are to gain full understanding of the Jewish revolt 
and the power dynamics of Roman rule in Judaea, we must focus on this question of military 
expectation.  Whatever their grievances against the empire, most Jewish combatants did not want 
to die on the battlefield (and those who did wanted to take some Romans with them).  When 
faced with a life-or-death struggle against the most powerful army in the known world, the Jews 
thought carefully about how their revolt might unfold.  By tracing where and how rebels chose to 
fight, we see that they made these considerations with the physical landscape firmly in mind.   
 As noted, rough terrain did not ultimately prevent the Roman reconquest of Judaea.  Yet 
if we reconsider this war in terms of the military landscape, it is clear that broken ground shaped 
the outbreak, conduct, and resolution of the Jewish uprising.  Because of the defensive 
                                                          
19 On class tension: Horsley 1979, 37-63; Horsley and Hanson 1988.  On the failure of the Jewish ruling 
class: Goodman 1987.  On provincial governors: Curran 2005, 70-98.  On Greco-Jewish conflicts: 
Rappaport 1982, 81-95; Mason 2016, 200. 
 
20 On the paucity of military histories of the Jewish War: Millar 1993, 70 n. 2.  For a comprehensive 
operational history of the Jewish War (and succeeding conflicts): Bloom 2010.  For outstanding tactical 
treatments of the Battle of Beth Horon (discussed in greater detail below): Bar-Kochva 1976; Gichon 
1981.  On the Roman military response to rebellion in Judaea: Isaac 1990; Gambash 2015; Russell 2016. 
Though not entirely a military history, Mason 2016 is often influenced by military considerations: see 
especially ch. 3. 
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advantages which they provided, hills and mountains were the means for successful resistance 
and an important impetus to rebellion.  In a moment where all other sources of social power 
faltered, broken ground limited the empire’s ability to restore its authority efficiently, thus 
exacerbating and prolonging ruptures of Roman control.21 
 With this argument in mind, let us turn to the first in our pair of case studies: Cestius 
Gallus’ disaster at Beth Horon in 66.  Analyzing this clash in terms of military geography—and 
with the assistance of GIS technology—reveals the importance of the strategic landscape 
surrounding Jerusalem in the outbreak of the Jewish war, as well as in the longer-term 
relationship between the city and its imperial rulers. 
 
Section One: Beth Horon and the Topographical Advantages of Jerusalem 
 
 The Battle of Beth Horon in October 66 was a crushing defeat for the Romans, second 
only to the slaughter in Teutoberg Forest among the military catastrophes of the early empire.  Its 
effects were profound, especially if we follow Mason’s view that the Romans were initially 
hesitant to take heavy-handed military action against the Jews; according to Mason, even after 
the massacre of Jerusalem’s auxiliary garrison and the High Priests’ halting of sacrifices to the 
emperor, Gallus and the Romans did not consider the province of Judaea to be in open revolt.22  
Peace (albeit with appropriate punishment for the leading agitators) was still possible.  The 
Jewish victory in 66 emboldened radicals and temporarily silenced moderates, providing the 
                                                          
21 Mann 1986 (and see Introduction above). 
 
22 Mason 2016, ch. 5. 
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impetus for a widespread rebellion.23  Furthermore, the death of 6,000 Romans in the pass at 
Beth Horon compelled the empire to respond with overwhelming force. 
 Most accounts of Beth Horon stress the incompetence of Cestius Gallus, painting the 
legate as a blunderer whose ignorance and miscalculation brought disaster to the men in his 
charge.24  While this case study far from exonerates Gallus, I would stress that the general’s 
decision to approach and depart Jerusalem via the Beth Horon pass was not among his numerous 
mistakes.  The Romans recognized their campaign as a calculated risk necessary to quell the 
revolt in Jerusalem, and both they and the Jews foresaw the possibility of a successful ambush at 
Beth Horon.  As a result, the battle there is best seen not as a historical accident with tremendous 
consequences, but as the result of underlying structural and topographical factors.  The 
Jerusalemites understood and appreciated the strategic implications of their surrounding 
landscape, and in 66 they found the means for (temporarily) effective rebellion in the defiles 
surrounding the Judaean plateau. 
 Let us begin by briefly recounting the events of Cestius Gallus’ campaign and the battle 
of Beth Horon.  In 66, responding to growing unrest in Jerusalem, Gallus marched south along 
the coast from Antioch.  According to Mason, he had begun to assemble his forces a month 
before the destruction of Jerusalem’s auxiliary garrison.25  While the Romans did not expect 
serious resistance, they had no qualms about using force as a warning to their subjects: Gallus 
                                                          
23 Joseph. Vit. 24; Bloom 2010, 76-77. 
 
24 Bar-Kochva 1976; Gichon 1981; Bloom 2010.  cf. Mason 2016, 281.  A new study of the battle of Beth 
Horon is forthcoming from Ran Ortner in the proceedings of the 24th Limes Congress; Dr. Ortner has 
been kind enough to share a preliminary draft. 
 
25 Mason 2016, 301-309. 
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burned Jewish communities along the borders of Ptolemais and slaughtered the population of 
Joppa.26  After delays pacifying Galilee (where fighting centered on the rugged terrain at Mt. 
Asamon), by October the Romans were established in the south and prepared to ascend from the 
coastal plain to Jerusalem.27   
In the hills of Judaea, however, Gallus faced a level of opposition that he evidently did 
not expect.  As depicted on Map 3.1, the Jews struck as the Romans climbed towards 
Jerusalem.28  Outside Gabao, radicals from the Jewish capital temporarily shattered the Roman 
line, inflicting 515 casualties with only 22 losses.29  At almost the same time, a Jewish 
detachment under Simon bar Giora attacked the Roman baggage-train (still ascending the Beth 
Horon pass), badly hampering Gallus’ ability to provision his main army.30  Drawing on the 
common topoi of mountain combat discussed in Chapter One, Josephus suggests that broken 
ground brought defensive advantages for the Jews, and discomfort for the Romans: as Cestius 
Gallus encamped at Gabao, “the Jews occupied the heights and kept guard on the defiles, clearly 
not intending to remain inactive, should the Romans begin to move.”31 Afterwards, the client-
king Agrippa II tried to negotiate terms with the Jews, “perceiving that, with the enemy in such 
                                                          
26 Joseph. BJ 2.503-509. 
 
27 Joseph. BJ 2.510-12. 
 
28 Note that this map gives only an approximate presentation of the Roman march and Jewish attacks. In 
particular, the depiction of Jewish movements should not be taken as precise indications of where and 
how ambushes took place.   
 
29 Joseph. BJ 2.517-20.  We need not consider these figures as anything more than approximations which 
Josephus uses to communicate the magnitude of the Jewish victory.  
  
30 Joseph. BJ 2.521-22. 
 
31 Joseph. BJ 2.522: οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι τὰ μετέωρα κατειληφότες ἐπετήρουν τὰς παρόδους δῆλοί τε ἦσαν οὐκ 
ἠρεμήσοντες ἀρξαμένων τῶν Ῥωμαίων ὁδεύειν. 
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countless numbers in possession of the surrounding mountains even a Roman army was in a 
perilous position.”32  While we should remain alert to the impact of literary convention on 
Josephus’ text, the GIS reconstruction below indicates that these passages realistically depict the 
challenges of Gallus’ advance.  On the rugged edges of the Judaean plateau, the Romans 
encountered perilous terrain which multiplied the lethality of Jewish hit-and-run attacks.     
Taking advantage of dissent among the Jewish ranks, Gallus was ultimately able to push 
through to his objective.  He encamped outside Jerusalem on Mt. Scopus.  Even after his losses 
in its hinterlands, Gallus evidently expected Jerusalem to surrender.33  When it did not, the 
Romans torched the suburbs and assaulted the walls of the Old City.  Josephus insists that the 
Romans were on the verge of success when Gallus ordered a sudden retreat.34  While we cannot 
know whether a more persistent assault would have broken Jewish resolve, according to 
Mordechai Gichon the decision to withdraw was strategically sound.  Gallus lacked the siege 
equipment necessary to take Jerusalem by assault, and with his supply lines compromised and 
winter rains closing in, he had insufficient time either to construct these weapons or to rely on 
pro-Roman factions in the city to defeat the rebels and open the gates.35 
                                                          
32 Joseph.BJ 2.523: Ἔνθα δὴ κατιδὼν Ἀγρίππας οὐδὲ τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἀκίνδυνα πλήθους ἀπείρου πολεμίων 
τὰ ὄρη περισχόντος… 
 
33 Joseph. BJ 2.528. 
 
34 Joseph. BJ 2.533-539. 
 




Cestius Gallus’ withdrawal only emboldened the rebels; as shown on Map 3.2, the march 
back to the coast quickly turned disastrous for the Romans.36  Initial attacks on the rearguard 
inflicted heavy casualties before the Romans reached the security of their base at Mt. Scopus.37  
The next day, the Jews continued to harry Gallus with great effect, exploiting their ability to 
move freely around the edges of the cumbersome Roman column.38  “Hanging upon [Gallus’] 
heels they cut up his rear, and enclosing the troops on either side of the route poured their 
missiles on the flanks of the column.”39  The Romans limped to a temporary respite at Gabao, 
where a two-day delay only allowed time for more militants to flood the surrounding 
countryside.40  Realizing too late the gravity of his situation, Gallus abandoned what remained of 
his baggage train and ordered a quick descent through Beth Horon.41 
 What followed, according to Josephus’ narrative, was a paradigmatic “defile ambush,” a 
common topos of Greco-Roman combat description described above in Chapter One.  As in 
Livy’s semi-legendary disaster at the Caudine Forks, the Romans found themselves surrounded 
in the narrows, while the Jews rained fire on them from the adjacent heights.42  “There was no 
                                                          
36 See Map 3.2 for a rough depiction of Gallus’ retreat.  As with Map 3.1, all routes of march (particularly 
those of the Jews) are approximate and impressionistic. 
 
37 Joseph. BJ 2.540-42. 
 
38 As seen in Chapter One, the Romans themselves recognized their vulnerability to light skirmishers on 
rugged terrain, and this tactical mismatch was a common topos of military literature.  
  
39 Joseph. BJ 2.542: …καὶ τοὺς ὑστάτους αὐτῶν προσκείμενοι διέφθειρον καὶ καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον τῆς ὁδοῦ 
περιιόντες ἠκόντιζον εἰς πλαγίους. 
 
40 Joseph. BJ 2.545. 
 
41 Joseph. BJ 2.546. 
 
42 Joseph. BJ 2.547; cf. Livy, 9.2-3. 
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room for flight, no conceivable means of defense; in their utter helplessness the troops were 
reduced to groans and the wailings of despair.”43  Only the fall of darkness put a pause to the 
Jewish attack, allowing the Romans to flee to the safety of the coastal plain.44    
 Josephus’ text, as seen in the excerpts above, stresses the role of broken ground in the 
Jewish victory at Beth Horon.  As in Chapter Two’s discussion of Rome’s evolving strategy in 
Spain, GIS analysis can demonstrate that this is not just a literary allusion, but a representation of 
military reality.  Showing TRI values for the region around Jerusalem, Map 3.3 substantiates the 
connection between the terrain and Gallus’ defeat, demonstrating that the physical landscape 
proved fatal to Rome’s first attempt to restore order in Judaea.  As in previous TRI maps, 
relatively flat and unproblematic ground is shown in green, while shades of yellow (100-200 m) 
and red (200+ m) indicate areas where the terrain was probably rough enough to hamper Roman 
operations. 
At the tactical and operational levels, GIS confirms that the terrain surrounding Jerusalem 
was sufficiently rugged to enable the Jewish ambush and decisive victory at Beth Horon.  
Following the principle of generalized positioning developed in the previous chapter, this 
conclusion holds regardless of Cestius Gallus’ precise route through Beth Horon (a matter of 
some debate).45   We may thus challenge Mason’s assertion that Josephus misrepresents the 
terrain near Beth Horon for literary effect.46  To be sure, this was not the “true Alpine landscape” 
                                                          
43 Joseph. BJ 2.549: καὶ οὔτε φυγῆς τις τόπον οὔτε ἀμύνης εἶχεν ἐπίνοιαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἀμηχανίας ἐπ᾽ 
οἰμωγὴν ἐτράποντο καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἀπογνώσεσιν ὀδυρμούς. 
 
44 Joseph. BJ 2.550-55. 
 
45 See discussion in Mason 2016, 300. 
 
46 Mason 2016, 300. 
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of Josephus’ imagination.47  Nevertheless, TRI statistics suggest the severe difficulty which the 
Romans faced in the Beth Horon pass, even in comparison to other famous engagements of the 
Jewish rebellion: the worst of the terrain leading up to Masada has TRI values around 210 m, 
while the ridgeline which overhangs the Beth Horon pass has TRI values closer to 260 m.  In 
Mason’s criticism of Josephus, “Spectacular scenery was more important to this pivotal episode 
than fidelity to a nature unknown to his audiences.  This is a good place to remember how much 
Josephus omits, which is almost everything, and why it is futile to suppose that we can recover 
the past from him.”48  While parts of this criticism may be justified as a general principle, in this 
specific instance TRI analysis largely exonerates Josephus’ narrative, and supports the previous 
scholars—Gichon and Bezalel Bar-Kochva chief among them—who have defended its validity.49  
Mason is very harsh on Jesephus in this respect.   
As Josephus claimed, rough terrain had a crucial impact on the way in which the opening 
battle of the Jewish war was fought, enabling an improbable Jewish victory (and the political 
consequences which followed).  Yet if we analyze the early days of the war at the level of 
military expectation and anticipation, we may further suggest that even before the decisive battle, 
the terrain around Jerusalem would have called into question the strength of Rome’s grip on the 
city.  As the Roman army closed in on Jerusalem in October 66, potential rebels recognized the 
degree of protection afforded by Beth Horon and the other passes up the Judaean plateau.  They 
saw that the Romans would be vulnerable on this terrain, making victory a distinct possibility.  
                                                          
47 The phrase is originally from Gichon 1981, 58.  It is quoted (rather selectively) in Mason 2016, 300: the 
ensuing paragraphs of Gichon’s argument give a more thorough discussion of the potentially severe 
military difficulties posed by the Beth Horon pass. 
 
48 Mason 2016, 300. 
 
49 Bar-Kochva 1976; Gichon 1981. 
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At a moment when Rome’s non-violent forms of power crumbled in the face of Jewish rage, 
broken ground emboldened radicals with hopes for military success against their occupiers.50  By 
undercutting the fear of Roman force—that final bulwark of empire—rough terrain thus helped 
to cause the dissolution of Roman control and the outbreak of the Jewish rebellion. 
 This argument that the Jews anticipated victory at Beth Horon rests on two premises.  
First, Cestius Gallus’ approach to Jerusalem through this narrow defile was not a mistake, but a 
calculated and unavoidable risk which the Jews could expect.  Second the Jerusalemites knew 
their own history of remarkable triumphs in these same hills (including two victories by Judas 
Maccabeus at Beth Horon itself), and thus had reason to hope for a similar victory against the 
Romans. 
 GIS technology allows us to confirm cartographically and quantitatively the impression 
of Mordechai Gichon (who fought over much of this terrain in 1947) that Cestius Gallus chose 
the safest approach to Jerusalem.51  Even a quick survey of Map 3.3 reveals the magnitude of the 
city’s natural defenses.  There was simply no way for an external power to project military force 
against Jerusalem without accepting the risks of broken ground combat, and the Jerusalemites 
knew it.  In fact, we can use TRI data and a GIS technique known as Least-Cost Path Analysis to 
confirm mathematically that the path through Beth Horon is the least rugged northern approach 
to Jerusalem from the Mediterranean coast.  In this method, each grid-square in our TRI dataset 
is assigned a cost for moving through it (in this case, its TRI value).  GIS software then 
calculates the route from a designated start and endpoint—Antioch and Mt. Scopus—that incurs 
                                                          
50 Note the model of force and control laid out in the Introduction above, drawing largely on Mann 1986. 
 
51 Gichon 1981, 51.  Bar Kochva 1976, 13 and Mason 2016, 291 come to similar conclusions. 
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the lowest cost (and so traverses the least rugged terrain).52  As seen in Map 3.4, the results 
almost perfectly trace the ascent through Lower and Upper Beth Horon to Gabao and the 
Judaean plateau. 
 While Gallus could perhaps have done more tactically to counter the Jewish ambush, at 
an operational level he minimized the dangers to his troops by selecting the Beth Horon pass for 
his approach and retreat.53  Josephus himself saw the battle of Beth Horon as one of inevitable 
risk and predictable disaster. While Josephus criticizes the Roman commander’s decision to fall 
back from Jerusalem when on the cusp of victory, Gallus’ leadership during the retreat itself 
draws little complaint.54  And indeed, Josephus uses the topoi of mountain combat not just as a 
literary affectation, but as an explanatory device for the Jewish victory.  When the historian 
chooses to deploy the topos of the defile ambush, he explains the Roman defeat at Beth Horon in 
terms of a permanent geographic quandary, rather than an unpredictable and individual error.   
 In short, Cestius Gallus and the Romans did not wander into the Battle of Beth Horon by 
accident, and the Jews did not stumble upon their decisive ambush.  With even a basic working 
knowledge of Judaean topography, malcontents in Jerusalem understood that the Romans would 
have to run the risk of combat at Beth Horon (or even more treacherous ground) in order to put 
                                                          
52 For documentation of this tool in ArcMap: <https://desktop.arcgis.com/en/arcmap/10.5/tools/spatial-
analyst-toolbox/cost-path.htm> 
 
53 For criticism of Gallus’ tactical preparations, see Bloom 2010, 74-76.  On the importance of securing 
passes like Beth Horon in advance of major operations (no easy task in this case), note Onas. Strat. 7.1, 
11.4; Veg. Mil. 3.6. 
 
54 See BJ 2.540 for Josephus’ criticism of the decision to withdraw.  Josephus’ narrative of the retreat to 
the coast critiques Gallus for continuing the retreat from Mt. Scopus (“by continuing his retreat, he invited 
further opposition from the enemy”) and for delaying at Gabao.  Gallus is portrayed as overly 
conservative, perhaps bordering on timorous, but allegations that he should somehow have negated the 
Jewish advantage on broken ground are absent. 
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down large-scale resistance in the city.  Moreover, the long mythology and history of Judaea 
before Roman rule provided numerous examples of successful defile ambushes to inspire hope 
and rebellion in 66.  According to the Hebrew Bible, Joshua routed the Amorites through the 
Beth Horon pass.  Accounts of a divine assault on the fleeing Amorites perhaps presage the 
ability of Jewish skirmishers to turn the pass into a killing ground: “while they were going down 
the slope of Beth Horon, the Lord threw down huge stones from heaven on them as far as 
Azekah, and they died.”55 Judas Maccabeus defeated the Seleucids twice in Beth Horon, and 
Bar-Kochva argues that his first strike came from the same hilltop where the Jews ambushed 
Gallus.56  In the first battle at the pass between Judas and the Seleucid general Seron, the Book of 
Maccabees hints at Beth Horon’s defensive qualities (although its explanations are supernatural, 
rather than topographical).  Upon seeing the size of the Seleucid force, the Jewish militants asked 
their commander, “‘How can we, few as we are, fight against so great and so strong a 
multitude?’…. Judas replied, ‘It is easy for many to be hemmed in by few, for in the sight of 
Heaven there is no difference between saving by many or by few.  It is not on the size of the 
army that victory in battle depends, but strength comes from Heaven.’”57  Drawing on such 
examples of victory, the Jerusalemites were culturally primed to anticipate that both God and 
tactics would favor them at Beth Horon. 
 In 66, the Jews knew the Romans would have to cross unfavorable terrain to reach 
Jerusalem, and they knew that similar imperial powers had fallen victim to Jewish ambushes on 
such terrain.  As a result, when they considered fighting Cestius Gallus in October 66 (and 
                                                          
55 Josh. 10.11.  All biblical translations are from the New Revised Standard Version. 
 
56 Joseph., AJ 12.288-92, 408-12; 1 Macc. 3.13-26; Bar Kochva 1976, 17, 19-20. 
 
57 1 Macc. 3.18-19. 
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perhaps even when they considered how stringently to oppose the procurator Florus in the 
preceding summer), their knowledge of Jerusalem’s advantageous topography encouraged 
resistance against imperial control.  It was in part the Judaean terrain itself which ultimately 
plunged the region into all-out war.58      
Before concluding this case study of the battle of Beth Horon, we should ask what role 
the surroundings of Jerusalem played in the longer-term relationship between the city and 
Roman power structures.  There is certainly evidence that Beth Horon and the similarly rugged 
ground which rings the Judaean plateau were spaces of shallow imperial control.  The 
Maccabees revolt against the Seleucids had its origins in the village of Modeein, at the very edge 
of the Judaean hills.59  Under Roman rule in the early 50s, a slave of the imperial household was 
robbed by bandits on the road near Beth Horon; imperial troops could only retaliate against the 
surrounding villages for allowing (if not abetting) the bandits’ escape.60  Nevertheless, the 
impact of Beth Horon and its surrounding hills on resistance movements in Jerusalem itself is 
more difficult to ascertain.  While broken ground proved decisive in the defeat of Cestius Gallus’ 
campaign, it does not seem to have presented similar difficulties to other Roman commanders.  
Pompey (63 BCE), Varus (4 BCE), and Vespasian (68-70 CE) did not face significant opposition 
as they climbed a variety of rugged passes towards Jerusalem.61  As explanation, we may point to 
the operational and logistical barriers to defending these passes.  In order to take advantage of 
                                                          
58 Joseph. Vit. 24. 
 
59 Joseph. AJ 12.268-70.  As noted above, some of this revolt’s greatest victories were similarly won 
thanks to the defensive terrain of the Judaean plateau. 
 
60  Joseph. BJ 2.228-29. 
 
61 Joseph. BJ 1.138-41, 2.66-71; Bloom (2010) ch. 11. 
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the defensive terrain at Beth Horon in 66, Jewish rebels needed to be sufficiently motivated and 
organized to march 17 km away from Jerusalem, no easy task for an amateur militia.62  Against 
Gallus, the Jerusalemites were sufficiently angry and united to take advantage of their defensive 
terrain; in previous conflicts, these preconditions were evidently not met.  Though important in 
shaping and motivating resistance, the physical environment was not historically determinative.   
 Yet even though the security of the Judaean plateau was not a constant trigger for 
outright rebellion, there is evidence that Romans and Jews consistently thought about their 
relationship and acted upon it in ways that were influenced by the military environment, both 
before and after the revolt in 66.  Passes such as Beth Horon seem to have influenced the 
symbolism of Jewish negotiation with the Romans: in times of duress in the first century, 
Jerusalem elites tended to come down from the Judaean plateau and present their case to the 
Roman governors in the cities of the coastal plain.63  Since the Romans perceived broken ground 
as an obstacle to imperial control, such descent from the hills can be seen as a sign of ritualized 
submission, analogous to the empire’s forced removal of defeated peoples from mountains to 
plains discussed in Chapter One.64  When the Jews made themselves vulnerable before the 
governor on level ground, he tended to grant their requests, eager to show clementia (and 
perhaps mindful of the difficulties in taking further military action against Jerusalem).  Yet in 
cases where the proper forms of submission were not observed and the governor confronted 
                                                          
62 Distance calculated in ArcGIS, roughly following the road from Jerusalem to Upper Beth Horon as 
depicted in BAtlas 70 and TIR Iudaea 1994.  Joseph. BJ 2.517 emphasizes for literary effect the haste and 
unplanned nature of the Jews’ first attack on Cestius Gallus, misrepresenting the geographic realities 
involved. 
 
63 Joseph. BJ 2.169-74, 184-201, 228-31. 
 
64 App. Ill. 4.21, Hisp. 13.76; Dio Cass. 54.11; Livy, 39.2, 40.38.    
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Jewish opposition in Jerusalem itself, the Roman response was harsh and violent.65  Over the 
course of decades, we can see the military environment and imperial control intersect at a 
symbolic level: while the Jews did not always use passes such as Beth Horon to defend their 
interests through violence, the strategic potential of the landscape influenced both Roman and 
Jewish thinking about  their imperial relationship. 
In addition, changes in Roman deployment patterns after the First Jewish War suggest 
that the empire recognized the role of military geography in a longer-term pattern of Jewish 
disobedience.  From Pompey’s arrival in 63 BCE to the outbreak of war in 66 CE, Judaea was 
monitored by a mix of auxiliary cohorts and the armies of royal clients.  Except for a brief period 
following Herod’s death in 4 BCE, no Roman legions were posted in the province.66  This 
changed after the sack of Jerusalem, when Legio X Fretensis was permanently stationed in the 
city.67  We can read this change in deployment as evidence for how the Romans evaluated the 
threat of Jerusalem and its surrounding landscape.  As Benjamin Isaac stresses, Judaea was an 
internal frontier, and Legio X was not stationed in anticipation of foreign invasion.68  Its 
redeployment to Jerusalem reflected Rome’s need to maintain order in the city, and its growing 
understanding of the difficulties in doing so from coastal bases.  In short, when Roman leaders 
reflected on the events of the Jewish revolt, they identified the physical terrain as a structural 
factor in their loss of control over Judaea.  As they did with the hill-tribes of Spain, the Romans 
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67 Bloom 2010, 182. 
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adjusted their deployments accordingly, moving a more imposing garrison into the highlands 
surrounding Jerusalem. 
This case study demonstrates the potential of a tightly focused GIS analysis to reveal 
larger trends in Roman imperialism and local resistance.  Moving outward from the historical 
“tipping point” at Beth Horon, I have suggested a structural relationship between the terrain 
surrounding Jerusalem and the Roman grip on the city, arguing that broken ground not only 
enabled Jewish victory for a few short days in 66, but also provided an important psychological 
cause of their revolt in the first place.  Turning north, the second of this chapter’s case studies 
makes a similar argument on a somewhat larger scale, using the physical landscape to explain 
broader patterns of resistance and compliance across the entire region of Galilee. 
 
Section Two: The War in Galilee 
 
Unlike their coreligionists to the south, the Jews in Galilee never won a decisive victory 
over their Roman opponents: the region fell to Vespasian in a matter of months.69  Yet while 
Rome ultimately triumphed, broken ground still shaped the spatial organization of resistance in 
Galilee and helped to determine where and how the Romans lost provincial control.  Here, as in 
Jerusalem, rough terrain and its military advantages provided the means for revolution (in 
anticipation, if not in practice). 
After a very short introduction on the handling of Josephus as an admittedly problematic 
source, this case study proceeds in two parts.  The first maps out the geographic foci of the 
Jewish rebellion in the north, exploring how in Galilee, as in Judaea, the presence of broken 
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ground played an important role in local decisions between rebellion and compliance.  The 
second subsection traces Vespasian’s reconquest of Galilee in 67; as in Spain more than two 
centuries earlier, it shows Rome’s hesitation to engage its enemies on rough terrain, and 
demonstrates more clearly than ever how the topographical priorities of Roman imperialism 
allowed highland insurgents to survive the act of rebellion and even extract concessions from 
their would-be rulers.  
We must begin, however briefly, with the challenges Josephus poses as our only literary 
source on the revolt in Galilee.70  Scholarly opinion of Josephus’ historical merits has tended to 
be negative (though recent work is increasingly charitable).71  For the Galilean war in particular, 
we are hampered by the centrality of Josephus himself as a character in the narrative, and by the 
fact that the Jewish War and the Life give contradictory purposes for his mission to the north.72   
When it comes to the geography of the Galilean revolt, however, we may confidently use 
Josephus as a reliable source: though far from comprehensive, his toponym-lists—both of Jewish 
strongpoints (whether fortified by himself or others) and of sites which fell to Vespasian and his 
lieutenants—are essentially trustworthy.  We are on even firmer ground here than in the previous 
                                                          
70 For Beth Horon, on the other hand, Josephus’ account is confirmed in broad outline by Tac. Hist. 5.10 
and Suet. Vesp. 4. 
 
71 For the pro-Josephus camp, see especially Rajak 1983; Curran 2007; Mason 2016, ch. 2.  See also n. 4 
above.  Mason provides the most up-to-date bibliography on the debates over Josephus. 
 
72 In BJ 2.572-76, Josephus was sent by a militant Jerusalem government to organize the defense of 
Galilee, where he allegedly raised 100,000 soldiers (an absurd overstatement).  In Vit. 28-29, both the 
provisional government and Josephus’ mission are moderate and conciliatory; he was sent north to disarm 
extremists and to keep the peace in Galilee while awaiting the arrival of the Romans and (hopefully) a 
negotiated settlement.  This contradiction has produced a range of scholarly responses, from attempts to 
reconcile the two sources to arguments for the dismissal of one or the other; among others, see Rappaport 
1994; Miller 2001. 
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chapter: Josephus knew far more about Galilee than Livy and Polybius (let alone Appian) knew 
about Spain.  Like these authors and their sources, Josephus seems unlikely to have falsified or 
simply invented the toponyms of sieges and battle sites: in most cases, he had no discernible 
motive to misrepresent this information (as will see below, the city of Sepphoris is a notable 
exception).73  Indeed, given that at least some readers of the War and Life must have participated 
in the Galilean wars on one side or the other, Josephus was under pressure to render the basic 
geography correctly, however much he embellished his own importance in the narrative.  Even 
more than the composite picture of the early Spanish conquest provided by Livy, Polybius, and 
Appian, Josephus gives us a reasonable register of the “hot spots” in the Galilean war: the major 
centers of Jewish resistance and the main targets of Roman reprisal.      
With good reason for methodological confidence, let us turn to the events of the Galilean 
war themselves, and in particular to the Jewish preparations for war in the months between 
Cestius Gallus’ defeat at Beth Horon in 66 and the arrival of Vespasian in 67.  Analyzing this 
prelude to the conflict in terms of military topography demonstrates how rough terrain served as 
an incubator for resistance: as in Jerusalem, the Galileans proved more likely to rebel where they 
could take confidence (however misplaced) in defensive terrain.  
*** 
Unlike with the battle of Beth Horon, a linear narrative of Jewish preparations for war in 
Galilee is neither simple to reconstruct from Josephus’ text nor particularly necessary for present 
purposes.  Suffice it to say that Josephus found the region deeply divided in late 66 and early 67.  
                                                          




Many aristocrats of Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Taricheae preferred peace, thanks in part to their 
lucrative connections with the Romans and Herodians.74  The core of the revolutionary 
movement, in addition to the urban poor, was a group described by Josephus simply as “the 
Galileans,” composed primarily of poorer villagers from the countryside.75  Giorgio Jossa makes 
a persuasive case that Josephus made a bid for leadership of the Galileans, but was rapidly 
coopted into supporting their pro-war stance.76  Meanwhile, a powerful faction coalesced in 
Upper Galilee around John of Gischala, a fierce opponent not only of the Romans but also of 
Josephus himself.77  Finally, the political landscape was further complicated by widespread 
brigandage in Galilee.78  Whether we see these raiders as simple criminals, “social bandits,” or 
politically aware proto-revolutionaries (or a mix of all three), they remain an important but 
poorly documented source of manpower and tension in the Galilean revolt.79 
Josephus preserves the spatial organization of the Galilean revolt in a pair of parallel lists 
in the Jewish War and the Life, recording the names of cities and towns which he allegedly 
                                                          
74 Horsley 2002, especially 92-95.  See also: Joseph. Vit. 30-42 
 
75 The identity and geographic association of “the Galileans” have been the subject of some debate, 
though most historians now agree that they tended to be rural and relatively poor.  Zeitlin 1974; Loftus 
1977; Armenti 1981; Feldman 1981; Jossa 1994.  Note that Horsley 2002, 98 argues to the contrary that 
the Galileans were socially motivated and hostile to the urban elite, but not particularly concerned with 
larger Roman or Herodian power structures. 
 
76 Jossa 1994. 
 
77 Horsley 2002, 95-96.  While recognizing that John of Gischala was an opportunist whose priorities and 
allegiances shifted over time (see especially Joseph. Vit. 43), I disagree with the argument in Jossa 1994 
that John was a pro-Roman figure when he attempted to usurp Josephus’ role in Galilee, and only turned 
against the Romans later (see Joseph. Vit. 70). 
 
78 Horsley 2002, 99-101. 
 
79 Joseph. Vit. 77-79, 104-107. 
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fortified in the months before Vespasian’s arrival. 80  While the list in the War contains four sites 
not found on the equivalent in the Life, they are otherwise identical.  Summarized in Table 3.1 
(along with textual and locational references), these geographic registers form the basis for this 
section’s analysis.  Previous scholarship has been skeptical of these texts, and not without 
reason.  As records of Josephus’ own accomplishments in Galilee they are certainly unreliable.81  
We can be reasonably confident that Josephus himself did not fortify Gischala, the base of his 
hated rival John; nor did he probably garrison the consistently pro-Roman Sepphoris (a special 
case I return to below).82  Nevertheless, we may productively take these lists not as indicators of 
Josephus’ own actions, but as a broader guide to the insurgency in Galilee: in aggregate, they 
provide us with the geographic layout of the rebellion in the north.   
With Josephus’ roster of resistance sites in hand, we can use comparative GIS analysis to 
more thoroughly test the correlation between rough terrain and the willingness of locals to resist 
Roman authority, seen in microcosm in the case of Beth Horon and Jerusalem.  Map 3.5 layers 
Josephus’ nineteen sites over our now familiar TRI dataset.  Even at a purely visual level, the 
connection between broken ground and resistance is apparent.  Anchored by John’s base at 
Gischala, almost a third of the Jewish strongholds cluster on the rugged massif of Upper Galilee, 
even though the majority of the region’s population and wealth lay on the plains to the south.  
Both in Lower Galilee and across the sea to the east, centers of rebellion seem to seek out the 
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81 Horsley 2002, 90.  On the other hand, Bloom 2010, 114-15 takes the lists as accurate (with the possible 
exception of Sepphoris). 
 
82 On Gischala: Joseph. BJ 575; Vit. 45, 102-103.  On Sepphoris: Joseph. BJ 574; Vit. 30, 104.  According 
to Meyers 2002, the Sepphorites actually tore down their city’s fortress in a deliberate show of 
submission to Vespasian’s army. 
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most rugged ground available: see in particular Jotapata, Gamala, and Mt. Itabyrion/Tabor, and 
to a lesser extent Japha, Sigoph, and Seleucia. 
Even in some of the rare cases where Jewish resistance concentrated in the plains, we 
may find alternate explanations in cultural geography, the limited resolution of our TRI dataset, 
or simple misdirection on the part of Josephus.  Capharrecho, quantitatively the most level of the 
nineteen sites, sits just off the main road which runs from Ptolemais east of Mt. Carmel—the 
logical route for a Roman advance into Samaria—and within striking distance of the road 
connecting Ptolemais and Sepphoris.83  Despite its vulnerable position in the plains, it made 
strategic sense as an advance warning post for Roman incursions.  Further inland, TRI analysis 
probably underestimates the defensive potential of the Caves of Arbela.  The caves here, though 
invisible in our elevation dataset, provided an important refuge against attackers: a century prior, 
they served as a bandit refuge during Herod’s campaign of reconquest, and were taken only with 
great difficulty in 38 BCE.84    
The regional capital at Sepphoris, for its part, should in all likelihood be redacted from 
Josephus’ list as an outright and clumsy falsehood.85  As the text of the Life makes clear, 
Sepphoris was never a meaningful site of homegrown resistance against the Romans.86  Nor 
should we expect it to be, regardless of the surrounding defensive landscape.  Thoroughly 
                                                          
83 See BAtlas 69 B4.  Caphareccho is just southeast of Gedru. 
 
84 Joseph. BJ 305-13. 
 
85 I retain Sepphoris in the analysis below only in accordance with the principles of accuracy in aggregate, 
discussed above in Chapter Two.  Its inclusion makes little discernable impact on the broader conclusions 
which we may draw from this dataset. 
   
86 Joseph. Vit. 104-105. 
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Hellenized and favored by the Romans as the administrative center of Galilee, the city had little 
motivation to rebel.87  We must suspect that Josephus adds it to the list solely to protect his own 
reputation: as the putative commander of Galilee, he could hardly omit the regional capital from 
his list of bases without raising uncomfortable questions about his own level of control.    
 Even beyond the visual impression of Map 3.5, GIS quantitatively confirms that the 
strongholds of Jewish resistance tended to lie either on or within easy reach of substantially 
rugged, defensible terrain.88  Table 3.2 calculates the average and maximum TRI values for 1 km 
radius circles surrounding each of Josephus’ sites of resistance.89 (organized in ascending order 
of TRI average).  Color-coding roughly matches that of the TRI maps, with red denoting 
severely difficult terrain (>200 m TRI) and yellow marking potentially difficult terrain (100-200 
m TRI).  Only five sites have local TRI averages less than 100 m, and only two lack any sort of 
nearby stronghold with a TRI score above 100 m.  Moreover, if we compare the TRI figures for 
these sites with a random regional sample (as in Chapter Two’s analysis of Spain), it becomes 
clear that the Jews based their resistance on ground substantially more rugged than the regional 
norm.  Only five sites (Sogonaea, Taricheae, Tiberias, the Caves of Arbela, and Cepharrecho) 
                                                          
87 Josephus claims (and TRI analysis confirms) that the defensive advantages of Sepphoris were 
substantial: “as it was the largest city of Galilee, a fortress in an exceptionally strong position in the 
enemy’s [i.e. the Jews’] territory, and adapted to keep guard over the entire province.”  Joseph. BJ 3.24: 
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88 As noted above, this was also true in the first round of resistance against Cestius Gallus in the north, 
where rebel fighters coalesced around Mt. Amanus. Joseph. BJ 2.510-12. 
 
89 While Chapter Two used 10 km radii as default, these 1 km calculations continue to reflect the principle 
of general positioning, while adapting to the increased certainty of our positional data.  Because we are 
dealing here with fortification and conflict settling on urban sites, many of which include archaeological 
remains, we can locate the sites of Jewish resistance much more precisely than the nebulous and 
frequently debated battlefields of Spain. 
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have local TRI averages below the Galilean average, and the average TRI score for Jewish 
strongholds reaches the 64th percentile of a random regional sample.   
 The relative ruggedness of Josephus’ list of fortified sites is similarly evident when we 
compare these strongholds with the major population centers in and near Galilee where Josephus 
makes no specific mention of resistance or combat.90  As seen in Map 3.6, many (though not all) 
such settlements lay on relatively level ground.  Eleven, including the sizeable city of Hippos, 
hug the low coasts of the Sea of Galilee (although of these, Hamath and Beth Maon find slightly 
more rugged sites southwest of Tiberias).  Another eight towns can be found on level ground in 
lower Galilee; as we will see below, the plains here fell to Vespasian’s forces early and with no 
significant resistance.91  Table 3.3 provides quantitative confirmation that the towns on which 
Josephus remains silent sat on substantially more level ground than his attested strongholds: 
twenty of the thirty-three sites have local TRI averages below 100 m (and below the 50th 
percentile of our random Galilean sample).  Taken in aggregate, these sites have an average TRI 
score of 111 m, 38 m (and 18 percentile points) less than Josephus’ strongholds. 
To be sure, Josephus’ lists omit several severely rugged population centers: Meron, Baka, 
and Kefar Nevoraia are all significantly mountainous, while Thekoa (297 m) is surrounded by 
terrain more broken than the most imposing Jewish stronghold at Jamnith (292 m).  We should 
be careful not to overstretch any argument based on the silence of Josephus, and an investigation 
of the potential role of these sites in the Galilean war should be a promising avenue for future 
archaeological research.  Nevertheless, when we investigate Josephus’ account of this war’s “hot 
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spots” through TRI analysis, it confirms the correlation between Jewish resistance and rugged 
topography.  We may safely conclude that here, as in Jerusalem, the Jews recognized Roman 
discomfort in mountain warfare and the defensive advantages of broken ground, and proved 
more willing to rise in revolt in the highlands than they were in the plains.   
*** 
If we turn from the preparations in Galilee in anticipation of invasion to the war as it 
actually occurred, we see how broken ground continued to shape geographic structures of 
conflict and control.  Mapping Vespasian’s invasion in 67 reveals patterns now familiar from 
Chapter Two’s Spanish wars, albeit played out over a much shorter period of time and recorded 
by Josephus in far greater detail: the restoration of Roman control began for the most part in the 
plains and worked its way uphill.  With the advantage of Josephus’ focused narrative and “local” 
perspective, we can see more clearly in Galilee how the costs of pacification increased 
dramatically when the Romans besieged the Jewish insurgents’ hilltop redoubts.  Indeed, at some 
of Galilee’s most rugged fortifications, the empire reestablished its authority only through the 
negotiated surrender of Jewish strongholds on lenient terms, giving reason to question how 
secure Roman control over such spaces actually was.    
Upon his arrival in Galilee in early 67, Vespasian began his campaign by occupying 
Sepphoris, which had requested a Roman garrison for protection from Jewish rebels and 
brigands.92  From this secure and friendly base, the Romans launched raids across the plains:  
“Galilee from end to end became a scene of fire and blood; from no misery, no calamity was it 
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exempt; the one refuge for the hunted inhabitants was in the cities fortified by Josephus.”93  
Within weeks of Vespasian’s arrival, Roman control was reestablished on level terrain; a 
combination of Sepphorite collaboration and unopposed violence proved sufficient to pacify the 
plains.  Yet pockets of resistance persisted in the hills, and grew in strength as rebels and 
refugees flooded in from lower ground.94  In an early skirmish, the Jews entrenched at Jotapata 
even drove back a Roman assault led by the tribune Placidus.95  Whether fortified on local 
initiative or by Josephus’ orders, these rugged strongpoints evidently provided refuges against 
Vespasian’s otherwise irresistible army. 
All nineteen strongholds could not resist forever.  The boldness of Jotapata’s attack on 
Placidus (and, we should suspect, its proximity to the Roman base at Sepphoris) caught 
Vespasian’s attention.  On the Jewish side, Josephus took personal command of Jotapata’s 
defense just days before a Roman cordon closed around the town.  His account in the War of the 
site’s natural strength (“surrounded on three sides by ravines so deep that sight fails in the 
attempt to fathom the abyss”) is certainly an overstatement, but a local TRI score above 180 m 
(82nd percentile) suggests that the military landscape around Jotapata would have caused the 
Romans substantial difficulties.96 Moreover, while many aspects of Josephus’ long narrative of 
the siege of Jotapata are tinged by self-aggrandizement, archaeological evidence indicates that 
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94 Joseph. BJ 3.111. 
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170 
 
serious and sustained fighting did take place there.97  Rugged terrain allowed the Jews to hold 
out, at least temporarily, against superior Roman numbers and siege engineering.98 
While Jotapata’s fall was practically inevitable once Vespasian brought up the bulk of his 
army, Roman victory came at a tremendous cost in time, money, and lives.  The empire 
expended substantial military energy against this hill-fort, thanks in part to its topographical 
position.  The Romans’ return on this investment in terms of imperial control (and economic 
reward) was questionable at best.  Jotapata was just one of many strongholds (and a small one at 
that), and its rebel garrison could not have been particularly large.99  As we have seen, on the 
level ground below Jotapata the Romans reasonably expected easy victory.  Even better, they 
could often expect instant capitulation at the mere threat of devastating violence.  The rough 
terrain at Jotapata not only emboldened its inhabitants to fight, but forced the Romans to pay a 
steep price for unrewarding victory.  
Josephus’ military role in the north ended with his capture at Jotapata; Mason argues that 
with this victory and continuing peace in Sepphoris, Vespasian considered his mission in western 
Galilee complete.100  Unrest continued in the east, where the client-king Agrippa II called for aid 
against the Jewish insurrection in his territory.101  Vespasian obliged, and as in the first stage of 
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100 Mason 2016, 369. 
 
101 I have intentionally glossed over the distinction between the portions of Galilee under direct Roman 
administration and the portions ruled by Agrippa II.  While motives in the east may have centered on 
hatred of Agrippa, rather than the Romans specifically, in practice all would have recognized that an 
uprising against the king was an affront to the empire that legitimized his rule.  
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the Galilean campaign the Jews of the plains were first to fall.  The Romans took Tiberias (with a 
local TRI average of 56 m, 19th percentile) and Taricheae (66 m, 27th percentile) with little 
difficulty.102  Imperial control was quickly restored on the flat shores of the Sea of Galilee.   
Josephus maintains that with the collapse of resistance in Tiberias and Taricheae (the two 
largest settlements in the east), most of Galilee fell once more under Roman control.  The 
exceptions were Gischala (235 m, 94th percentile) and Mt. Itabyrion/Tabor (233 m, 94th 
percentile), among the most rugged of Josephus’ fortifications.103  Major fighting also remained 
across the Sea of Galilee at the hill-fort of Gamala (201 m, 86th percentile).  Despite a seven-
month siege by Agrippa and the surrender of the less-imposing, nearby strongholds of Seleucia 
and Soganaea, Gamala persisted as a successful refuge for anti-Roman and anti-Herodian forces 
in Gaulanitis, and, “the city was packed with fugitives owing to the strength of its defenses.”104  
As with Jotapata, TRI mapping supports Josephus’ account of Gamala’s natural strength, and 
archaeological evidence confirms the severity of the fighting there.105   
As at Jotapata, a determined Roman siege ultimately triumphed, but not without great 
cost to Vespasian and his forces.106  When an initial assault successfully breached the walls, but 
was attacked from above by an onslaught of Jewish fighters using the steep hills to their 
advantage, the Roman army suffered heavy casualties, and Vespasian himself was nearly killed 
                                                          
102 Mason 2016, 370-79. 
 
103 Joseph. BJ 4.1. 
 
104 Joseph. BJ 4.3-4, 10; Vit. 114. 
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in the fighting.107  Perhaps more importantly, even with Jerusalem in open revolt, it took 
Vespasian nearly a month to take Gamala, whose rebels were a symbolic affront to imperial 
power but no real threat to the security of the Roman province itself.108  Broken ground could not 
save the insurgents and fugitives gathered at Gamala—according to Josephus, only two women 
escaped the sack of the fortress—yet it dramatically increased the risks and costs which the 
Romans faced reasserting imperial control.109 
With Gamala subdued, John’s rebels in Gischala were all that remained of the Galilean 
rebellion (Mount Itabyrion/Tabor, the last holdout in Lower Galilee, fell to Placidus’ trickery).110  
Vespasian dispatched Titus into the highlands of Upper Galilee where, according to Josephus, he 
called on the Gischalans to surrender on merciful terms.  Josephus dramatically understates the 
defensive terrain at Gischala in order to proclaim Titus’ clementia; the historian reports that Titus 
“saw that the town might easily be carried by assault….[but] he was already satiated with 
slaughter and pitied the masses doomed along with the guilty to indiscriminate destruction.”111  
TRI analysis, however, disputes Titus’ claim to the Gischalans that “they had seen cities far 
stronger than their own overthrown at the first assault.”112  While TRI cannot speak to any 
artificial defenses of Gischala, its surrounding landscape was severely rugged, worse than that at 
                                                          
107 Joseph. BJ 4.17-38. 
 
108 Contra Mason 2016, 377.  On the timeline of the siege of Gamala, see Joseph. BJ 4.83. 
 
109 Joseph. BJ 4.81-83. 
 
110 Joseph. BJ 4.54-61. 
 
111 Joseph. BJ 4.92: Τίτῳ δὲ προσιππασαμένῳ τοῖς Γισχάλοις εὐπετὲς μὲν ἦν ἐξ ἐφόδου τὴν πόλιν ἑλεῖν… 
ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῷ κόρος ἤδη φόνων καὶ δι᾽ οἴκτου τὸ πλέον ἀκρίτως συναπολλύμενον τοῖς αἰτίοις, ἐβούλετο 
μᾶλλον ὁμολογίαις παραστήσασθαι τὴν πόλιν. 
 
112 Joseph. BJ 4.94: …ἑωρακότες μὲν ὀχυρωτέρας πολλῷ πόλεις ὑπὸ μίαν προσβολὴν κατεστραμμένας… 
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Jotapata, Gamala, or any other Galilean site taken by Roman assault (see Table 3.2).113  This was 
no easy target for Roman force. 
Titus, despite Josephus’ protestations, recognized the difficulty of assaulting Gischala 
(along with the relative poverty and political insignificance of this highland stronghold).  John, 
with the recent examples of Jotapata and Gamala, recognized that while defensive terrain could 
impose heavy costs on a Roman victory, a determined siege would ultimately overthrow his 
defenses.114  Though Josephus distorts the details, the two commanders appear to have come to 
an arrangement.115  Citing religious scruples, John pled for Titus to delay his siege until after the 
Sabbath; Titus obligingly withdrew, leaving Gischala unguarded; John and a large body of 
fighters and refugees fled the town that night.116  The following day, Titus entered Gischala 
without opposition, and while his cavalry massacred stragglers from the Jewish column, John 
and his men made it to Jerusalem to continue the fight for years to come.117 
With the surrender of Gischala in late 67, the bulk of the Roman army moved south to 
besiege Jerusalem, taking Josephus’ narrative attention with it; active fighting in the north was at 
                                                          
113 See Table 3.2. 
 
114 We might compare the peaceful surrender of Tebora in Cilicia to Cicero, after his destruction of 
Pindenissus (Cic. Ad. Fam. 15.10) or the impact of the Roman sack of Uspe on the surrounding towns of 
the Bosporus (Tac. Ann. 12.17). 
 
115 Josephus maintains, unconvincingly, that John escaped Gischala by tricking Titus.  The historian fails 
to explain why Titus did not post guards around Gischala, even after John allegedly invited him to do so.  
Two explanations appear plausible: either Titus was grossly incompetent (an explanation at odds with his 
generalship at Jerusalem and Josephus’ motives to cast him in the best possible light) or he was willing to 
let John leave the highly defensible Gischala in order to fight him at a later date and on more favorable 
ground (not unlike Placidus’ strategy at Mt. Tabor: see Joseph. BJ 4.54-61).   
   
116 Joseph. BJ 4.97-111. 
 
117 Joseph. BJ 4.112-20.  John of Gischala would play a major role in the siege of Jerusalem, leading his 
followers against both Titus’ Romans and rival Jewish factions.  
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an end.  If we reflect on the geographic shape of this Galilean revolt with an eye to the physical 
landscape, the impact of broken ground on the course and costs of the war is immediately 
apparent.  Roman reconquest in the west began in the plains around Sepphoris, and moved 
upland only with difficulty in the siege of Jotapata and the negotiated surrender of Gischala.  
Similarly, in Agrippa’s kingdom the relatively low-lying sites of Tiberias and Taricheae were 
first to fall—rebels gravitated to Gamala, the region’s most defensible site, and exacted a heavy 
cost for their eventual defeat.  Broken ground in Galilee was not just an incubator for resistance 
in anticipation of warfare, but a refuge for rebels once war broke out. 
Moreover, while we can certainly say that the Romans had reasserted their control over 
Galilee by the end of 67, the ferocity with which they brought their Jewish opponents back in 
line varied with geography: while the Galilean rebellion was nowhere successful, on rough 
terrain rebels were more likely to survive their reintegration into the empire.  The escape of John 
of Gischala and his followers is a key example: John lived, and continued to fight, because Titus 
preferred to let him escape rather than undergo the risks of besieging an exceptionally rugged 
Jewish stronghold.  We should similarly suspect that rebels in a number of other rugged 
fortifications were able to surrender on favorable terms, thanks to the high cost and 
comparatively low reward of taking them by force.  Of the nineteen strongholds listed by 
Josephus, only three (Jotapata, Taricheae, and Gamala) were sacked by the Romans.118  The 
others surrendered, seemingly on merciful terms: the natives of Mt. Itabyrion/Tabor, who at the 
very least had harbored rebels, were allowed to deliver themselves “into the trust [of the 
                                                          




Romans].”119  Upon taking Gischala, “after directing his troops to pull down a small portion of 
the wall in token of capture, [Titus] proceeded to repress the disturbers of the city’s peace by 
threats rather than by punishment.”120  And, according to Titus’ speech at Gischala, the 
numerous strongpoints which surrendered after the Roman victory at Taricheae were left 
unharmed, and the few rebels remaining “beheld in the secure enjoyment of their possessions all 
who had trusted in the Romans’ good faith.”121 
In part, the merciful treatment of most Jewish strongholds in Galilee reflects the motives 
of Vespasian’s campaign.  As Mason argues, the future emperor never wanted a “scorched-
earth” pacification of the north, and was happy enough to secure or suppress only the major 
population centers (especially Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Taricheae) before moving against 
Jerusalem.122  Yet when we focus our analysis of this campaign on the military landscape of 
Galilee, we see that military means and strategic calculation were just as much at issue.  
Vespasian and the Romans were willing to let many Jewish rebels rejoin the imperial fold quietly 
and without punishment because the alternative was to wage at least a half-dozen more sieges, all 
against objectives as naturally well-fortified and economically unrewarding as Jotapata and 
Gamala.  In short, broken ground not only motivated rebels to fight and prolonged the rupture of 
                                                          
119 Joseph. BJ 4.61: …οἱ δὲ ἐπιχώριοι πίστεις λαβόντες… 
 
120 Joseph. BJ 4.117: …καὶ τοῖς στρατιώταις ὀλίγον τοῦ τείχους παρασπάσαι κελεύσας νόμῳ καταλήψεως 
ἀπειλαῖς μᾶλλον ἢ κολάσει τοὺς ταράσσοντας τὴν πόλιν ἀνέστελλε. 
 
121 Joseph. BJ 4.101: ἑωρακότες…ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κτημάτων ἀπολαύοντας ὅσοι ταῖς Ῥωμαίων 
δεξιαῖς ἐπίστευσαν, ἃς καὶ νῦν προτείνειν αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μνησικακῶν τῆς αὐθαδείας. 
 
122 Mason 2016, 377.  According to Gambash 2016, this light-handed imperialism was more typical of the 
Roman approach than the brutal siege and sack of Jerusalem which followed. 
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The two case studies in this chapter have drawn further connections between the topoi 
and discourse of Roman warfare on rugged terrain and the historical realities of force and 
control.  In the best documented rebellion against imperial authority, we have seen that once 
imperial control was shattered, broken ground exacerbated the rupture, giving insurgents the 
chance for battlefield victory (at Beth Horon and in an early skirmish at Jotapata) and the ability 
to prolong costly sieges by otherwise superior armies (at Jotapata and Gamala).  In the initial 
decisions of Jerusalemites to strike at Cestius Gallus, and the spatial organization of Jewish 
strongholds in Galilee, we have seen that when prospective insurgents considered their options 
for resistance against the Romans, they recognized rough terrain as a means for successful 
rebellion and were thus more willing to rise against the empire.  Finally, while Rome ultimately 
pacified Judaea (violently reminding both their ancient subjects and modern observers that 
broken ground, whatever its challenges, neither made defeat certain nor victory impossible), 
numerous rebels used the defensive terrain of their fortresses as bargaining chips in a negotiated 
surrender.  This phenomenon suggests that, even as Vespasian and Titus basked in the glory of 
Judaea capta, Romans’ control in the province’s hills was shallower and more dependent on 
compromise than their domination of the plains, where violence was cheaper, easier, and 
generally more profitable. 
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The findings of this chapter suggest a rough typology of Roman control, dependent on 
force and fear and strongly correlated with the physical landscape.  We can see how some 
communities were enthusiastic participants in the Roman imperial project, such as the Greeks of 
the Mediterranean coast and aristocratic elements in Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Jerusalem.  We can 
see how others (including the Jewish towns on the coastal plain during Cestius Gallus’ march to 
Jerusalem) may have had the motivation to rebel but lacked the topographical means, and 
remained loyal because they feared certain destruction by the Romans.  As local topographies 
become more rugged and broken ground begins to challenge Roman force projection, we see 
communities sufficiently confident in their defensive terrain to rise in opposition to the empire.  
While some (Jotapata, Taricheae, Gamala, Jerusalem) were crushed by overwhelming military 
force, even in destruction they testify to the greater fragility on such terrain of imperial control: 
active violence, at tremendous cost to the empire, was required because latent, threatened 
violence was insufficient to dominate well-defended locals.123  Finally, in some rugged spaces 
(including Gischala and many other Galilean strongholds), the costs of military intervention were 
so great that the Romans evidently accepted a shallower level of control (low- or no-consequence 
surrender and survival of rebels), governing through a mixture of threats and compromise 
because they were unwilling or unable to force an unconditional victory. 
With the substantial evidence provided by Josephus, we can argue that, during the Jewish 
revolt in the late 60s and early 70s, Roman control varied depending on the military landscape.  
While power relations certainly shifted over time, it seems likely that a similar patchwork of 
Roman control prevailed before and after these dates, albeit usually with levels of Jewish 
resistance more subtle than open rebellion.  Yet Josephus’ texts cannot support this same depth 
                                                          
123 On latent violence, see Lee 2020 (forthcoming). 
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of military-environmental analysis outside the First Jewish War.  While these sources provide a 
particularly revealing snapshot of the connections between power, violence, and the physical 
environment, they are less useful for a longitudinal study of Roman control.  The next, final 
chapter adopts a longer-term perspective.  Turning its focus north and dramatically broadening 
its chronological range from a matter of months to several centuries, this chapter explores how 
we can use Roman deployment patterns and the archaeological record to study the relationship 





























































HOLDING CONTROL: THE ROMAN FRONTIER IN EASTERN ASIA MINOR 
 
The previous chapter’s investigation of the Jewish War considered control and terrain 
primarily from the perspective of local insurgents, examining how broken ground stimulated 
resistance and revolt against the Roman empire.  This chapter approaches the same problem from 
a Roman point of view, examining imperial choices with regard to the northeastern frontier in 
Asia Minor in the late first and second centuries CE.  It considers how the Romans chose to 
deploy their military resources in these rugged regions, and asks what these decisions can tell us 
about an imperial “strategy” for broken ground and the broader purpose of the frontier in Asia 
Minor.  The answer largely parallels Chapter Two’s conclusions on Spain (although the focus 
here is on the long-term maintenance of Roman rule rather than its initial imposition): the roads 
and bases of the Roman frontier made only limited efforts to dominate the highlands along the 
empire’s nominal boundaries.  At least on a military level, the Romans tended to cede effective 
control of the mountains to local actors, focusing instead on the limited security of strategic 
routes in the larger struggle against Parthia. 
Numerous factors make the northeastern frontier a promising setting for a case study.1  
Given the sheer size of this area, my digital approach reveals patterns that traditional methods 
cannot.  In addition, the frontier in Asia Minor was severely mountainous, more so than either 
                                                          
1 For the purposes of this chapter, the “northeastern frontier” refers to the border-zone stretching from 
Samosata in northern Syria up through the legionary bases of Melitene and Satala to Trapezus on the 
Black Sea coast. 
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Spain or Judaea.  As the TRI data in Map 4.1 makes clear, the terrain of eastern Anatolia 
hampered Rome’s sizeable garrison to an extent rarely found elsewhere in the empire, making 
this an ideal test case for the landscape analysis of imperial power relations. 
 Despite this region’s potential as a promising case study, any analysis of Rome’s 
northeastern borderlands must contend with serious problems of evidence.2  Narrative accounts 
of this area are scarce, and only rarely reveal the day-to-day problems of frontier control.  There 
is no equivalent here to Josephus’ Jewish War, or even to Livy’s patchwork narrative of the 
Spanish conquest.  The material record is hardly better.3  Political instability and challenging 
terrain have discouraged surveys of eastern Turkey, and a substantial portion of the frontier is 
now inundated by dams on the Upper Euphrates.  As desirable as it may be, a complete and 
diachronic history of Roman occupation in the northeast is difficult to achieve with the evidence 
currently available.  
 Nevertheless, thanks in large part to the recent publication of Timothy Mitford’s East of 
Asia Minor: Rome’s Hidden Frontier (2018), it is now possible to advance our historical 
understanding of this border-zone.4  The product of a long and frequently perilous career 
surveying the ancient remains of eastern Asia Minor, this remarkable book traces the full length 
of the Roman frontier north of Samosata, mapping its roads and stations in considerable detail.  
Mitford’s geographic reconstruction combines his own observations with evidence from the 
Antonine Itinerary, Peutinger Map, and Notitia Dignitatum and an exhaustive bibliography of 
                                                          
2 See Fergus Millar’s preface to Mitford 2018. 
 
3 French 1983, 71; Wheeler 2017, 161. 
 
4 See also reviews by Lightfoot 2019 and Mitchell 2019. 
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previous surveys and travelers’ accounts.  While his conclusions remains necessarily tentative in 
numerous places, East of Asia Minor can provide the starting point for an analytical history of 
the northeast frontier.5  
 The GIS methods that form a core contribution of my dissertation are the second crucial 
ingredient for the large-scale analysis of Rome’s presence in Anatolia.  East of Asia Minor 
contains beautiful maps, skillfully produced by Sean Goddard: drawn over base-maps produced 
by the Turkish General Staff in the first half of the 20th century, they provide crucial illustrations 
to accompany Mitford’s description of the frontier.6  However, these maps do not provide easily 
extractable coordinate data for modern GIS software.7  With Mitford and Goddard’s generous 
permission, I have reconstructed their geographic information on Roman roads and sites in a 
digital format, georeferencing their materials and producing datasets that can be easily integrated 
into GIS platforms.8  Much of the resulting coordinate data will be released along with this 
                                                          
5 For some important earlier contributions to the geography of the eastern Turkish frontier, see Crow and 
French 1980; French 1983, 1988; Crow 1986; Wheeler 1991, 2017; Speidel 2009.   
 
6 Mitford 2018, 579-82.  The maps in question (Turkish General Staff, 1:200,000) were issued in the 
1940s, but draw heavily on Ottoman work from the First World War.  For the history of mapping Asia 
Minor, see Talbert 2018, 110-12, and his forthcoming work on Heinrich and Richard Kiepert. 
 
7 Based on personal correspondence with Sean Goddard, the 1:200,000 maps in Mitford 2018 were 
produced in Adobe Illustrator, drawing features over a scanned graphic of the Turkish basemaps.  No GIS 
software was required for this method, and the resulting features have no embedded geographic data. 
  
8 Hereafter, the maps from Mitford 2018 (printed as plates in the second volume) are referred to as TBM 
1-24.  I georeferenced TBM 6-15 and 17-23 against ArcGIS satellite imagery and OpenStreetMap, and 
digitized Goddard’s ancient sites and roads with reference to the georeferenced TBM series (checking the 
results for accuracy against the satellite imagery and OpenStreetMap).  The results are imprecise in 
places, a result not only of the computational difficulties of projecting a flat map against a round earth but 
also of the changes in human geography from the initial compilation of the Turkish General Staff maps in 
the early 20th century.  Nevertheless, the resulting spatial data is accurate enough for a historical overview 
and analysis in aggregate of the northeast frontier. 
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dissertation, and can be reused under open license by future investigators of Rome’s Anatolian 
borderlands. 
 With this data in hand, it becomes possible to broaden the scope of our analysis, relying 
once again on the principles of generalized positioning and accuracy in aggregate to address the 
shortcomings of our geographic knowledge in the Roman northeast.9  While even Mitford’s 
decades of effort cannot entirely overcome the fact that we cannot securely and precisely place 
numerous sites in the northeast, a GIS approach allows us to identify larger trends in the 
relationship between the Roman frontier and the landscape.  As in previous chapters, my analysis 
does not hinge on the location of any individual military site.  Nor, in the absence of good 
evidence, does it hang on specific chronologies of military development and imperial policy.  
Looking for general trends in large sets of GIS data, over hundreds of miles of space and over a 
century, we can be less concerned about the geographic and chronological specificity of any 
given data point. 
 Even with careful handling, the predominance of Mitford’s data in this chapter’s 
reconstruction of the Roman frontier raises the threat of circular argumentation.  The geography I 
present in the following sections is essentially a digitized representation of Mitford’s claims; if 
Mitford located Roman installations with their specific purpose (as he envisaged it) in mind, 
analysis based on this data could not help but confirm his interpretation for the frontier system as 
a whole.  And indeed, while East of Asia Minor does not advance a comprehensive argument for 
the nature and purpose of the Roman frontier, there are signs that Mitford has incorporated into 
                                                          
9 A factor lamented correctly, if perhaps overly pessimistically, in Wheeler 2017.  On these principles, see 
Chapter Two, Section One, above. 
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his geography a particular vision of Rome’s mission and modus operandi.10  In the Anatolian 
frontier, he sees a parallel to the better preserved systems on the Rhine and Danube, a defensive 
line concerned with monitoring and interdicting traffic across the border.11  Roman forts are 
consequently drawn toward river crossings and, indeed, toward level ground.  Note for example 
Mitford’s problematic case for a Roman fort at modern Tillo, near a major crossing of the 
Euphrates: “geography thus insists that the Tillo promontory contained the site of Claudiopolis.  
The tactical requirement to observe, patrol, and maneuver to north and south recommend the 
terrace, rather than the enclosed hillsides below.”12 
 However, generalized positioning helps to compensate for any interpretive bias in 
Mitford’s geography: because I evaluate statistics based on regional averages (in this chapter, for 
200 m and 1 km radii surrounding frontier installations) the hills below Tillo will factor into its 
TRI score regardless of Mitford’s assertion about the precise location of the fort.13  Accuracy in 
aggregate also provides a valuable margin of error: even if we suspect that some of Mitford’s site 
locations may skew low and level, his biases surrounding the tactical purpose of Roman bases 
are not sufficiently rigid or consistent to invalidate patterns of Roman behavior observed across 
hundreds of miles of frontier.  Indeed, while Mitford’s largely unspoken concept of this frontier’s 
mission may skew micro-level analyses on the tactical purpose of any given fort, my broader 
                                                          
10 On the absence of a conceptual or theoretical approach to the Roman frontier, see the gentle criticism in 
Mitchell 2019. 
 
11 Mitford 2018, 57.  Cf. Lightfoot 2019, 906; Mitchell 2019. 
 
12 Mitford 2018, 135.  Cf. Lightfoot 2019, 908. 
 
13 This chapter uses substantially smaller radii than the analysis of Spain in chapter two, which defaulted 
to 10 km.  This is in part because Mitford’s survey produces a smaller margin of error than the amorphous 
connection between toponyms and battle sites in the Iberian peninsula.  In addition, the severely 
mountainous terrain of Turkey distorts the statistics for larger areas; the immediate environs of a site may 
be relatively level, but the prevalence of broken ground skews the TRI statistics high for 10 km radii. 
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geospatial perspective supports largely different conclusions.  For the most part, the frontier 
system was not concerned with the strict control of movement through the borderlands, but 
focused on Rome’s larger military and political struggle with the Parthians and, later, the 
Sassanid Persians.        
The body of this chapter advances this argument in three sections.  The first briefly traces 
the development and strategic environment of the northeast frontier from the late Republic to the 
end of the Antonine dynasty, highlighting both the persistent threat of Parthia and the challenges 
of smaller-scale brigandage that made nominally “Roman” territory quite unstable.  The second 
section maps the Roman frontier between the legionary base of Samosata and Trapezus on the 
Black Sea.  Though relying primarily on Mitford’s voluminous findings, this is no simple précis: 
using TRI and elevation statistics, it focuses on the relationship between the Roman frontier and 
the mountainous terrain of eastern Anatolia.  I argue that the Roman frontier, when considered in 
aggregate, tended to lie on relatively low and flat terrain amidst the mountainous extremes of the 
Euphrates and Pontic frontiers.  This trend indicates that the primary purpose of the frontier in 
this region was the support of large-scale warfare against Parthia.  Roman troops in this region 
were deployed to secure supply lines and likely crossing points into Armenia and the broader 
Parthian world.  In order to secure these narrow but convenient and defensible corridors of 
military movement, imperial decision-makers were willing in most places to forego any serious 
attempt to dominate the mountaineers along the border.   
The third and final section situates the frontier in Anatolia within the broader 
historiography on Roman military borders, asking what GIS technology and Mitford’s 
remarkable geographical data contribute to ongoing debates on the nature and purpose of 
imperial frontiers.  I caution against overly schematic and doctrinaire explanations of Roman 
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frontier strategy: as in Spain, imperial decision-makers in eastern Anatolia appear highly 
competent and flexible in the face of widely varied and sometimes mutually contradictory 
missions.  Yet Section Three also indicates that imperial choices in this region came with real 
costs (even if these are largely invisible in our written sources).  Predominantly focusing on level 
ground and large-scale war, Rome accepted shallower and more contingent control over vast 
areas of mountainous terrain within the empire. 
 
Section One: The Historical Development and Strategic Context of the Northeastern 
Frontier 
 
In modern scholarship, the history of the Roman borderlands in eastern Anatolia is 
dominated by the empire’s relationship with its Parthian and later Persian neighbors.14  This view 
reflects the priorities of our ancient authors: even when writers such as Tacitus, Suetonius, and 
Cassius Dio were well informed of events in the northeast, they were generally uninterested in 
local affairs unless they impinged upon the grander concerns of the emperor and his court.15  
Even if the actual, day-to-day threat of a Parthian invasion has perhaps been at times overstated, 
this rival empire was a serious concern in the east, and the frontier in eastern Anatolia developed, 
at least in part, with Parthian wars in mind.16 
                                                          
14 Among many examples, Levick 2000, 604-609; Wheeler 2002, 287; Bennett 2006; Mitford 2018, 38-
40, 60-68.  
 
15 The notable exception is Arrian, whose Ektaxis and Periplus discuss northeastern security with little 
reference to the Parthians.  Cf. Bosworth 1977.   
 




 Yet the grand sweep of relations between the empires should not entirely overshadow 
problems of local control and resistance.  There is scattered but persuasive evidence that this 
region did not lie placidly under Roman domination, and that (as already seen in Judaea) broken 
ground weakened Rome’s grip on its nominal subjects.  The empire was forced to choose its 
missions and priorities in the northeast, between maintaining a diplomatic and military edge in 
its large-scale rivalry with Parthia and addressing small-scale, local threats of brigandage and 
rebellion.   
 While Rome held territory in Asia Minor by the late 2nd century BCE, its entanglement 
with eastern Anatolia was initially a product of the Mithridatic Wars. Between 88 and 63 BCE, a 
series of late republican commanders led armies across the Near East, dramatically expanding 
Roman influence in the region.17  By the time of Pompey’s ultimate settlement, the territories 
which would form Rome’s northeastern frontier (Commagene, Cappadocia, Armenia Minor, and 
eastern Pontus) were client-kingdoms under Roman hegemony.18 
 Rome’s forcible entry into Anatolia and the Levant quickly brought it into conflict with 
the Parthians—replaced by the Sassanid Persians in the early 3rd century—a struggle which 
would dominate the history of the Near East until the Arab conquests of the 7th century.  Most 
crucially in the long term, Pompey’s settlement first asserted Rome’s right to crown proxy kings 
in Armenia, and backed this claim with a legionary garrison in the new province of Syria.19  
                                                          
17 Sherwin-White 1984, 93-185; Evans 2011, 53-108.  Sherwin-White’s Roman Foreign Policy in the 
East remains the standard diplomatic narrative of late Republican and Augustan involvement in the Near 
East, though Evans Roman Conquests provides an engaging supplement on the military narratives of the 
same period. 
 
18 Plut. Pomp. 34-35, 45; Sherwin-White 1984, 186-234; Evans 2011, 109-12; Mitford 2018, 23-24.   
 
19 Mitford 2018, 23-24. 
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More immediately, ambitious warlords in Rome and Parthia found their new neighbors to be 
appealing targets for wars of personal aggrandizement.  Meaningful victory proved beyond their 
reach.  Crassus’ invasion ended ignominiously at Carrhae in 53 BCE.20  The Parthians raided 
Syria in 40 BCE, but were only temporarily successful against a divided and distracted Roman 
empire.  Antony’s reprisal in 36 BCE was driven back with heavy casualties and no territorial 
gains.21 
 While the first Romano-Parthian wars of the late Republic centered on Syria and the 
Middle Euphrates, over time the military and diplomatic center of the conflict shifted north into 
Anatolia.  After Crassus’ disastrous assault from Syria, Caesar evidently planned to invade 
Armenia and sweep into the Parthian empire from the north, and Antony put a similar strategy 
into action in 36.22  Moreover, as it became clear that neither Rome nor Parthia could sustain a 
major advance along the Syrian frontier, proxy-control over the kings of Armenia Major became 
the central issue in their rivalry.23  This “Armenian Question” was at the center of Augustan 
diplomacy in the late first century BCE.  Rome ultimately won the diplomatic stand-off, thanks 
to Augustus’ threats of war and the characteristic fragmentation of the Arsacid royal family.24  In 
                                                          
20 Sherwin-White 1984, 279-89; Campbell 1993, 214.  On Carrhae: Plut. Crass. 18-31; Dio Cass. 40.20-
27.  Caesar planned a similar invasion, forestalled by his assassination: Dio Cass. 44.51. 
 
21 Dio Cass. 48.25-26, 41, 49.19-33; Sherwin-White 1984, 298-321; Campbell 1993, 214.  The Parthians 
also launched a smaller invasion in 51: Cic. Att. 5.18. 
 
22 Caesar: Suet. Iul. 44.3; Sherwin White 1984, 307-308; Antony: Plut. Ant. 37-38; Sherwin-White 1984, 
308-12.  In an unusual reversal of the general pattern established in Chapter 1, the mountainous north 
probably aided the Roman efforts against the cavalry-heavy Parthian army; Sherwin-White 1984, 307. 
 
23 Wheeler 2002, 288. 
 




a treaty struck between Augustus’ grandson Gaius Caesar and the Great King Phraataces in 1 
CE, Rome secured the right to nominate kings of Armenia; its territory was to remain free from 
military occupation, with the Euphrates serving as the Romano-Parthian border.25  
 Thus, by the start of the first century CE, Rome’s relationship with its most powerful 
remaining neighbor centered firmly on the Upper Euphrates.  The military importance of this 
region only continued to grow, as Augustus’ treaty failed to settle the Armenian question 
permanently: tensions and proxy-wars would flare up through the rest of the Julio-Claudian 
period.  From the accession of Tiberius to the reign of Nero, we can narrate imperial frontier 
policy in terms of the gradual intensification of Rome’s presence in eastern Anatolia, as the 
empire learned (too late) that maintaining its edge in Armenia would require ever greater 
investments of political and military capital. 
 The transformation of former client-kingdoms into provinces is an early and integral part 
of this story: Tiberius took a key step in the development of the northeast frontier by annexing 
Cappadocia in 17 CE.26  While it is tempting to see this administrative change as a move against 
the Arsacids, we should be careful not to oversimplify matters.  At least initially, the annexation 
of Cappadocia did little to change the military balance with Parthia, for despite its geographic 
                                                          
25 Strabo, 16.1.28; Sherwin-White 1984, 322-28; Campbell 1993, 220-28; Mitford 2018, 27-28.  Wheeler 
2002, 290 argues to the contrary that Rome never recognized the Euphrates as the limit to their power, 
and indeed there is reason to question whether the empire ever accepted formal limits to its dominion (see 
Whittaker 2000, 297-98; note a more moderate position in Wheeler 1993a and 1993b).  Evidence for 
imperial deployment east of the Euphrates supports Wheeler’s conclusion: the Romans had a small 
garrison at Gorneae in Armenia, positioned to protect their chosen client-king in nearby Artaxata: Tac. 
Ann. 12.45-47; Bennett 2006, 90.  For a broader statement on Roman presence and power east of the 
Euphrates, see Wheeler 1991, 507. 
 
26 Bennett 2006, 78-80; Mitford 2018, 28.  Tiberius also annexed Commagene at the same date, but it was 
returned to client-kingdom status by Caligula in 38. 
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extent, Cappadocia had only an equestrian governor and an auxiliary garrison of unknown size.27  
Julian Bennett argues that Tiberius’ primary motivation was financial, and that he hoped to use 
Cappadocian revenues to reduce unpopular taxes in Rome.28  Our ancient sources tend to 
emphasize instead Tiberius’ hatred for the Cappadocian king, who had declined to visit during 
his exile in Rhodes.29  Whatever his motives, Tiberius’ annexation of Cappadocia brought a large 
portion of what would become the northeast frontier under provincial jurisdiction, establishing a 
foundation for later developments in the region. 
 While the provincialization of Cappadocia in 17 CE may not have sprung directly from 
any Parthian threat, the events of subsequent years would emphasize the tenuous nature of 
diplomatic relations in the northeast and the expanding role played by the Arsacids in shaping 
Rome’s frontier activity.  In 35, Tiberius had the son of the Parthian king deposed from the 
Armenian throne, by fomenting rebellion by disaffected Arsacid nobles, backing an Iberian 
invasion of Armenia, and checking Parthian intervention by the threat of retaliation with the 
Syrian legions.30  Claudius used similar tactics in 41 CE to install a pro-Roman monarch in 
Artaxata.  An Iberian client army and a small Roman auxiliary force waged war in Armenia 
itself, while the Syrian legions to the south forestalled any interference by the Parthian army. 31  
                                                          
27 Bennett 2006, 80, who argues (against Levick 1976, 141) that Tiberius deliberately avoided putting 
legions in Cappadocia so as not to escalate tensions with Parthia.  Cf. Bennett 2002, 301. 
   
28 Bennett 2006, 79.  Cf. Tac. Ann. 1.78, 2.42.  
 
29 Dio Cass. 57.17.7; Tac. Ann. 2.42.  For still another explanation, in which Archelaus of Cappadocia 
was suspected of rebellious tendencies, see Suet. Tib. 37.4. 
 
30 Tac. Ann. 6.31-37, 43-44; Campbell 1993, 229; Dabrowa 2002, 277-78; Mitford 2018, 29. 
 
31 Tac. Ann. 11.8-10; Dio Cass. 60.8.1. 
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In both cases, the use of allied troops, limited Roman deployment, and the threat of 
overwhelming force were sufficient to maintain Rome’s advantage in Armenian affairs. 
In the later years of Claudius’ reign, this advantage began to slip away, as the Roman 
army proved increasingly unable to support pro-Roman regimes in the face of mounting Parthian 
pressure.  In 51 CE, a Roman auxiliary garrison posted outside Artaxata failed to defend 
Armenia’s client-king against the Iberian invader Radamistus.32  The procurator of Cappadocia, 
Julius Paelignus, launched an ill-conceived attempt to retake the kingdom, ending in widespread 
desertion and (allegedly) Paelignus’ defection to Radamistus’ court.  Cappadocia was left 
essentially defenseless as the Parthian king Vologeses invaded Armenia.33  In the face of 
rebellious locals, the Arsacids failed to install one of their own on the Armenian throne, but the 
now-leaderless region fell loosely under Parthian control.34  The Syrian garrison’s response 
proved ineffective.  After Paelignus’ disaster, a legion hastily marched north to stabilize 
Cappadocia, but quickly returned to Syria to avoid sparking outright war with the ascendant 
Parthians.35  A fundamental weakness in Rome’s arrangements for the northeast was thus 
revealed: in the face of determined Parthian opposition and without the support of client-
kingdoms such as Iberia, Roman armies in the East lacked the strength and proximity to maintain 
control over Armenia.36 
                                                          
32 Tac. Ann. 12.44-47; Mitford 2018, 30. 
 
33 Tac. Ann. 12.49-51; Bennett 2006, 81-82. 
 
34 Tac. Ann. 12.50-51. 
 
35 Tac. Ann. 12.49. 
 
36 Mitford 2018, 30. 
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 When Nero became emperor, the debacle of 51 CE and his own need for military 
legitimization combined to inspire a more aggressive Roman policy in the northeast.37  In 54 or 
55, with Vologeses backing his brother Tiridates for the Armenian throne without paying due 
homage to Rome, Nero sent Domitius Corbulo east to check Parthian influence.  The dispatch to 
Cappadocia of Corbulo, a skilled commander and equal in rank to the Syrian legate Ummidius 
Quadratus, demonstrated an intensification of Rome’s commitment to solving the Armenian 
problem.  So, too, did the fact that Corbulo was given command of two legions, transferred north 
from the resentful Quadratus (a third legion was ultimately added from Germany).38  Not only 
did this mark a sizeable increase in the Roman military capacity on the Upper Euphrates, but the 
Romans proved willing to use Corbulo’s army as more than a passive display of force: in 58 CE, 
these legions invaded Armenia to enthrone the pro-Roman Tigranes.39  According to Tacitus, the 
empire left a garrison of five auxiliary units and 1,000 legionaries to support its new client-king 
(a notable increase from the small force that failed to protect the pro-Roman regime in 51).40      
        So long as Corbulo retained command of the war-effort and the Parthian Vologeses 
remained distracted by Hyrcanian revolts on the eastern edge of his empire, Rome’s policy held 
firm.41  When the rash new client-king Tigranes provoked the Parthians into mustering their full 
forces in 62 CE, Nero’s ad hoc military build-up was insufficient to maintain Roman proxy-rule 
                                                          
37 Tac. Ann. 13.6; Mitford 2018, 30-31. 
 
38 Tac. Ann. 13.7-8, 35; Bennett 2006, 83-84.   
 
39 Tac. Ann. 13.37-41, 14.23-26; Mitford 2018, 31-34. 
 
40 Tac. Ann. 14.26.   
 
41 On the Hyrcanians, Tac. Ann. 15.1. 
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in Armenia.42  Fearing an invasion of Syria, Rome was forced to divide its forces and attention 
along the full frontier from Antioch to the Black Sea.  This was too great a task even for 
Corbulo, who managed defenses in the south while the soon-to-be infamous Caesennius Paetus 
took command of the armies on the Upper Euphrates.43  Paetus led his men into Armenia, where 
they met a Parthian force under Vologeses’ personal command.  The results were disastrous, an 
embarrassing Roamn defeat.  Encircled by the Parthians, and with Corbulo too distant to provide 
timely assistance, Paetus was forced into ignominious surrender and retreat.44 
 The events of 62 CE effectively exposed the frailty of Augustus’ Armenian policy.  To be 
sure, with Corbulo’s army and reputation untouched, Vologeses did not attempt to force outright 
Parthian dominance through continued fighting.  Still, when the two sides negotiated in 63 CE, 
the military setbacks under Paelignus in 51 and Paetus in 62 compromised Rome’s bargaining 
position.  The Roman empire had escalated the conflict over Armenia and lost, making its 
permanent dominance in the region untenable.  In the Peace of Rhandeia, named after the site 
where Paetus was defeated and where Corbulo and Vologeses negotiated, Parthia gained the 
right to nominate the kings of Armenia.  It was only a renewed campaign by Corbulo which won 
the concession that these kings would travel to Rome to accept their crowns from the emperor.45  
Symbolically a compromise, this bargain clearly favored the Parthians, legitimizing the de facto 
Arsacid influence over Armenian affairs. 
                                                          
42 Tac. Ann. 15.2.  
 
43 Tac. Ann. 15.6. 
 
44 Tac. Ann. 15.8-17; Bennett 2006, 85; Mitford 2018, 34. 
 
45 Tac. Ann. 15.28-29; Mitford 2018, 36-38.  For an alternate interpretation, see Campbell 1993, 232.   
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 As a result, Rome under Nero (and later Vespasian) was forced to reckon with a newly 
intensified threat on the northeastern frontier.  Bloodied on the Armenian question, the empire 
needed a new military and diplomatic approach to its struggle for pre-eminence in the Near 
East.46  It chose, with considerable historical consequence, to formalize and militarize the 
frontier system along its northeastern border.47  
 In the aftermath of Rhandeia, Nero first attempted to strengthen Roman influence along 
the Black Sea, hedging Armenia in from the north with Roman clients and allies.48  He annexed 
the rump kingdom of Pontus Polemoniacus in 64 CE, thus gaining direct control over the port at 
Trapezus.  A crucial point on Roman supply lines to the northeast frontier, Trapezus became the 
main naval base supporting imperial operations in the eastern Black Sea.49  Nero also planned a 
major expedition against the Caspian Gates.  In addition to checking any threat from Sarmatian 
raiders, this campaign could not fail to remind the Iberians, Albanians, and other client-rulers of 
                                                          
46 See especially Wheeler 1993a, 32-33. 
 
47 I would argue, following Bennett 2002; 2006; and Mitford 2018, that the Roman system of roads and 
fortifications on the Upper Euphrates and over the Pontic mountains was largely a creation of the Late 
Neronian and Flavian periods.  See also Dabrowa 1989, 72-73; Levick 2000, 605.  Other historians 
maintain that the defensive works in the northeast are much later creations: see Crow 1986; Wheeler 
1991; 2017.  See further discussion below.   
 
48 For this argument on Roman strategy under Nero and Vespasian, see Dabrowa 1989, 72; Wheeler 2012, 
141.  Note arguments to the contrary in Braund 1989, 31; 1991, 420-21 (stressing the importance of 
police actions against local brigands and pirates); Gabelia 2015, 291; Mitford 2018, 38 (stressing the 
importance of a forward defense against trans-Caucasian raiders). 
 
49 Suet. Nero 18; Wheeler 2012; Mitford 2018, 37-38. Mitford argues (against Bennett 2002; 2006) that 
with Armenia Minor still in the hands of a client king, the Romans could not yet have established a 
military frontier on the Upper Euphrates during Nero’s reign.  In this case, Mitford overstates the 
necessity of annexation to Roman policy.  As we see in the substantial Roman garrison of Armenia under 
Tigranes (Tac. Ann. 14.26) and the later Roman deployments in Colchis (Arr. Peripl. M. Eux.; Braund 




Roman strength.50  While Nero’s death forestalled the expedition, his successors would continue 
plans to expand Roman influence along the Black Sea littoral.  By the early 2nd century a 
substantial auxiliary garrison was established in forts as far east as Pityus and Sebastopolis in 
modern Georgia.51 
 While Nero sought to outflank Arsacid-controlled Armenia, Vespasian strengthened the 
Roman presence directly opposing it on the Upper Euphrates.  Reacting to the perceived 
weakness of Julio-Claudian arrangements in eastern Anatolia (made evident both by Paetus’ 
debacle and by the outbreak of local rebellion in 69), Vespasian annexed the client-kingdoms of 
Commagene and Armenia Minor, bringing the full length of the Upper Euphrates under direct 
Roman administration.52  While Commagene was attached to Syria, Vespasian incorporated 
Armenia Minor into his newly combined “super-province” of Galatia-Cappadocia, a powerful 
command that encompassed the frontier from the Taurus mountains to the Black Sea (along with 
much of the Anatolian interior).53  Two legions, in position at Satala and Melitene by the mid-
70s, anchored Galatia-Cappadocia’s defense, while a third held the southern flank at Samosata in 
                                                          
50 Suet. Nero 19; Plin. HN 6.4; Mitford 2018, 38.  Mitford stresses the threat of the Sarmatians, looking 
forward to the Alani invasion in 135 CE.  See opposing arguments from Bosworth 1977, 225-26; Braund 
1991, 421. 
 
51 Braund 1994; Mitford 2018, 404-25 and TBM 4 B1.  On Sebastopolis, see Gabelia 2015.   
 
52 Tac. Hist. 3.47-48; Dabrowa 1989, 71.  In 69, A rebellion by Anicetus (a freedman of eastern Pontus’ 
former client-king) sacked Trapezus and forced Vespasian to divert forces to settle affairs on the Black 
Sea.  Both Commagene and Armenia Minor had been annexed by Tiberius, but were returned to semi-
independence by Caligula and Claudius: Mitford 2018, 40. 
 
53 Bennett 2002, 384; Speidel 2009, 620-22; Mitford 2018, 40-42. 
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Commagene.54  The legions were complemented by a sizeable auxiliary garrison along the 
frontier and the Classis Pontica based at Trapezus.55 
 Heavily militarized by the end of Vespasian’s reign, the Roman frontier in Asia Minor 
continued to play an important role in the Parthian and later Persian struggle over the following 
centuries.  While in the interest of space we need not trace the full history of the frontier until its 
fall to the Arabs in the 7th century, a brief review of activity during the Antonine dynasty 
suggests that Rome’s struggle with Parthia for regional hegemony continued to form an 
important part of the frontier’s strategic context.56  After 40 years of relative quiet under the 
Flavians, Trajan used the military infrastructure which his predecessors had built in the northeast 
as a staging ground for a major expedition against the Parthians, an unprecedented commitment 
to shifting the balance of power between the two empires.57  In 114 CE, Trajan assembled fully 
eight legions at Satala along with a large complement of auxiliaries.58  This force proved 
irresistible, and Trajan conquered Armenia within the first year of the war (with minimal 
fighting, according to Cassius Dio).59  By the end of campaigning in 116, Trajan had extended 
                                                          
54 Keppie 1986, 421-23.  XII Fulminata, the core of the Roman force at Beth Horon, was sent to Melitene 
at the end of the Jewish Revolt.  XVI Flavia was in Satala no later than 75 (the exact date is a point of 
disagreement). 
 
55 On the auxiliary garrison: Speidel 2009; Mitford 2018, 451-98.  On the Classis Pontica: Wheeler 2012. 
 
56 Mitford 2018, 77-83. 
 
57 Dio Cass. 68.17-26; Mitford 2018, 62-67. 
 
58 Mitford 2018, 63-64. 
 




Roman rule deep into Mesopotamia, only then to suffer a fierce backlash by the Parthians.60  
Following Hadrian’s immediate retrenchment back to the Euphrates and the return of Armenia to 
client-king status (albeit with a Roman-leaning ruler), the strategic utility of the northeast frontier 
in large-scale warfare against the Parthians was clear.61   
 Renewed warfare under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus in the early 160s further 
demonstrated the Anatolian frontier’s role in countering any threat from Parthia.  In 161 CE, the 
Parthians invaded Armenia and destroyed a small Roman advance post at Elegeia.62  To the 
south, a second Parthian army crossed the Euphrates into Syria, forcing Verus to travel to 
Antioch and take command of the war effort.  As under Trajan, the Roman forces in Cappadocia 
went on the offensive with large reinforcements (perhaps as many as five additional legions were 
temporarily transferred into the theater from the Rhine and Danube).63  By 163, a Roman army 
once again marched east from the staging ground at Satala, overwhelming Parthian resistance 
and conquering Armenia.64  As in 116, Armenia was left as a client-kingdom under a Roman 
nominee; the loyalty and security of its king were to be guaranteed through the end of the second 
century by a garrison at Kainepolis, the new Armenian capital 30 km northwest of Artaxata.65  
                                                          
60 Lightfoot 1990, 115-26; Graham 2014.  For an extensive survey of Trajan’s Parthian War: Lepper 
1948. 
 
61 On the revolt of Armenia in 116, generally acceded to by the Romans, see Mitford 2018, 67. 
 
62 SHA Marc. 8; Mitford 2018, 72.  Mitford argues persuasively that the Roman force destroyed at 
Elegeia was not a full legion (as in Speidel 2009, 601) but a smaller collection of vexillationes and 
auxiliaries.  
 
63 Mitford 2018, 73.  See especially n. 69 for epigraphic evidence of these reinforcements. 
 
64 SHA Marc. 9; Mitford 2018, 73-74.  Roman coins of 163 and 164 proclaimed victory over Armenia; 
see Mitford n. 70. 
 
65 Mitford 2018, 73-74.  Kainepolis: TBM 4 C2. 
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As under Trajan, the northeast frontier displayed its potential as a base for decisive military 
action on the Armenian question. 
*** 
 This frontier continued to be an important site of imperial power-politics until the Arab 
invasions; if anything, the rise of the Sassanids in the 3rd century only increased the importance 
of this region in Rome’s military affairs.66  Even if we allow for the tendency of our ancient 
authors to emphasize the Parthian conflict in their accounts of the first two centuries CE, the fact 
remains that Rome’s military and diplomatic relationship with its only imperial neighbor was an 
important factor in the structure and strategic purpose of the northeastern frontier.  At the same 
time, we must recognize other types of threats to Roman security in Asia Minor.  When we look 
past the struggle between empires which dominates our sources, it becomes clear that while 
Parthia was certainly Rome’s most powerful opponent in the East, the empire also faced 
widespread, smaller-scale challenges to regional prosperity and imperial control. 
 Numerous examples suggest that Asia Minor did not lie quietly under Roman rule.  Some 
threats emerged as a backlash to Roman provincialization: Nero’s seizure of eastern Pontus from 
Polemon in 64 led to a revolt five years later by the royal freedman Anicetus, while Vespasian’s 
annexation of Commagene provoked a rebellion by the sons of the deposed king.67  Others 
challenges came from the large-scale movement of hostile peoples, most notably the Sarmatian 
                                                          
66 For a brief survey of the Anatolian frontier from Septimius Severus to the Arab Conquest: Mann 1974, 
524-25; Mitford 2018, 75-83. 
 
67 Anicetus: Tac. Hist. 3.47-48; Dabrowa 1989, 7; Mitford 2018, 39.  Commagene: ILS 9198; Joseph. BJ 
7.219-43; Suet. Vesp. 8; Mitford 2018, 41-42. 
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Alani from north of the Caucasus, who famously clashed with Arrian’s legions in 135 CE.68  
Ultimately, however, the Roman army proved well suited to these “medium-scale” threats.  The 
rebellions in Pontus and Commagene featured clearly defined opponents with Hellenistic 
political structures and conventional armies; both were put down with little difficulty.69  The 
Alani were a similarly manageable foe, not an existential threat to Roman rule.70  Their 
predations were mostly confined to the Parthian world, and Rome’s alliance with Iberia was 
usually sufficient to keep the Alani north of the Caucasus.71  Despite the importance of Arrian’s 
battle description to our understanding of Roman tactics in the 2nd century CE, the fight itself 
was a minor affair against an exhausted opponent.72 
 The frequent, low-intensity conflict which the Romans encountered in Asia Minor was 
potentially more challenging.73  Though not a major concern of our sources, Anatolia certainly 
played host to brigandage, raiding, and other forms of social resistance; as in Judaea and Galilee, 
rugged, militarily inaccessible terrain incubated agitators against Roman authority.74 Some of our 
                                                          
68 Bosworth 1977; Mitford 2018, 71. 
 
69 Even Anicetus, who briefly threatened the stability of the entire northeastern frontier by seizing the port 
of Trapezus, was rapidly driven from Roman territory by a relatively small imperial force. Tac. Hist. 
3.47-48; Mitford 2018, 39.  
 
70 On the contrary, see Magie 1950, 572-76, who makes the Alani the primary impetus for Vespasian’s 
militarization of the northeast frontier. 
 
71 Joseph. BJ 7.244-51; Suet. Dom. 2.2; Bosworth 1977, 220-23; Dabrowa 1989, 70-72; Mitford 2018, 42 
n. 21. 
 
72 Dio Cass. 69.15; Bosworth 1977, 220, 222; Mitford 2018, 70-71. On the Ektaxis and Roman tactics: 
Wheeler 1979. 
 
73 Shaw 1990a and 1990b argue convincingly for the significance of low-level violence and imperfect 
imperial control in Cilicia-Isauria, in the Anatolian interior to the west of the frontier line. 
 
74 We need not parse out how much of this “background violence” was explicitly targeted at Roman rule.  
Whatever the intentions of its perpetrators, brigandage made it more difficult for the Romans to 
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best evidence for such “small wars” comes from the coast of the Black Sea east of Trapezus, a 
region outside official provincial administration but still garrisoned by the Roman army.75  The 
Heniochi tribe contributed to widespread piracy here, and sacked the city of Pityus in the 70s 
CE.76  We hear from Strabo (writing at a very early stage) that while local elites were relatively 
successful in combating banditry, Roman governors were not particularly interested in hunting 
down brigands.77  As we saw in examples from the early conquest of Spain, Roman concepts of 
military glory (and expectations of economic reward) tended to put little weight on small-scale 
warfare against mobile and widely dispersed brigands, especially when these opponents could 
use their native mountains to their advantage.  The Heniochi were thus left to thrive under 
marginal Roman control, even profiting from the menace they posed to larger Roman operations: 
in the early second century, Trajan bribed the Heniochi with gifts in order to secure the northern 
flank for his Armenian war.78    
In part, the Heniochi were protected by their distance from the main Trapezus-Antioch 
frontier line.  Closer sources of resistance could certainly face Roman retribution.  Take, for 
example, Arrian’s plans to wage war against the Sanni, a tribe somewhere east of Trapezus that 
                                                          
administer and secure imperial territory, and the suppression of such small-scale violence fell within the 
purview of Roman governors (whether or not they chose to prioritize this mission).  See Shaw 1984; 
Wheeler 1993a.  
 
75 On this region in general: Braund 1989; 1994; Dabrowa 1989.  For the phrase “small wars”: Callwell 
1896. 
 
76 Strabo, 11.12-13; Braund 1989, 31. Cf. Wheeler 2012, 134-41, who generally argues against the 
severity of Black Sea piracy after the reign of Augustus.  For the location of this tribe, see BA 87 F4 
Heniochoi; Pleiades 857153. 
 
77 Strabo, 11.12. 
 
78 Dio Cass. 68.19; Mitford 2018, 66.   
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refused in the early 130s to pay taxes or recognize imperial rule.79  We do not know if this plan 
was ever carried out, although its articulation alone indicates that the Romans were not averse to 
cementing their control of eastern Anatolia through small-scale fighting.  Regardless, it did not 
bring a permanent solution.  Centuries later, the Sanni still thrived as brigands and pirates.  
While Procopius is evasive on the subject, it seems that they were held under imperial authority 
by persuasion as much as by force.80  The political instability of the mountain regions in Anatolia 
is further demonstrated by Rome’s conflicts with the Cietae, a tribe in the Taurus mountains that 
twice launched serious challenges against the authority of Rome and its client-kings.81  In 36 and 
52 CE, the Romans deployed detachments from the Syrian garrison to force the Cietae into 
obedience. 82  In each case the Cietae were pacified, as we must assume the Sanni would have 
been (at least temporarily) in Arrian’s putative war.  Yet the fact that the empire could defeat 
such small-scale threats when it focused its military resources against them should not blind us to 
the opportunity costs of such missions.  For every soldier Rome posted back to Cappadocia to 
fight the Cietae, it had one fewer facing Parthia on the Syrian frontier. 
We may safely suggest that these documented uprisings are only a fraction of the small-
scale opposition which Rome faced; here, as almost everywhere in the ancient world, banditry 
was endemic.83  In line with the conclusions of Chapter Three, our evidence from Asia Minor 
similarly indicates that this type of illicit violence tended to take place on broken ground, rather 
                                                          
79 Arrian, Perip. M. Eux. 11; Braund 1991, 419. 
 
80 Procop. Aed. 111.6.1-14; Wars 1.15; Maas 2014, 339. 
 
81 Shaw 1990a, 229-30. 
 
82 Tac. Ann. 6.41, 12.55; Lenski 1999, 419-20.   
 
83 MacMullen 1967, 192-241; Shaw 1984; Isaac 1990, 54-100; Wheeler 1993a, 37.  On the importance of 
policing among the activities of the Roman army: Fuhrmann 2012.   
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than the level plains and valleys that typically hosted conventional warfare.  The exceptionally 
rugged physical geography of eastern Anatolia thus compromised the maintenance of Roman 
authority against insurgency and brigandage.  For the Cietae, like the Judaean rebels, mountains 
served as an incubator for political resistance.  In 36, the tribe “migrated to the heights of the 
Tauric range, and, favored by the nature of the country, held their own against the unwarlike 
forces of the king [Archelaus].”84  In 52, broken ground allowed the Cietae to rout the Roman 
cavalry sent against them.85  We might similarly point to the importance of mountains in the long 
and contentious relationship between Rome and the mountain-dwelling Isaurians (as Brent Shaw 
argues), or even to Cicero’s dubious military accomplishments against insurgents at Mt. Amanus 
and Pindenissum.86  We certainly cannot assume that any specific mountain in eastern Asia 
Minor was a site of rebellion or resistance at any given time.  Yet it seems likely that in 
aggregate over time and space, this rugged region had more than its fair share of internal 
conflicts, that these struggles typically took place on or near rough terrain, and that as a result, 
Roman commanders on the Anatolian frontier would have frequently confronted the difficulties 
of broken-ground combat enumerated in Chapter One. 
Literary evidence can flesh out the threat-environment which the Romans confronted on 
the northeastern frontier: we have ample documentation for the large-scale conflict with Persia, 
along with indications of internal rebellion and small-scale but endemic banditry.  However, 
given the biases of our ancient authors towards grand conflict and inter-state politics, these texts 
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cannot reliably confirm which of these challenges the Roman frontier prioritized, or to what 
extent it neglected some threats in favor of others.  To analyze the purpose and nature of the 
Anatolian frontier, we must turn instead to geographic evidence, situating the frontier within its 
physical environment and asking what the siting of imperial forts and the courses of Roman 
roads can tell us about the mission of the soldiers who garrisoned and patrolled them.   
 
Section Two: The Geography of the Northeastern Frontier 
 
The northeastern frontier demonstrates geographic patterns similar to the Roman 
conquest of Spain, albeit over a longer period and much more difficult terrain: even in the rugged 
heights of eastern Anatolia, the Romans tended to deploy their forces, forts, and roads along 
relatively low and level ground.  This preference was not absolute, and there are noteworthy 
deviations where the Romans seem to have deliberately sought rough terrain in the construction 
of the northeast frontier.  Yet by and large, Roman troops relinquished the mountains’ defensive 
advantages to their restive inhabitants. 
 As in Spain, the distinction between level and broken ground reflected a choice between 
missions and opponents.  In literary topos and, to a large extent, military reality, plains and 
valleys played host to large-scale wars, while hills and mountains were the realm of low-
intensity counterinsurgency against rebels and brigands.  For evaluating the mission of the 
Roman frontier, the central question thus becomes whether the Romans avoided the challenges 
of broken ground or confronted them head-on. 
We may envision two possible scenarios, each of which should produce a recognizable 
pattern in the relationship between the Roman frontier and the surrounding terrain.  If the 
211 
 
Romans adopted a direct approach to the problems of mountain brigandage and control, we 
would expect them to augment their tactical disadvantages on rough terrain through the 
construction of highland roads and forts, aimed to improve speeds of movement and 
preemptively deny local strongpoints to the enemy.87  In this case, TRI scores for Roman roads 
and installations would be higher than the average for their surrounding areas.  On the other 
hand, if the empire chose to avoid or ignore the challenges of broken ground in favor of high-
intensity military priorities—in the northeast, the ever-present possibility of Parthian wars—we 
would expect its roads and fortifications to be found on leveler terrain, with TRI figures below 
the regional average.   
Besides TRI, elevation can help us to understand the purpose of Rome’s northeastern 
frontier.  In the severe terrain of Anatolia, altitude could present military problems independent 
of terrain ruggedness.  The winter cold was lethal at high elevations, while the characteristic 
transhumance and pastoralism of the mountains made these spaces more difficult and less 
rewarding to govern and control, and less capable of providing logistical support to substantial 
Roman forces.  As with areas of high TRI, we would expect a frontier concerned with Parthia to 
avoid these challenges, and a frontier concerned with detailed pacification of borderland tribes to 
confront elevation head-on.    
TRI is a familiar variable to this dissertation, and elevation is closely related.  Yet to 
understand the strategic purpose of the Anatolian frontier fully, we must add viewshed (the area 
that Roman garrisons could see from their frontier installations) to our geographic model.  
Though easy to calculate in GIS software, the interpretation of this data is tricky and potentially 
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ambiguous.  A large field-of-view was important both for defense against large-scale armies and 
for the interdiction of smaller-scale migrants and raiders; good vantage point could serve both 
purposes.  Nevertheless, we might expect a northeastern frontier focused on high-intensity 
threats to feature heavy surveillance of the major, level crossing points into Parthian territory, 
with less thorough observation along more rugged sections of the frontier line.  On the other 
hand, a frontier built for small-scale local control would feature extensive and equally distributed 
surveillance both along the frontier line and in a deeper zone on both sides of the nominal border.  
 Before we match the geography of the northeastern frontier against these archetypes, a 
brief word is necessary on our geospatial evidence.  Mitford’s data, the basis for the maps in this 
section, is based in large part on his extensive autopsy of the Turkish landscape, along with the 
reports of scholars and travelers dating back to the 19th century.88  He supplements the physical 
remains of the Roman frontier with ancient geographic evidence, especially from the Antonine 
Itinerary, the Peutinger Map, and the Notitia Dignitatum.89  For the frontier of the 1st and 2nd 
century CE, these are late records, and only the Notitia (at least in part) is an explicitly military 
document. 90  Given the potential weaknesses of this textual data, along with the scanty 
                                                          
88 For other examinations of the northeastern frontier in the modern period, see (among others); Crow and 
French 1980; French 1983; 1988; Crow 1986.  The bibliography in Mitford 2018 contains the most up-to-
date list of work in this region. 
 
89 Hereafter It.Ant., Tab.Peut., and ND. These can be supplemented in places by Pliny, Ptolemy, and 
Strabo, but the focus of these authors on urban and physical (rather than military) geography limits their 
utility.  Mitford 2018, 565-77. 
 
90 On the It.Ant. and Tab.Peut.: Talbert 2007, 256-70; 2010, 133-42; Purcell 2015.  Mitford 2018, 570 
suggests that most of the source material for It.Ant. reflects conditions during the reign of Caracalla.  On 
the ND: Mann 1976. Cf. Goodburn and Bartholomew 1976. 
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archaeological record for this region, scholars such as James Crow and Everett Wheeler argue 
that we cannot responsibly reconstruct the geography of the Flavian frontier in Asia Minor.91   
 On the whole, I lean towards the more optimistic school of Mitford and David French.92  I 
maintain that the Roman northeast frontier was a product of the first century CE, for which 
Michael A. Speidel (using military diplomas as his evidence) estimates a garrison of between 20-
25,000 soldiers in Galatia-Cappadocia.93  While it is impossible to determine the exact 
distribution of these forces throughout the province, I follow Mitford’s argument that substantial 
portions of this garrison were stretched along the frontier line (rather than centralized around the 
legionary fortresses at Samosata, Melitene, and Satala).  I do not agree in all cases with Mitford’s 
assumption, often unstated, that all the forts and fortlets he identifies were necessarily garrisoned 
at all times in the late 1st and 2nd century CE.  Nor should we assume that Roman soldiers were 
confined to these installations and the roads that connected them: patrols certainly ventured into 
the wider countryside.  What Mitford has successfully identified, however, are the foci of Roman 
force along the Anatolian frontier.  As with Chapter Two’s list of military toponyms, when taken 
in aggregate these sites speak to the empire’s concerns and priorities in the region over the long 
term, testifying to Rome’s willingness in certain critical locations to augment the capacities of its 
troops by investing in military infrastructure. 
                                                          
91 Crow 1986; Wheeler 1991; 2017.  Wheeler (see especially 164-65) goes so far as to deny the existence 
of a frontier line in the northeast before the mid-3rd century, arguing that whatever forces Rome deployed 
in the region did not form a cohesive defense system aimed at controlling the border-zone. 
 
92 French 1983; 1988; Mitford 2018.  For the late-Neronian/early-Flavian origins of the frontier, see also 
Levick 2000, 605; Bennett 2002; 2006. 
 
93 Speidel 2009, 624. Cf. Mitford 2018, 426-98. 
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  As I have indicated, the topographic context of the northeastern frontier suggests that the 
frontier’s primary mission was warfare, both defensive and offensive, against the Parthian 
Empire.  In addition to citing some of the most important evidence for Mitford’s findings and 
reservations about them the following reconstruction proceeds north through the frontier in four 
sectors.  Each is accompanied by at least four maps, corresponding to the variables outlined 
above: the first two provide TRI statistics (one as raw data, one processed with a variety of GIS 
generalization tools to reveal broader patterns), a third depicts elevation, and a fourth illustrates 
the viewsheds of the sector’s military sites.94  Where productive, additional maps examine 
alternative routes and sites which the Romans did not utilize, sparking discussions of the 
strategic disadvantages which imperial decisions could produce.  In addition, each sector pairs its 
visual and cartographic analysis with quantitative data, comparing the TRI and elevation 
statistics for Roman forts, stations, and roads with randomly generated regional averages. 
 
SECTOR ONE: SAMOSATA TO MELITENE95 
 Let us begin our northward march in Samosata on the Upper Euphrates.96  Once the 
capital of Hellenistic Commagene, Samosata housed a legion by approximately 72 CE.97  This 
                                                          
94 For a summary of generalization tools and their use in ArcGIS: 
http://desktop.arcgis.com/en/arcmap/10.3/tools/spatial-analyst-toolbox/an-overview-of-the-
generalization-tools.htm. Viewshed maps do not necessarily account for the curvature of the earth or the 
limits of human vision, and are thus more accurate for areas closer to Roman installations than those 
farther away. 
 
95 For Section One, refer to Maps 4.2-6 and Tables 4.1-2. 
 
96 TBM 6 D5. 
 
97 Mitford 2018, 41-42, 84-87.  Cf. Joseph. BJ 7.219-43; Goell 1974; Özgüç 1983. 
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force was the northernmost extension of the Syrian garrison, now increasingly dispersed along 
the frontier line.98  Much like the fortress of Zeugma to the south, Samosata guarded a major 
crossing point of the Euphrates.99  As Maps 4.2-4 indicate, this most significant installation in 
Commagene was surrounded by low, flat, and militarily uncomplicated territory on either side of 
the river.100 
 From Samosata, two roads led north to Melitene in Cappadocia, the next legionary 
fortress along the Euphrates.  One road ran across the Taurus mountains, while a second 
followed a longer, winding course along the river-bank.  The mountain route crossed the broad 
plain north of Samosata in two branches.  The eastern one, waterless in modern times, led 
directly to the monumental Severan bridge over the Chabina river.101  The western branch ran 
northwest past the Tab.Peut.’s waystation of Carbanum to Perre.102  A station in both the It.Ant. 
and Tab.Peut., and identified by Mitford as a Flavian administrative center, Perre was a likely 
                                                          
98 Mann 1974, 522-25; Keppie 1986, 423. 
 
99 Kennedy 1998; Hartmann and Speidel 2002; Mitford 2018, 84, 96.  Zeugma: TBM 4 A4. 
 
100 Due to inundation by the Atatürk Dam, our TRI data underestimates the ruggedness immediately 
surrounding the now-submerged Samosata, though mid-20th century Turkish military maps suggest that 
any difference is slight.  TBM 6 D5 indicates elevation changes around 100 vertical feet per mile, which 
would barely register in our TRI dataset. 
 
101 Mitford 2018, 102, 107-11. 
 
102 Carbanum: TBM 6 B3; Tab.Peut. 10 B2; Mitford 2018, 102-103.  References to the Tab.Peut. indicate 





spot for a Roman fort.103  From here, the road turned sharply to avoid the southern foothills of 
the Taurus, rejoining the eastern branch below the Chabina.104 
 From the Severan bridge, the frontier road ascended the Taurus, following, according to 
Mitford, the “only practicable route through the gorges and abrupt mountainsides” (as we will 
see below, alternate paths existed to the east).105  There was an imperial outpost at modern Direk 
Kale, the probable site of the It.Ant.’s Lacotena.106 Archaeological finds reveal a substantial 
Roman presence there.107  Immediately north, the road crossed the plateau at the Sincik Gates 
(just visible on Map 4.2) before cresting the summit of Mt. Kopal and descending to the 
waystation of Miasena in the Şiro river valley.108  From Miasena, the frontier road climbed 
northwest over the northern arm of the Taurus (the modern Şakşak range), emerging into the 
plains southeast of Melitene.109 
 The second route to Melitene, recorded in the Tab.Peut., ran east from Samosata along 
the bank of the Euphrates.110  Low and level enough through the probable forts at Charmodara 
                                                          
103 It.Ant. 210.3; Tab.Peut. 10 B2; TBM 6 B2; Mitford 2018, 87, 104-105.  For the numismatic finds: 
Facella 2008.  All references to It.Ant. refer to the edition by Cuntz, Itineraria Romana, 1929.  
  
104 Mitford 2018, 105-107. 
 
105 Mitford 2018, 118. 
 
106 It.Ant. 210.2; TBM 7 B4; Mitford 2018, 108, 112-17.  
 
107 Hoepfner 1966; Wagner 1983, 194; Mitford 2018, 112-17.  
 
108 It.Ant. 210.1; TBM 7 B2; Mitford 2018, 117-120.  Though no physical evidence of Miasena remains, 
Mitford’s assessment of the physical landscape and the distances in It.Ant. indicate two possible locations 
(only 1.5 km apart) at crossings of the Siro. 
 
109 TBM 11 A4; Mitford 2018, 121-22, 166-70. 
 
110 Tab.Peut. 10 B2, B3. 
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and Heba, the road entered rugged terrain near the Gerger river, where the important city of 
Juliopolis served as a collection point for rafting supplies down the Euphrates to Samosata.111  
As the road encountered ever-more broken ground along the river-bank, a temporary respite 
could be found in the narrow plain at Barzalo, a convenient crossing of the Euphrates and the 
most securely identifiable military site in this sector of the frontier.112  Present on the Tab.Peut. 
and named as a fort in the 3rd century by Ammianus, the site maintained the name “Berzelo” into 
the 1980s.113 
 From Barzalo, the road traced the Euphrates through the Taurus gorge, where the 
exceptionally rugged terrain has badly limited exploration.114  The course of the road is now 
generally clear thanks to Mitford’s observations in the early 1970s.115  Mitford is confident that 
this curve of the Euphrates, unnavigable for riverine fleets, was well defended by the Roman 
army, even if it is difficult to locate their bases securely and precisely.116  Claudiopolis was 
undoubtedly a military site in Ammianus’ time, and probably housed a garrison long before; its 
                                                          
111 Charmodara: Tab.Peut. 10 B3; TBM 8 B5; Mitford 2018, 101. Remains of Roman water-pipes and its 
strategic position near the mouth of the Chabina suggest a military function (though see an alternate 
argument in French 1983, 94).  Heba: Tab.Peut. 10 B3; TBM 8 D3; Mitford 2018, 127. Mitford’s 
positioning here assumes an error in the mileage of Tab.Peut., but his identification is supported by local 
finds of military inscriptions: see French 1983, 75. Juliopolis: TBM 9 D4; Mitford 2018, 129-31.  While 
Mitford notes that the potential error in Tab.Peut.’s mileage for Heba, along with the general spacing of 
sites in this section of the document, would call for an omitted waystation in the vicinity, archaeological 
evidence is insufficient to establish a garrison or other official military outpost at Juliopolis. 
 
112 TBM 9 E3; Mitford 2018, 132-34. 
 
113 Amm. Marc. 18.7.10; Tab.Peut. 10 B2 Barzalium.  The Atatürk dam has since inundated the site (see 
Mitford 2018, 134).  
 
114 Mitford 2018, 123. 
 
115 Mitford 2018, 134-42.  See also: French 1983, 71-82. 
 
116 Mitford 2018, 123-25. 
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placement by Mitford at modern Tillo is speculative, but persuasive.117  To the north, 
archaeological evidence survives from a Roman fortlet at Kerefto, a small outpost commanding 
traffic along the gorge.118  15 km to the west, the fort of Metita sat somewhere at the mouth of 
the Siro valley.  It housed a cohort by the time of the Notitia Dignitatum, and Mitford argues that 
a garrison was in place well before.119 
 Skirting below the heights of the Şakşak mountains, the frontier road emerged onto level 
ground near the strategic crossing of the Euphrates at Tomisa, proceeding west from there to 
Melitene.120  A longstanding waypoint on the Persian Royal Road, the Tomisa crossing was a 
geographic fixture in Romano-Parthian relations, serving in the first century CE as the probable 
launching point for invasions by both Paetus and Corbulo.121  Writing under Augustus, Strabo 
identified a fortress of the then-still-independent Cappadocians at Tomisa itself.122  After the 
Flavian militarization, Roman troops were probably garrisoned nearby in the Tab.Peut.’s Corne 
(modern Cafer Kale), where locals reported that a sizeable fort was flooded by the Euphrates in 
                                                          
117 Amm. Marc. 10.7.10 (in which “Claudias” is listed as the sister-fort to Barzalo); TBM 9 E2, 10 F4; 
Mitford 2018, 136-37.  Mitford’s identification is based in part on the mileage in Tab.Peut. 10 B2 
(“Glaudia”), in part on Tillo’s position near one of the few practicable crossings of the Euphrates in the 
Taurus gorge.   
 
118 TBM 10 E3; Mitford 2018, 139. 
 
119 TBM 10 D3; Mitford 2018, 142.  This positioning requires slight alteration of the mileage in Tab.Peut. 
10 B2.    
 
120 I have intentionally omitted from analysis the fort at Sis Kale (TBM 10 B3), securely dated to the 
Justinianic period by archaeological evidence.  Mitford 2018, 152.  
 
121 Tac. Ann. 13.7, 15.12.  Mitford 2018, 157. 
 
122 Strabo, 12.2.1. 
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the late 1980s.123  Corne was potentially supported by small garrisons in a fortlet 6 km upstream 
and the waystation of Ad Aras just across the river.124 
 Taking Mitford’s data as the starting point for GIS analysis, a preponderance of evidence 
indicates that Rome’s primary concern in this sector was securing and monitoring low and level 
ground.  The relatively low TRI and elevation figures for Roman sites and roadways suggest this 
conclusion (especially in light of alternatives which better penetrated the Taurus mountains), as 
does the strength of Roman surveillance at the most likely points of Parthian invasion.  While the 
geographic configuration of Sector One suggests that the Romans paid some attention to the 
problems of low-intensity mountain warfare, by-and-large the military infrastructure in this 
region was built with the Parthians in mind.  
The Roman preference for low and level ground is apparent in a visual survey of Maps 
4.2-4.  Consider for instance the sharp turn of the western frontier road at Perre, and the precision 
with which it skirts the Taurus foothills on its way to the Chabina river.  Note as well how on 
Map 4.3 the road between Barzalo and Metita avoids for as long as possible the 400-800 m TRI 
terrain marked in light red.  Rome’s bases in the Taurus follow the same pattern: on Map 4.2, 
Barzalo, Claudiopolis, and Metita are visibly associated with pockets of level terrain.  Even on 
the direct, high-altitude route over the Taurus, Lacotena and Miasena have relatively low 
elevations (as seen on Map 4.4), positioned well below the heights of Mt. Kopal. 
                                                          
123 Tab.Peut. 10 B2; TBM 10 A2; Mitford 2018, 153-55.   
 
124 TBM 10 A2; Mitford 2018, 160-62. Though marked as a civilian site on Mitford’s map, Ad Aras 
appears as a station on Tab.Peut. 10 B2. 
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As seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, quantitative analysis supports this cartographic impression, 
confirming that the Roman frontier avoided broken ground more than confronting it.125  Table 1 
gives average TRI and elevation statistics for the dozen fortresses, forts, and waystations in the 
first sector of the northeastern frontier (along with several local sites discussed below).  
Averages are given for 200 m and 1 km radii: the first to approximate the engineering challenges 
of building at these sites, the second to capture the tactical difficulties of patrolling and fighting 
in their environments.  Each location’s TRI and elevation averages are given a regional 
percentile rank, in this case in reference to 1,000 randomly selected points along the frontier 
between Samosata and Melitene.  When we aggregate the percentile-ranks for Roman fortresses, 
forts, and waystations, it is clear that the Romans preferred gentler terrain in Commagene: at 
both 200 m and 1 km radii, the TRI scores around Roman sites fall in the 22nd percentile for the 
sector, while elevation is in the 26th.  While there are certainly some Roman installations with 
middling statistics (Lacotena for TRI; Lacotena, Miasena, and Claudiopolis for elevation), on the 
whole these probable bases for Roman force fall well below the regional mean. 
As seen in Table 4.2, the same pattern holds in the statistical analysis of Roman roads.  
Calculated in six segments (alongside a number of alternative local routes discussed below), the 
TRI statistics for the frontier roads in Sector One fall in the 32nd percentile when compared to the 
regional norm. 126  Elevation statistics are only slightly higher, averaging to the 37th percentile.  
Even if we exclude the two road segments between Samosata and the Chabina river, which lie 
                                                          
125 As seen by the shading in the “TRI Mean,” most of these sites were quite rugged in absolute terms; the 
Anatolian mountains dwarf the broken ground see in previous chapters.  We are concerned here with the 
Romans’ choices relative to their various options in this region, and my TRI analysis in this chapter is 
based almost entirely on percentile ranks, rather than absolute statistics. 
 
126 I have given the statistic for the 1 km radii around Roman roads; TRI figures are slightly higher for 
200 m radii, averaging to the 34th percentile. 
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almost entirely in the plains, the figures for the four segments of mountain road are 
unremarkable: only the high road over the Taurus clears the regional mean for TRI (even then, 
only by a few percent).    
To be sure, the empire did not enjoy unrestricted choice in placing its forts and building 
its roads (or, more frequently, selecting pre-existing routes to improve).127  Without dynamite 
and heavy machinery, there was an upper limit to the Romans’ ability to reshape rugged terrain.  
Nevertheless, a variety of evidence suggests that the empire could have extended itself onto 
higher and more rugged terrain, but chose not to.  Take for example the direct route over the 
Taurus, mentioned above: while its overall TRI and elevation figures are underwhelming (if still 
higher than the regional mean), over shorter segments this road’s statistics speak to the 
tremendous ingenuity of Roman engineers.  Ascending from Lacotena to the Sincik Gates, the 
frontier road has a 1 km TRI of 407 m (69th percentile).  Near the summit of Mt. Kopal, the 1 km 
TRI average is 465 m (81st percentile).  We find even more impressive statistics further to the 
north where the frontier ascends the Pontic mountains (see Sector Four, below).  The most 
rugged section of the Roman road here has a TRI average around 660 m (97th percentile with 
reference the entire northeastern frontier).  While we should not assume that the Romans could 
replicate this feat of engineering on any patch of ground with the same statistical profile, these 
figures indicate that the much lower TRI averages of Sector One reflect a choice to avoid the 
mountains, rather than the simple inability to build over them. 
Evidence in the Taurus mountains for local, non-Roman transportation networks leads to 
a similar conclusion that the empire intentionally ignored more rugged alternatives when 
                                                          
127 Cf. Mitford 2018, 118. 
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choosing how to construct its frontier.  Mitford identifies numerous caravan tracks in this region, 
shown in dashed lines and numbered in Map 4.6.  These were heavily traveled during the 
Ottoman period; Mitford argues that they were also used in antiquity.128  The Romans could 
certainly have employed them when necessary—Track 4, running parallel to the official road 
between Lacotena and Miasena, may have seen especially frequent imperial usage—but the 
empire did not select them for incorporation into the frontier system.129  Without waystations and 
engineering improvements, Roman soldiers would have found these to be more difficult avenues 
for projecting force. 
Table 4.2 gives statistical profiles for these local routes as well as the official Roman 
roads: comparison between the two throws the empire’s preferences into stark relief.  The 1 km 
TRI figures for local routes nearly reach the 60th percentile of the regional mean (compared to 
32nd for the Romans).  Elevation figures stand at the 64th percentile (compared to the Roman 
37th).  For individual segments of the caravan tracks, TRI and elevation figures above the 80th 
percentile are not uncommon.130  Possessed of overwhelming military force and engineering 
capacity, the Romans could have secured and improved any of these paths for their own use.  
The fact that they did not speaks strongly to the priorities of imperial decision-makers. 
A visual survey of Map 4.6 also indicates that by avoiding these more difficult routes (as 
well as some key sites along them), the Romans denied themselves ready access to large swaths 
of mountainous and dangerous space.  For experienced locals, these rudimentary tracks enabled 
wide-ranging movement across the “bubble” of territory between the high Taurus road and its 
                                                          
128 Among others, Mitford 2018, 142-45. 
 
129 Mitford 2018, 108. 
 
130 See especially Tracks 6-10, in the Taurus heights overlooking the Euphrates. 
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lower counterpart on the Euphrates.  While detachments from the probable forts of Barzalo and 
Claudiopolis might risk patrols up local routes from time to time, our evidence for frontier 
deployment indicates that the empire made no permanent commitment to monitor and interdict 
movement in this mountainous zone. 
The Romans were similarly uninterested in installing garrisons at a number of key 
highland sites where a mix of defensive terrain and symbolic importance produced potential 
“hot-spots” of anti-Roman resistance.  I have selected four (though many more certainly existed) 
to include on Map 4.6, and in Table 4.1’s quantitative analysis.  Arsameia ad Nymphaeum, 
Arsameia ad Euphratem, and Nemrud Dağ were all important sites for Commagene’s Antiochene 
monarchy: the first two were readily defensible palaces (Mitford describes the terrain around 
Arsameia ad Nymphaeum as “almost impregnable”), while Nemrud Dağ was a major religious 
center and home to the Antiochene royal tombs.131  Given the Antiochenes’ violent resistance to 
Roman annexation, we might suspect that any of these defensible and symbolic spaces of royal 
power might have attracted insurgent activity, and thus Roman attention.132  Further north, Kerar 
Kale was one of a number of sites dominating movement along the surrounding caravan-tracks; 
later home to a Seljuk castle, it was a natural position from which to control passage through the 
Taurus mountains.133  The Romans do not appear to have established a standing military or 
administrative presence at any of these sites.  The statistics on Table 4.1 suggest why: although 
their 1 km TRI figures only average in the 54th percentile, this is 31 points higher than the 
                                                          
131 Mitford 2018, 111. See further: Goell 1957; Versluys 2017, 16. 
 
132 ILS 9198; Joseph. BJ 7.219-43; Suet. Vesp. 8; TBM 7 B4 (Arsameia ad Nymphaeum), 7 C4 (Nemrud 
Dag), 8 E1 (Arsameia ad Euphratem); Mitford 2018, 41-42.  For the argument for local resistance against 
the Romans, see especially Wagner 1983, 194 (along with Mitford 2018, 117).   
 
133 TBM 7 D1; Mitford 2018, 144-45. 
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corresponding statistic for Roman sites in this sector.134  Faced with a difficult opportunity to 
secure the mountainous Taurus interior, the Romans chose a hands-off approach instead, 
providing little infrastructural support for counterinsurgency and policing operations in the 
mountains. 
If we turn from the variables of TRI and elevation to consider the viewshed analysis in 
Map 4.5, we see a similar Roman concern for level ground: Sector One of the frontier provided 
its most thorough surveillance on and near the plains which formed the most likely sites of 
Parthian warfare.  South of the mountains, Roman installations had a mostly unbroken field of 
vision along the Euphrates from Samosata to Arsameia ad Euphratem (though we should wonder 
how much detail Roman guards could make out at a distance from their watchposts).135  As we 
can see on Maps 4.2-4, this scope corresponds with the plains of Commagene, a probable front in 
any war with the Parthian empire.136  Surveillance is similarly thorough from Metita along the 
northern end of the Taurus gorge, past the strategically crucial crossing at Tomisa, and into the 
plains around Melitene.137 
 The viewshed from Roman posts was notably less complete along the Taurus gorge itself.  
Despite Mitford’s assertion that this region must have been heavily guarded, his placement of 
Roman sites leaves a substantial section of unmonitored frontier near Claudiopolis, as well as 
                                                          
134 The differences in 200 m TRI (32 percentile-points), 200 m elevation (27 points), and 1 km elevation 
(26 points) are broadly comparable. 
 
135 This point holds even if we bear in mind that the view from the fortress at Samosata is exaggerated in 
our modern data by the reservoir of the Atatürk dam 
 
136 Mitford 2018, 84 notes the major crossing at Samosata. 
 
137 Despite the mountains on the Parthian side of the Euphrates, this area was evidently a major 
battleground in Rome’s eastern wars.  Mitford 2018, 89. 
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smaller gaps along the Euphrates below Metita.138  The Roman field of vision was similarly 
patchy below the gorge in the southern Taurus mountains, where the confluence of the Gerger 
and Euphrates rivers appears unmonitored by any Roman installation.  Finally, the mountainous 
“bubble” between the two frontier roads fell almost entirely outside the viewshed of the Roman 
frontier.  To be sure, some of these surveillance deficiencies would have been addressed by 
frequent patrols, especially along the river-road.  Moreover, geography would have made 
permanent surveillance of some of these areas unnecessary: sections of the Euphrates were 
impossible to cross, even for knowledgeable locals, and portions of the Taurus heights were 
simply uninhabitable (though as we will see at the end of this chapter, these areas were smaller 
than we might expect).  On the whole, however, Roman surveillance in Sector One concentrated 
on areas of likely Parthian contact and conflict; the empire took less care to monitor and interdict 
low-intensity threats moving through the mountains.   
This is not to say that the imperial authorities were entirely oblivious to small-scale 
resistance in this sector of the frontier: there is some evidence for a more direct Roman approach 
to the control of the mountainous interior.  The frontier road running through Lacotena and 
Miasena could certainly have been used to project force against mountain bandits (though it also 
offered advantages for large-scale warfare, connecting the legions at Samosata and Melitene by a 
route that was both shorter than the riverine alternative and more difficult for a Parthian surprise 
attack to sever).139  This route seems at times to seek altitude and broken ground, cutting directly 
across the summit of Mt. Kopal rather than following the easier local route through the valley 
                                                          
138 Mitford 2018, 123-25. 
 
139 My thanks to J.E. Lendon for suggesting the latter strategic advantage. 
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east of Lacotena.140  Roman construction of roads and outposts in the heart of the Taurus 
mountains suggests that the empire recognized the difficulties of forcibly dominating the 
highlands, and that it designed segments of the frontier system with this mission at least partially 
in mind. 
Similarly, the Roman road through the Taurus gorge suggests some concern for 
controlling East-West movement along the Taurus range, even if the imperial strongpoints along 
this route failed to provide continuous surveillance over the frontier.  Along the course of this 
road, rugged terrain made high-intensity operations impossible for Romans and Parthians alike: 
Rome’s choice to extend its military infrastructure into the gorge suggests some concern with 
small-scale raiding (though patrols along the route could just as easily interdict Parthian spies 
and provocateurs, and this low-altitude road would have been the only practicable option in 
winter when snows closed the direct route to the west).141   
On the whole, however, Sector One gives a consistent (if not entirely uncomplicated) 
pattern for Roman frontier construction, indicating an imperial preference for low and level 
terrain.  Using military infrastructure to augment their ability to project force, the Romans 
devoted most of their attention and resources to areas where the Parthian threat was strongest, 
even as this choice to prioritize plains and valleys came with notable consequences for local 
security and imperial control. 
                                                          
140 Formed by the Çat river (TBM 7 C3), the advantages of this valley are made particularly clear by the 
generalized TRI figures of Map 4.3.  We see a similar decision north of Miasena, where the road climbs 
the southeast heights of the Şakşak mountains rather than taking a more westerly route across what Maps 
4.3 and 4.4 indicate is lower and easier terrain. 
 




SECTOR TWO: MELITENE TO ZIMARA142 
Shorter and simpler than its neighbor to the south, Sector Two demonstrates a similar 
trend in the frontier’s relationship with the mountains.  We begin in Melitene, home to the 
southernmost of Cappadocia’s two legions.143  The garrison was Legio XII Fulminata, sent to 
Melitene by Titus in 71 CE and remaining there (at least in the form of vexillationes) until the 
composition of the Notitia over three centuries later.144  The exact location of its fortress is now 
unknown, but substantial archaeological remains were still visible in the mid-20th century.145  
Leg. XII not only covered the strategic crossing downstream at Tomisa, but also dominated the 
triangular plain watered by the Melas river, the largest expanse of flat, agricultural land north of 
the Taurus mountains.   
As seen in Maps 4.7-10, the frontier followed a single road north from Melitene, although 
major support roads led west toward the cities of Sebasteia and Caesarea.  The It.Ant. and 
Tab.Peut. agree that Ciaca was the next base north; it housed an ala by the time of the ND.146  
The road continued along the Euphrates past the river-port of Sartona, an important stop on the 
flow of supplies to Melitene, before curving north to avoid the gorge below modern Keban.147  
                                                          
142 For Sector Two, refer to Maps 4.7-10 and Tables 4.3-4. 
 
143 TBM 11 A4; Mitford 2018, 171-182.  
 
144 Joseph. BJ 7.18; ND Or. 38.6, 14; Mitford 2018, 172-73. 
 
145 Gabriel 1940, 264-68; Mitford 2018, 174-78. 
 
146 It.Ant. 209.4; ND Or. 38.21; Tab.Peut. 10 B2; TBM 11 A2; Mitford 2018, 186-87. 
 
147 TBM 11 B1; Mitford 2018, 187-92. 
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Near the confluence of the Euphrates, Arapkir, and Arsanias rivers lay the fort of Dascusa.148  
Recorded on the It.Ant., Tab.Peut., and ND, Dascusa was a major military hub protecting the 
Arapkir valley;  Mitford lists it as “the principal defensive point of this vulnerable and important 
section of the frontier.”149 
 North of Dascusa, the frontier road split as it approached the Antitaurus.  One branch 
turned west, climbing into the mountains along high but level terrain between the Çit and 
Arapkir rivers (its strategic purpose is perplexing: see below).  The other picked its way along 
the Euphrates through the Antitaurus gorge.  In addition to numerous fortlets and watch-posts 
identified by archaeological remains, these routes were guarded by four waystations.  On the 
western branch, the Romans probably established a presence at Vereuso and Zenocopi.150  
Mitford’s positions for these sites follow the distances in the Tab.Peut. and his own estimation of 
likely stopping-points; neither offers substantial archaeological remains.  We may more securely 
identify the Roman stations on the eastern road.  Remnants of a 2nd century auxiliary fort survive 
for Sabus, listed as a Roman strongpoint in all three of our textual sources.151  Remains of an 
                                                          
148 Körpinik hüyük was another, nearby site of potential interest: TBM 12 D4; Mitford 2018, 193-97.  
Numismatic finds in the suggest Roman activity, including at the time of Flavian militarization, but 
current evidence struggles to confirm Körpinik hüyük as a base for Roman control.  
 
149 It.Ant. 177.1; ND Or. 38.22; Plin. HN 5.83, 6.27; Tab.Peut. 10 B2; TBM 12 D3; Mitford 2018, 193 (on 
Roman occupation of the Arapkir valley), 199-201 (on Dascusa).  For a strikingly different location of 
Dascusa well to the east of the Euphrates: Howard-Johnston 1983, 254 (and cf. Wheeler 1991, 506-507).  
Note that Tab.Peut. includes two intermediate stations between Ciaca and Dascusa; Mitford argues that 
the cartographer is mistaken, and that these sites were located on the support roads heading west from 
Melitene (Mitford 2018, 187). 
 
150 Vereuso: Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 13 C5, Mitford 2018, 217.  Zenocopi: Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 13 B4; 
Mitford 2018, 219. 
 
151 It.Ant. 209.2; ND Or. 38.3, 11; Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 12 C1; Gregory 1998, II.43-45; Mitford 2018, 
208-12.   
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aqueduct and bridge put the It.Ant.’s Teucila at modern Geruşla.152  To the west of this outpost, 
the perilous river-road rejoined the route over the Antitaurus, and proceeded north to Zimara, 
where a Roman garrison is confirmed by epigraphy and the Tab.Peut.’s icon for the site.153 
 A visual survey of Maps 4.7-9 demonstrates the Melitene-Zimara sector’s tendency to 
avoid mountains and broken terrain.  On Map 4.7, the three largest military installations in this 
region—Dascusa, Sabus, and Zimara—all sit on relatively low and level terrain.  At higher 
resolutions it becomes clear that Teucila and Zenocopi follow the same trend, finding narrow 
pockets of level ground in the midst of more rugged space.  Similarly, the course of the frontier 
road skirts rough terrain where it can: note on Map 4.7 how the road bends away from the 
riverbank between Ciaca and Körpinik hüyük, and on Maps 4.8 and 4.9 how the routes diverge 
to avoid Mt. Harmancik. 
 Statistical analysis (following the same methods as in Sector One) confirms this 
impression.  As seen on Table 4.3, the average TRI and elevation figures for Roman sites fall 
below the mean for terrain between Melitene and Zimara.  The average Roman statistics are even 
lower if we leave aside the mountainous waystations of Vereuso and Zenocopi, the only sites on 
this list without strong evidence for a longstanding military presence.  On Table 4.4, the TRI and 
elevation percentiles for Roman roads are somewhat higher, with both routes through the 
Antitaurus mountains falling above Sector Two’s averages.  Yet Roman roads pale in 
comparison to the local alternatives over Mt. Harmancik, with TRI figures in the 85th percentile 
and elevation figures in the 90th.   
                                                          
152 It.Ant. 209.1; TBM 13 D3; Mitford 2018, 234. 
 
153 It.Ant. 208.5; Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 13 B1; Mitford 2018, 240-46. 
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 On the whole, TRI and elevation data suggest that level ground and high-intensity 
warfare continued to be Rome’s priority.  Viewshed analysis for Sector Two largely supports this 
interpretation.  On Map 4.10, the frontier maintained a consistent line of surveillance along the 
Euphrates from Melitene as far as Ciaca.  While the Roman viewshed is notably patchy from 
Ciaca to the Arsanias river, large-scale assaults in this quarter were prevented by the massif west 
of the Euphrates (see Map 4.9), and the signaling tower north of Sartona could see the western 
descents from these mountains reasonably well.154  Surveillance intensifies between Dascusa and 
Ciaca, as the Romans monitored the corridor of relatively level terrain leading east down the 
Arsanias valley to Arsamosata.155  Between Ciaca and Zimara, the quality of Roman surveillance 
decreased markedly: Rome had little to fear from Parthia in this rugged stretch of the Antitaurus 
mountains, and the frontier works here seem to have made little effort either to monitor the 
Euphrates (frequently but not entirely impassable in the gorge south of Zimara), or to 
continuously survey the broken ground between the two frontier roads.156  
 As in Sector One, the layout of the Roman frontier shows some concern for broken 
ground.  The most notable example is the bifurcated frontier road north of Dascusa.  As noted, 
neither road pushes onto as high or broken ground as it might (see the local alternatives on Map 
4.7) and surveillance from Roman fortifications was unremarkable.  Yet the only plausible 
strategic purpose for the western road was to augment the Romans’ ability to fight in the 
surrounding mountains.  The route through Vereuso and Zenocopi is longer than the eastern 
                                                          
154 The frontier viewshed notably excludes the major crossing of the Euphrates used in Ottoman times by 
the Keban Ferry, approximately 10 km downstream from the Arsanias.  Mitford suggests a probable 
Roman watchtower here, but can provide no evidence and does not map the site.  Mitford 2018, 191.   
 
155 Near the site of Paetus’ defeat in 63 CE.  Tac. Ann. 15.10; TBM 2 C3; BAtlas 89 B2. 
 
156 Mitford 2018, 214-21. 
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alternative; as Table 4.4 indicates, it was only slightly less rugged and substantially higher (and 
thus more vulnerable to winter snows).  Unlike the high road through Lacotena in Sector One 
(itself substantially shorter than the riverine parallel), the Vereuso route makes less sense as a 
safeguard in case the Parthians severed the Roman front-line.  In geographic terms, the most 
likely site for a Parthian invasion was in the plains at Dascusa, where Mitford identifies only a 
single frontier road; bifurcation occurs further north, in terrain that made anti-Parthian missions 
improbable but counterinsurgency quite likely.  Even if these routes did not penetrate the worst 
of the mountains themselves, regular patrols there could divide the mountaineers and deny them 
access to surrounding valleys. 
 Once again, our emerging picture of the Roman frontier is strategically complex: the 
Romans could have multiple missions in eastern Anatolia, and could build elements of the 
frontier to suit both.  Yet, as in Sector One, the frontier works between Melitene and Zimara 
seem to have been influenced primarily by the threat of Parthia across the Euphrates, and by the 
need to control what level ground the region offered in order to succeed in this high-intensity 
struggle.  
 
SECTOR THREE: ZIMARA-NICOPOLIS-SATALA157  
 Moving north into Armenia Minor, we enter the most geographically and analytically 
complicated sector of the northeastern frontier.  In Sector Three, even more than in previous 
regions, we see evidence for the frontier’s tension between two sets of priorities: the support of 
inter-imperial warfare and the suppression of small-scale brigandage.  While sticking to low and 
                                                          
157 For Sector Three, refer to Maps 4.11-16 and Tables 4.5-7. 
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level ground remains the trend, there are signs here of compromise and Roman extension into the 
highlands.  The Roman empire made some effort to control the rugged interior of Armenia 
Minor, even if this remained a secondary mission and fell short of what was required for deep 
and detailed territorial control. 
As Map 4.15’s schematic shows in simplified form, the Armenian frontier consisted of 
four main routes (along with numerous secondary paths).  Two support roads linked Nicopolis to 
Zimara and Satala.  The frontier proper ran from Zimara to Satala in two courses: a northern 
route through Haris and Ad Dracones as well as a river-road through Suisa. 
 Let us begin with the Nicopolis support roads, easily the worst-documented components 
of the Armenian frontier.  Along with the Euphrates and the road along it, these two routes 
encompassed a vast and exceptionally rugged triangle of Armenia Minor within the Roman 
frontier zone.  From Zimara, a route ran north through Ladana: mentioned in Ptolemy but none 
of the ancient itineraries, Mitford tentatively argues that this “high, fertile plain” housed a 
Roman waystation.158  Further north, the Tab.Peut. identifies stopping points at Caleorissa 
(probably modern Babsu, which still features large amounts of reused Roman ashlar) and 
Oleoberda (in the valley of the Upper Halys, perhaps at Girigizir).159  The best contemporary 
evidence for the Zimara-Nicopolis support road is a milestone of 129 CE from Aşkar, about 10 
                                                          
158 Ptol. Geog. 5.7.2; TBM 14 B2; Mitford 2018, 283.  
  
159 Caleorissa: Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 17 B5; Mitford 2018, 285.  Oleoberda: Tab.Peut. 9 B5; TBM 17 




km southeast of Nicopolis; the route was evidently important enough to receive attention in 
connection with Hadrian’s northeastern tour.160 
 Nicopolis itself was a crucial Roman city on both cultural and logistical grounds: the 
metropolis of Armenia Minor and seat of the imperial cult, it was also the last major depot along 
the important military road running east from Ankara.161  The Tab.Peut.’s use of a fort icon, 
along with the city’s size and importance, suggest a substantial military presence.162  From 
Nicopolis, both the It.Ant. and Tab.Peut. record a second support road running east to join the 
northern frontier line at Ad Dracones; as Map 4.14 shows, it was relatively well monitored by 
Roman garrisons.  The It.Ant. includes a waystation at Olotoedariza, located on a stretch of level 
ground near the route’s midpoint.163  Defended by an ala in the Notitia Dignitatum, Olotoedariza 
may well have held a garrison as early as the 1st century CE, guarding the vital link between 
Nicopolis and the forward edge of the Armenian frontier.164 
 About 10 km past Olotoedariza, the Nicopolis-Satala support road split in two to trace 
relatively level ridge-lines running above a precipitous river valley.165  The southern branch was 
met by the main frontier roads running north across the Antitaurus mountains from the 
Euphrates.  Coming together into a single route just before Ad Dracones, the roads proceeded 
                                                          
160 Mitford 2018, 68-70, 286, 526 (Cf. CIL III.12154). Alternately named Akşar in TBM 17.   
     
161 TBM 17 B2; Mitford 2018, 288-93.  Cf. Strabo, 12.3.28.    
 
162 Tab.Peut. 9 A5. 
 
163 It.Ant. 207.6; TBM 18 C2; Mitford 2018, 571. 
 
164 ND Or. 38.17; Mitford 2018, 295 argues to the contrary, that this site “is too far in rear of the frontier 
to have held a garrison.”  
 
165 TBM 18, 19. 
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east to Satala, completing the northern side of the Armenian triangle.  For much of its course, the 
road hugged the level banks of the Batahu river, a southern tributary of the Lycus.  Mitford 
places four Roman stations along this road, the last of Peutinger’s seven between Zimara and 
Satala.166  Only Ad Dracones can be securely located; the waystations of Cunissa, Haza, and 
Ziziola are based primarily on the distances recorded in the Tab.Peut. (and, in the case of Haza, 
the It.Ant.).167 
 Having surveyed the supply roads linking Nicopolis with Zimara and Satala, let us turn to 
the third and longest side of the Armenian triangle: the It.Ant.’s route along the Euphrates itself.  
From Zimara, the road ran northeast to Analiba, situated in the plains at the mouth of the 
Kuraçay river.168  An auxiliary garrison was probably based here, guarding the nearby crossing 
of the Euphrates at modern İliç (though the crossing itself notably falls outside the fort’s 
viewshed).169  The road proceeded northeast, well above the Euphrates gorge and past the 
waystation of Sinervas (hesitantly associated with the archaeological remains of modern İhtik) 
before descending to leveler ground at the mouth of the Kömür river, the probable location of the 
It.Ant.’s Carsaga.170  From Carsaga, the road clung tightly to the Euphrates riverbank.  A Roman 
                                                          
166 Tab.Peut. 9 A5, 10 A1, 10 B1. 
 
167 Ad Dracones: Tab.Peut. 10 B1 (note the use of a fort icon); TBM 19 E2; Mitford 2018, 322-25. 
Cunissa: Tab.Peut. 10 A1; TBM 20 C2; Mitford 2018, 325-26. Haza: It.Ant. 207.8; Tab.Peut. 10 A1 
Hassis; TBM 20 D2; Mitford 2018, 326. Ziziola: Tab.Peut. 9 A5; TBM 20 D2; Mitford 2018, 326. 
 
168 It.Ant. 208.4; Ptol. 5.7.4; TBM 14 C3; Mitford 2018, 256-58.  Note that Analiba is included in 
Tab.Peut. 10 B1, which mistakenly places it on the support road between Zimara and Nicopolis. 
 
169 Analiba was garrisoned by Coh. IV Raetorum in the ND.  The same unit appears in Arrian’s army 
against the Alani, implying a long and stable deployment in Cappadocia.  Arr. Ektax. 1; ND Or. 38.28. 
 
170 Sinervas: It.Ant. 208.3; TBM 14 E2; Mitford 2018, 261-62.  Perhaps cf. Ptol. Geog. 5.7.2 (Sinibra); 
Strabo, 12.3.28 (Sinoria).  Carsaga: It.Ant. 208.2; TBM 15 B2; Mitford 2018, 264. Note to the contrary, 
BAtlas 89 A1.   
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garrison of Arauraca probably took advantage of the level ground near the modern village of 
Ardosh; soldiers certainly held the fort of Suisa in the middle of the broad Erzincan plain, where 
Mitford observed archaeological remains in 2003.171  The road turned north from Suisa, crossing 
the mountains through a pass closed by winter snow, before descending to Satala.172 
 Marking the northeast corner of the Armenian triangle, Satala was a major Roman 
military base by 71 CE.173  A fort, surrounded in the second century by a thriving city, housed 
Cappadocia’s northern legion (XVI Flavia Firma before Trajan’s Parthian War, XV Apollinaris 
thereafter).174  Like most Roman bases in the region, Satala fell on relatively level and quite 
fertile ground; it could also supplement its supplies from the nearby Lycus valley.175  Though 
capable of dispatching troops to the rear to secure the Armenian triangle, the positioning of 
Satala suggests that its primary target was the Parthians to the east.  The city sat at the end of the 
primary route against Artaxata, the Armenian capital for much of the Romano-Parthian conflict, 
and the Roman base served as the main mustering ground for Trajan’s invasion of Armenia 
Major and later wars under Lucius Verus.176   
                                                          
171 Arauraca: It.Ant. 208.1; ND Or. 38.29 (cf. Arr. Ektax. 3, 18); TBM 15 D2 Mitford 2018, 267-69.  
Suisa: It.Ant. 207.12; ND Or. 38.23 (cf. Arr. Ektax. 8) TBM 20 D5; Mitford 2018, 271-74. See also 
French 1983, 85, who locates Suisa further north.  
 
172 Mitford 2018, 280. 
 
173 It.Ant. 207.9; ND. Or. 38.13; Suet., Vesp. 8; Tab.Peut. 9 A5; TBM 21 C5; Mitford 2018, 327-47. 
 
174 Keppie 1986, 421 (note the debate on the exact date of Leg. XVI’s arrival from Antioch); Mitford 
2018, 332-33 (cf. Inscriptions 64-66, 68).  For the archaeology of Satala: Lightfoot 1998. 
 
175 Mitford 2018, 346. 
 
176 Dio Cass. 68.19.2; Lightfoot 1990, 115-18; Mitford 2018, 60-66, 332.  There is no indication that the 
Romans ever constructed an official road east of Satala, but the route was certainly well known to them: 
see Tab.Peut. 9 A5 – 10 A4; Mitford 2018, 327-30.   
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 Finally, we come to the last element of the Roman frontier in Armenia Minor, the roads 
leading north from the Euphrates through Haris and on to Ad Dracones.177  Though the Tab.Peut. 
gives only a single route, three roads provide direct links between Zimara and Haris: labeled 
(from west to east) A, B, and C by Mitford, the first turns north from the river-road between 
Zimara and Analiba, the second between Analiba and Sinervas, and the third at Carsaga and the 
Kömür river.178  Mitford identifies Road A as the primary frontier route, with B and C receiving 
substantially less Roman attention.179 
 Peutinger records three waystations guarding these lateral routes across the Armenian 
triangle, all on Road A.  Mitford’s positioning of Bubalia on the upper Kuruçay river is 
extremely tentative; his identification of Elegarsina is somewhat more secure, but still 
uncertain.180  However, we may confidently locate Haris, the third station, at modern Melikşerif; 
19th and 20th century scholars record abundant evidence, now lost, for the presence of a fort.181  
Mitford also locates a fort at modern Çengerli, slightly west of Road C.  Though it is not 
mentioned in the itineraries, there are archaeological and epigraphic finds to indicate that this 
was the base of a cohort during the second century CE.182 
                                                          
177 Mitford 2018, 251-54. 
 
178 Tab.Peut. 10 B1. 
 
179 Mitford 2018, 300-18. 
 
180 Bubalia: Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 14 B2; Mitford 2018, 303. Elegarsina: Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 18 C5; 
Mitford 2018, 305.  
 
181 Tab.Peut. 10 B1; TBM 19 B2; Mitford 2018, 318.  Cf. Boré 1840, 369; Cumont and Cumont 1906, 
326-30.  In the case of Haris, and this case alone, I have listed as certain a site which appears as uncertain 
in the TBM maps.  The evidence presented in Mitford’s text is sufficient, in my view, to fully justify the 
placement of Haris at Melikşerif. 
 
182 TBM 19 B3; Mitford 2018, 315-18 and Inscription 54. 
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 To a considerable extent, our now familiar tools of TRI and elevation analysis reveal a 
similarly familiar pattern in this sector’s geospatial organization (even if the tentative positioning 
of numerous Roman installations cautions against overly granular analysis).  On Map 4.11, sites 
such as Analiba, Carsaga, Haris, and Cunissa seem to seek out leveler terrain in the midst of the 
mountains.  The data generalization tools in Map 4.12 suggest that this was a broader pattern, 
with almost all Roman forts and stations sitting on or near zones of 0-400 m TRI.  When we 
bring in the elevation data of Map 4.13, we may further argue that the Romans refused in almost 
all cases to build their centers of force-projection and control at extreme altitudes; only Ad 
Dracones is in the mountains proper.  Imperial roads, more securely located in general than 
Roman forts and waystations, similarly preferred lower ground, as seen on Map 4.13 (albeit with 
some exceptions discussed below).  Furthermore, while the visual chaos of Map 4.11’s raw TRI 
data makes it difficult to discern patterns in the ruggedness of imperial routes, the simplified 
Map 4.12 reveals how Roman engineers tended to work their way over the least rugged ground 
available: note especially the courses of the lateral roads as they wound wind north from the 
Euphrates to Haris, and the route of the northern support road between Olotoedariza and Ad 
Dracones. 
 As seen on Tables 4.5 and 4.6, statistical analysis broadly confirms our visual evidence, 
with aggregated statistics dispelling concerns over any individual site.  Percentile ranks for 
Roman installations fall in the low-20s for TRI and the low-30s for elevation.  Only Haris and 
Elegarsina clear the regional average for ruggedness; only Ad Dracones lies substantially above 
the mean for elevation (though a number of other sites score in the 50-60th percentile).  Roman 
roads are only slightly higher and more rugged: TRI averages fall at the 31st and 33rd percentile 
(for 1 km and 200 m, respectively), with elevation scores averaging to the 40th percentile.  Only 
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Road B is more rugged than the regional mean, and only it and the road from Ad Dracones to 
Satala possessed above-average elevation. 
 By and large, our TRI and elevation data suggests that the Roman frontier in Sector Three 
was concerned primarily with low and level areas, the types of space that matched both the 
practical requirements and Roman preconceptions of large-scale warfare.  To an extent, 
viewshed analysis supports this picture, suggesting the continued importance of the Parthians in 
this theater.  Surveillance was particularly good around Satala, the most likely mustering ground 
for Roman invasions into Parthia and the primary redoubt against Parthian attacks coming the 
other direction.  By the same token, the Roman viewshed is patchier in areas where large-scale 
campaigning was less likely.  Surveillance of the Euphrates between Analiba and the plain below 
Suisa was inconsistent; the practically impenetrable Capotes mountains forestalled any major 
incursion here.183  The Romans were content to monitor a couple major crossings of the 
Euphrates near Analiba and Carsaga, and to leave small-scale traffic across the remainder of this 
frontier unmonitored by any permanent military architecture.184 
 However, inconsistencies in the Roman road-courses spoil a perfect pattern of broken-
ground avoidance.  For instance, we may wonder why the long road from Nicopolis to Satala, the 
northern side of the Armenian triangle, takes the route it does instead of following a lower and 
                                                          
183 Mitford 2018, 271 n. 16.  The Suisa plain itself is notably invisible to Roman positions; perhaps the 
accessibility of this plain to cavalry patrols rendered permanent watch-posts unnecessary. 
 
184 Patrols on land and the river itself would have done something to address these gaps. The Euphrates is 
mostly navigable downstream between Suisa (mod. Erzincan) and the crossing at İliç, though gorges 




sometimes leveler path along the Lycus.185  We may ask as well why the road from Suisa to 
Satala forced its way over the heights between Mt. Ak and Mt. Aga, especially because this route 
was impassable during the winter.186  Could it not instead have followed a gentler path to the 
west, avoiding the worst of the mountains to meet the northern frontier road at Haza?  Finally, 
why did the Romans need the mountain roads outlined in the Tab.Peut. at all?  Crossing the 
rugged center of the Zimara-Nicopolis-Satala triangle, this road was hardly shorter or easier than 
the one along the Euphrates, yet evidently received substantial imperial attention and investment 
despite traversing mountainous ground. 
 As shown in Map 4.16, the GIS technique of Least-Cost Path analysis (LCP) confirms 
that the imperial frontier roads in Armenia Minor were more rugged in places than necessary.  
Used in the previous chapter to examine Cestius Gallus’ march through Beth Horon to 
Jerusalem, LCP constructs the least rugged route possible over a given landscape (i.e. the route 
with the lowest cumulative TRI score).  LCP routes were calculated for five pairs of sites, shown 
in the key to Map 4.16.187  As this map shows, only parts of the river-road east of Carsaga and 
the road from Suisa to Satala follow the least rugged routes possible.  The Zimara-Nicopolis-
Satala triangle tended to “suck-in” the Roman roads towards its mountainous center.  The 
Zimara-Nicopolis road runs to the east of the LCP route, closer to the foothills of Mt. Kizil.  The 
western half of the Zimara-Suisa route runs miles north of the LCP route along the Euphrates, 
                                                          
185 BAtlas 87 identifies a potential minor road along the Lycus through Arauraca, and both Naval 
Intelligence 1942, vol. 2 fig. 113 and imagery from OpenStreetMap suggests the route would have been 
practicable, though it may have been vulnerable to seasonal flooding.  Mitford’s maps give no indication 
of such a route beyond the potential Ottoman road in TBM 17 A1-C1, and their coverage of the Lycus 
valley is minimal. 
 
186 Mitford 2018, 280. 
 
187 While LCP routes were calculated in reference to the raw TRI data shown on Map 4.11, Map 4.16 uses 
an elevation base-map for ease of viewing. 
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approaching the southern slopes of Mt. Vank.  The northern side of the Armenian triangle runs 
far south of the course predicted by LCP, choosing the high and rugged path through Ad 
Dracones instead of the somewhat gentler valley of the Lycus river (where the Barrington Atlas 
suggests a minor Roman route).   
 Perhaps most notably, LCP analysis reveals how sharply the direct frontier road between 
Zimara and Nicopolis breaks from the Romans’ preference for lowland construction.  In terms of 
TRI, the most efficient route from Zimara to Nicopolis (the dashed red line on Map 4.16) is 
identical for most of its course with the Euphrates road to Suisa.  This predicted route turns due 
north shortly before Suisa, passing west of Mt. Ak towards Haza, and then turning east to join 
the final segment of the existing road along the Batahu river.  The Roman roads which ran north 
from the Euphrates to Haris were a far more rugged choice.  Compare the TRI statistics for 
actual Roman roads on Table 4.6 with the figures for LCP routes on Table 4.7.  Rome’s roads 
through the center of the Armenian triangle had TRI scores in the 33rd to 66th percentile (for 
Roads A and C, and Road B, respectively), far higher than the 15th percentile rank they could 
have achieved had they followed the easiest possible path. 
 The divergence of several Roman roads from their “ideal” LCP paths indicates the 
presence in Sector Three of competing military priorities, and a degree of imperial interest in 
pacifying Armenia Minor’s mountainous interior.  In the face of easier alternatives, the Romans 
extended frontier infrastructure up-country, sometimes onto severely rugged terrain: the roads 
through Haris and Ad Dracones presented substantial engineering and operational challenges that 
the empire might simply have avoided.  Map 4.14 suggests that these choices had strategic 
benefits for Roman counterinsurgency and policing.  For “internal space” behind an imperial 
border, the Zimara-Nicopolis-Satala triangle is quite well surveilled.  No foreign threat required 
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detailed observation of the Nicopolis-Satala support road, or the surveillance of the highlands 
south of Ad Dracones: the quality of the Roman viewshed in these areas suggests Roman 
attention to the issues of local control in rugged space.  The very existence of the lateral roads 
through Haris suggests a similar concern with monitoring and interrupting movement across the 
rugged interior. 
 We should not overstate the shift in the frontier’s mission and geographic disposition in 
Sector Three.  Though higher than the most efficient alternatives, imperial roads through the 
interior were predominantly lower and leveler than the regional average.188  Moreover, while 
throwing roads across the center of the Armenian triangle was likely a step towards local control, 
large areas of rugged and unmonitored space remained, and many inhabitants of these regions 
would have lived their lives at a safe distance from Roman military force.  Still, a geospatial 
analysis of the frontier between Zimara and Satala stresses the strategic contingency of Roman 
development and the empire’s zero-sum balancing act between missions of large-scale warfare in 
the plains and small-scale policing in the mountains, a balance that began to shift as the frontier 





                                                          




SECTOR FOUR: SATALA TO TRAPEZUS189 
 We come now to the final segment of the Romans’ northeastern frontier, running from 
Satala to Trapezus on the Black Sea coast.190  While there is evidence here for familiar trends, 
the empire appears to have struck a different balance in its Pontic deployment.  In Sector Four, 
the Romans took unusually direct steps to control the mountains and their inhabitants, enhancing 
their ability to project military force by building roads and waystations in the highlands. 
 From Satala, the frontier road descended through the northern foothills of the Antitaurus 
to cross the Lycus river.  The Roman station of Domana, recorded in both the It.Ant. and 
Tab.Peut., lay on the northern edge of this valley; garrisoned in the ND, it probably held at least 
a small force in the first and second centuries.191  From Domana, the frontier road curved around 
the western slopes of Mt. Hurlar, encountering substantially broken ground even as it avoided the 
mountain’s peak.  The road split in two at the Kanis river.  One path traced low river-valleys, 
following the Kanis downstream before turning northeast towards Trapezus.  The other took a 
higher and more direct route, running almost due north over the worst of the Pontic heights.   
 The It.Ant. records the stations of the longer, western route.  Two depots, Sedisca and 
Thia, lay on the Kanis river.  While relatively low (see Map 4.19), Map 4.17 indicates that even 
in this narrow valley the terrain was quite rugged.192  Although Mitford’s placement of both 
                                                          
189 For Sector Four, refer to Maps 4.17-20, and Tables 4.8-9. 
 
190 For the purposes of this chapter, I leave aside the Roman fortifications running east from Satala along 
the Black Sea as far as the Caucasus, maritime bases with a fundamentally different strategic purpose 
from the inland forts to the south. 
 
191 It.Ant. 217.3; ND Or. 38.4, 12; Tab.Peut. 9 A5; TBM 21 C3; Mitford 2018, 353-54.  
 




Sedisca and Thia are reasonably secure, neither shows signs of a permanent military presence.  
From the Kanis, the Roman road climbed through the Zigana pass, controlled in all likelihood by 
a cohort, before following the Pyxites river downstream.193 
 The eastern route is depicted in the Tab.Peut., though its earliest section is difficult to pin 
down: of the three roads which led north from the Kanis, Mitford argues that the westernmost 
saw the most Roman use.194  However, by the time the roads merge south of Medocia, the 
frontier route is clear enough, and truly severe.195  The Peutinger Map records high-altitude 
waystations at Patara and Frigidarium, both probably on the western slopes of Mt. Çakirgöl.196  
The road crested the Pontic range just north of Pylae, where Xenophon’s men caught their first 
sight of the sea.197  A difficult “shortcut,” bearing no signs of Roman improvement, ran west 
from Pylae to the Zigana pass, while the frontier road continued down a ridgeline, passing 
through a probable waystation at Gizenenica before rejoining the western route at modern Maçka 
(the Tab.Peut.’s Magnana, the It.Ant.’s Ad Vicensimum).198  The reunified frontier road followed 
the Pyxites river to the sea, terminating at the major commercial and naval port of Trapezus.199 
                                                          
193 It.Ant. 216.6; ND Or. 38.37; TBM 22 B2; Mitford 2018, 362-65. 
 
194 Mitford 2018, 355-56.  The position of Solonenica is especially uncertain; this is perhaps Tab.Peut.’s 
an alternate name for It.Ant.’s Sedisca.  Tab.Peut. 9 A4; TBM 22 E4; Mitford 2018, 355-56. 
 
195 Tab.Peut. 9 A4, TBM 22 E3; Mitford 2018, 368. 
 
196 Patara: Tab.Peut. 9 A4, TBM 22 E3; Mitford 2018, 370. Frigidarium: Tab.Peut. 9 A3, TBM 22 D2; 
Mitford 2018, 370-71.   
 
197 Tab.Peut. 9 A3; Xen. Anab. 4.7.19-27; TBM 22 D2; Mitford 2018, 373-76.    
 
198 Gizenenica: Tab.Peut. 9 A3; TBM 23 C5; Mitford 2018, 379.  Ad Vicensimun/Magnana: It.Ant. 216.5; 
Tab.Peut. 9 A3; TBM 23 C4; Mitford 2018, 381.  Mitford’s fortlet at Hortokop (TBM 23 C4) is a later 
construction: Mitford 2018, 379. 
 
199 Tab.Peut. 9 A2; TBM 23 D1; Mitford 2018, 383-404.  Trapezus is marked as a fortress on Maps 10-12 
due to the presence of the sizeable Classis Pontica (see Wheeler 2012); it did not hold a legion. 
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 As I have said, there are numerous signs that the Romans stuck to their general principles 
of avoiding high and rugged ground in constructing this final sector of the frontier.  As Map 4.19 
shows, every element in this region except the high road through Pylae adopted low-elevation 
routes where it could.  The western road through the Pontic mountains was particularly precise: 
running mostly through the valleys of the Kanis and Pyxites rivers, it entered the mountains as 
briefly as possible through the Zigana Pass.  While the very high TRI figures for the Pontic 
region make Maps 4.17 and 4.18 more difficult to read, we can still see in places the Roman 
preference for level ground.  Note the positioning of Thia in a rare pocket of 200-400 m TRI on 
Map 4.18, and on Map 4.17 how the frontier routes followed thin corridors of relatively smooth 
ground north of Domana, along the Kanis river, and on the Pyxites south of Ad Vicensimum. 
 Statistical profiling for Roman roads and waystations shows similar results.  As Table 4.8 
shows, the low road through the mountains has very low elevation figures compared to the 
regional average.  Its TRI scores were relatively low as well, especially for a 200 m radius.200  
Rome’s likely centers of military control along this route have similarly low TRI and elevation 
statistics; Table 4.9’s average percentile ranks for these sites (Sedisca, Thia, Zigana, and Ad 
Vicensimum/Magnana) are well below Sector Four’s random sample. 
 That said, the direct route running through Pylae over the Pontic range marks a striking 
divergence from typical Roman behavior on the northeastern frontier.  The southern portion of 
this road (between the Kanis river and Frigidarium) appears on Maps 4.17 and 4.18 to have been 
laid out with no reference to the ruggedness of the terrain.  This is especially true if Mitford is 
correct that the western route through Sedisca was the main Roman road, rather than the gentler, 
                                                          
200 The roads from Satala to the Kanis river and from Ad Vicensimum to Trapezus similarly fall well 
below the regional mean in TRI and elevation. 
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eastern path through Solonenica.201  Portions of the high frontier road line have local TRI scores 
approaching a staggering 900 m, and as Map 4.19 shows, the Roman route positively seemed to 
seek altitude, rather than avoiding it.  Between Medocia and Frigidarium, it is hundreds of meters 
higher than necessary up the slopes of Mt. Çakirgöl.202  Table 4.9’s statistical profile for the high 
road itself is perhaps less impressive than we might expect, though it clears the regional mean in 
all categories.  The stations along this road, however, were on particularly severe terrain.  As 
seen on Table 4.8, sites on the Pylae route had percentile scores in the low-60s for TRI, and in 
the high-60s for elevation.  Along the bitterest heights of the frontier road, Medocia, Patara, 
Frigidarium, and Pylae all exceed the 90th percentile for elevation. 
 Further evidence for imperial willingness to cut through mountainous territory comes 
from the tantalizingly uncertain Roman fort at Mochora.  Though unmentioned by the itineraries, 
Mochora held a garrison at the time of the Notitia Dignitatum; Mitford confidently places it at 
the modern village of Mollaali (where the 1 km TRI mean reaches the 81st percentile).203  If 
Mochora had a Roman detachment in the 1st and 2nd centuries, it would be an ideal base from 
which to secure the otherwise unguarded pocket between the two Pontic frontier roads.  As the 
viewshed data on Map 4.20 shows, a base in Mochora could monitor and interdict movement 
along the tracks nearby (as in the Taurus mountains, paths far higher and more rugged than the 
official Roman roads).  In isolation, restive mountaineers in this area could prey on the major 
frontier arteries to the east and west, protected by the landscape from Roman retribution.  A 
                                                          
201 Mitford 2018, 355-56. 
 
202 The road north of Pylae similarly eschews the Larhan river valley, though the higher ridge-line it 
follows is less rugged than the valley floor (which was choked by vegetation, according to Mitford 2018, 
371. 
 
203 ND Or. 38.38; TBM 22 D3; Mitford 2018 371-73. 
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Roman military presence at Mochora would thus represent a clear and direct use of frontier 
infrastructure to combat highland insurgency, denying the advantages of broken ground to 
potential rebels.  
 When combined with evidence for frontier construction on unusually high and rugged 
ground, Map 4.20’s viewshed information suggests Sector Four’s unusually intense focus on 
low-intensity threats.  In the southern half of this sector, Parthian warfare can explain the intense 
surveillance along the frontier between Satala and Domana, where the Roman viewshed 
projected east into the valley (clearly visible on Map 4.17) that provided the easiest route to and 
from Persia.204  High-intensity conflict is less able to justify the quality of Rome’s view west 
down the Lycus, visible from the Roman watchtowers north of Satala.205  In the Pontic 
mountains themselves, the Parthian menace had no bearing on the almost unbroken line of 
surveillance running north from Solonenica to Ad Vicensimum.  This area was too rugged for 
large-scale military activity, and north of the Arsacid area of influence—to the east were the 
Heniochi, mountaineers with a tradition of hostility to Roman rule.206  With its clear field of 
vision several kilometers in advance of an exceptionally high ridge-road (which allowed easier 
movement of patrols from well-distributed waystations), the Roman frontier here reflects a 
primary mission of defense against low-intensity raiding.   
                                                          
204 This sector of the frontier would serve as the launching point for Trajan’s invasion of Armenia and 
Arrian’s attack on the Alani, and was the first to fall to Sapor’s invasion in 256 CE.  Mitford 2018, 232-
33. 
 
205 The western extent of this viewshed, some 40 km down the river, certainly exaggerates the capacity of 
human vision from these watchtowers. 
 
206 Dio Cass. 68.19; Strabo, 11.12-13; BAtlas 87 F4 Heniochoi; Mitford 2018, 66.   
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In the Pontic mountains, Rome bracketed a border-zone between the eastern ridge-road 
and the lower, western alternative through the Zigana Pass.  The empire potentially controlled 
movement within this zone with a mountainous fort at Mochora, and appears to have carefully 
monitored entry into this zone from the east by potentially hostile migrants and raiders.  The 
design of the Roman frontier in this area reflects an attempt, unprecedented in scale on the 
northeastern frontier, to control rugged space and forestall low-intensity threats.  While elements 
of this frontier stick to lower and leveler terrain (and we have seen hints of a similar mission to 
the south, especially in the design of Sector Three), to a significant extent the frontier in Sector 
Four was designed to control the Pontic highlands and their inhabitants, not simply to allow 
Roman forces to march south from Trapezus towards more pressing, high-intensity battlefronts.  
Expanding tremendous energy and engineering ingenuity to build and maintain military 
infrastructure over rugged terrain, the Romans augmented their ability to inflict and threaten 
violence in the Pontic mountains.        
That said, our data from Sector Four should not overshadow the general trends in Roman 
frontier construction in the northeast.  When set against a digital model of the physical 
environment, Mitford’s reconstruction of the Roman frontier shows a clear (if not unvaried) 
preference for low and level ground.  By way of conclusion, the following section sets the layout 
and strategic purpose(s) of the northeastern frontier within the broader historiography on Roman 
strategy and defense, before examining the costs of this frontier’s design for imperial control and 





Section Three: The Purpose of the Northeastern Frontier 
 
 Since Edward Luttwak’s Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire (1976), numerous scholars 
have advanced broad theories on the purpose of Roman frontier systems.  Perhaps the greatest 
shortcoming of Mitford’s otherwise remarkable East of Asia Minor is his general avoidance of 
such synthetic debates.207  While the literature on this topic is too voluminous to review in full, it 
is productive to compare the geospatial preferences of the northeastern frontier with some 
leading interpretations of Roman military borders and the strategic intent of their designers, 
demonstrating how a GIS approach offers new insight into long-standing debates.208 
 To the limited extent that he suggests the broader purposes of the northeastern frontier, 
Mitford’s views are closest to Luttwak’s model of high-imperial military policy.  In general, 
Mitford envisions a Roman frontier in Anatolia similar to the northern systems of fortification 
that formed the basis for Luttwak’s theories.209  Roman roads and fortifications were rationally 
distributed, forward-looking, and highly ambitious: both against Parthians and smaller-scale 
opponents, this frontier was designed to mobilize and concentrate force against any foreign 
incursion.210 
 Luttwak faced a legion of challengers, especially on the argument that the Romans 
possessed something akin to modern “grand strategy.”211  A radically different vision of frontier 
                                                          
207 Mitchell 2019. 
 
208 For brief histories of frontier studies, see Birley 2002. 
 
209 Mitchell 2019.   
 
210 For a similar and more recent argument: Breeze and Jilek 2005. 
 
211 Mann 1979; Millar 1982.  The best survey of this debate is Wheeler 1993a.  
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policy (or lack thereof) emerged in Benjamin Isaac’s studies of the eastern (and especially 
Arabian) frontiers.212  For Isaac, imperial frontiers were most concerned with internal control and 
the pacification of nominally “Roman” territory; their garrisons were armies of occupation more 
than defense.213  To the extent that Roman troops in the East looked forward beyond the frontier, 
it was for offensive warfare against the Parthians, rather than “preclusive defense” against a 
variety of foreign opponents.214 
 Isaac’s views drew critique in the early 1990s from Everett Wheeler, who objected both 
to Isaac’s general denial of Roman strategic thought and to his specific interpretation of the 
eastern frontiers.215  While not endorsing Luttwak’s overly schematic vision of Roman policy, 
Wheeler advances a moderate position that the Romans carried out complex and rational 
strategic planning, even if they lacked the bureaucratic and rhetorical forms that characterize 
modern grand strategy.216  He sees the eastern frontier, particularly the segment which along the 
Euphrates facing Parthia, as a fundamentally defensive system designed to repulse Parthian and 
Persian incursions (in later work, Wheeler suggests that the bulk of the Roman frontier postdates 
the Sassanid revival).217  While its garrison may also have served to guarantee internal control 
                                                          
212 Isaac 1990. 
 
213 Isaac 1990, 54-160. 
 
214 Isaac 1990, 19-53. Cf. Whittaker 2000, passim and especially 310.   
 
215 Wheeler 1993a and 1993b. 
 
216 This perspective is at least partially acceded to in Whittaker 2000. 
 
217 Wheeler 1993a, 35-36.  For the argument on dating the frontier, see Wheeler 2017. 
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over provincial territory, this “open frontier” made little effort to secure anything but the most 
strategically critical crossing points into Parthia and Armenia.218   
 While admittedly leaving aside other work (most notably the archaeologically focused 
studies of the Limeskongress, and Whittaker’s view of borders as zones of cultural and economic 
exchange), let us take these three perspectives as the major “camps” on the military purpose of 
imperial frontiers.219  Which of these three—Luttwak’s system of “preclusive defense” against 
all challengers, Wheeler’s more limited notion of carefully planned anti-Parthian defense, and 
Isaac’s vision of borderland occupation and offensive belligerence into Parthian territory—best 
fits our geographic reconstruction of the northeastern frontier? 
 Let us start with the question of Roman strategy itself.  While it is not my intention in this 
chapter to enter the semantic fray of the grand strategy debate, the consistent relationship in our 
data between Rome’s northeastern frontier and the Anatolian landscape suggests a high degree of 
geographic knowledge and rational planning.  We need not adopt Luttwak’s sometimes 
anachronistic views of “scientific frontiers” and centralized doctrine in order to concede that 
Roman decision-makers in the northeast operated within a shared mental framework concerning 
their broader strategic goals and the impact of broken ground on military operations.  Despite 
arguments from Isaac (as well as Mann and Millar), the frontier’s consistent (though not 
absolute) avoidance of rugged and elevated terrain speaks to a Roman modus operandi in 
                                                          
218 Wheeler 2007. 
 




mountainous country.220  When it comes to the existence of Roman strategy in the Anatolian 
borderlands, my GIS analysis best supports Wheeler’s arguments. 
 When it comes to the purpose of this strategy, and the fundamental nature of the Roman 
mission in the northeast, my findings suggest a new balance between the positions of Luttwak, 
Isaac, and Wheeler.  As I have argued, the geographic disposition of the frontier suggests that its 
primary mission in most places was large-scale Parthian warfare: the frontier system was 
designed to monitor and control the low and level space which both tactical consideration and 
cultural predilection made suitable for high-intensity campaigning and pitched battle.  The 
northeastern frontier’s Parthian priorities match elements of both Isaac and Wheeler, who 
respectively emphasize the Roman garrison’s utility in either offensive or defensive warfare.  A 
GIS approach cannot ultimately indicate whether the frontier was an offensive staging ground or 
defensive line.  Sitting astride the major east-west routes across Anatolia and the Euphrates, 
Roman garrisons were just as capable of projecting force forward into Parthia as they were of 
receiving invaders coming from the other direction.  Moreover, despite its problems as a general 
rule for frontier deployment, Luttwak’s “preclusive defense” correctly identifies Rome’s 
preference for interdicting incoming threats on the far side of the frontier, relying on a tactical 
offensive for strategic defense.  Regardless, geospatial modeling reveals important information 
about Roman priorities in the northeast: much like the literary sources in this chapter’s opening 
section, imperial decision-makers saw Parthia as their greatest threat, and structured much of the 
frontier based on the strategic considerations of large-scale warfare. 
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 Conversely, the general geospatial patterns in Rome’s northeast frontier caution against 
overextending Isaac’s view of garrisons as forces of occupation and local control.  There are 
certainly places where the geography of the Roman frontier supported such a mission, most 
notably the roads through Haris and Ad Dracones in Sector Three.  Yet direct approaches to 
broken ground and its inherent problems of banditry and rebellion are the exception, not the rule.  
Moreover, while it is certainly true that Roman units positioned for a Parthian war could be 
redeployed for counterinsurgency and policing behind the frontier line, the lack of forts, 
waystations, and (most importantly) roads would have made this a more difficult mission.  
Despite Isaac’s refusal to accept the deployment of Roman troops as evidence for specific 
missions, we can and should recognize that the geography of the frontier and its infrastructure 
provides crucial evidence for the empire’s military intentions and concerns.221  As Isaac himself 
argues in reference to the Lebanon mountains, “mountainous territory inhabited by accomplished 
guerrilla fighters…can be permanently occupied only by an army which is constantly prepared to 
interfere, regularly patrols the countryside, visits every village, and protects its own 
communications.  Only a permanent presence in the area, not a passing army can effectively 
control such brigandage."222  Simply put, our available evidence suggests that the Roman frontier 
in Commagene, Cappadocia, and Armenia Minor was not designed to facilitate this sort of 
detailed counterinsurgency. 
 Similarly, a GIS approach argues against Luttwak’s vision of an even-handed, defensive 
frontier aimed at controlling movement across a boundary line.  Apart from the exceptional 
system of monitoring and control in the Pontic mountains, the Roman frontier was not well 
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222 Isaac 1990, 61. 
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surveilled in the rugged areas where Parthian conflict was unlikely.  While we need not belabor 
the point against Luttwak, critiqued for decades for his overly schematic approach, it is worth 
noting that, despite its provenance in East of Asia Minor, our data does not always support 
Mitford’s own elusive and understated conception of the frontier’s purpose.  The Romans did not 
deploy their considerable resources to secure an unbroken line of demarcation against territories 
to the east; to the extent they conceived of such a mission, it took low priority in the face of 
Parthian threats.      
By way of conclusion, let us turn from the historiographic implications of the northeast 
frontier and its missions to ask what costs the empire bore for its calculated neglect of low-
intensity warfare in eastern Anatolia.  It is impossible, especially in the absence of detailed 
survey archaeology, to fully reconstruct the economic and demographic patterns of this region in 
antiquity.  However, GIS analysis suggests that the layout of the Roman frontier relinquished 
control over large areas of populated and productive territory.223 
While broken ground imposed quite stringent restrictions on military activity, its impact 
on economic productivity was more gentle. 224  Civilians could survive and even thrive in 
landscapes too rugged and elevated for easy military access.  Consider Maps 4.21 and 4.22, 
which use the slope of the ground to estimate its long-term suitability for agriculture and 
pasturage.  According to agricultural scientists at the University of Kentucky, farming can be 
sustainably practiced at slopes up to 20° (with appropriate measures to manage erosion), while 
                                                          
223 Cf. Shaw 1986, 71 on the relative prosperity and high population of the Taurus mountains.  
 
224 Note especially Leveau 1977, and cf. Shaw 1986, 79. 
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slopes of up to 30° can support grazing.225  Maps 4.23 and 4.24 give a different form of proxy 
data for agricultural suitability, depicting the modern vegetation of Eastern Turkey; areas of 
cropland would likely have been most favorable for ancient farmers, while grassland and 
shrubland would have supported herders.226 
To be sure, neither set of maps is an unproblematic reflection of economic activity in the 
ancient world.  Maps 4.21 and 4.22 leave aside variables such as hydrology and soil 
composition, all of which are crucial to productive agriculture.  Maps 4.23 and 4.24 raise a 
familiar problem of historical GIS: the vegetation patterns of Anatolia have changed since 
antiquity (though limited industrial development in the mountains reduces alterations to the 
environment from human activity).  However, as rough metrics of the ancient terrain’s suitability 
for sustainable civilian settlement, these maps suggest widespread habitation and economic 
productivity in the mountains of the northeast.  Life on such terrain could hardly have been 
comfortable, but our data indicates that through a combination of small-scale agriculture, 
herding, and banditry, it was quite possible.227 
As a result, the configuration of Rome’s military frontier in the northeast was poorly 
matched to the economic and demographic landscape in which it sat.  To return to the theoretical 
language of John Landers The Field and the Forge, even in the mountains of eastern Anatolia (as 
in much of the pre-industrial world) civilian society was organized around extensive space, with 
                                                          
225 While there is no direct calculation to convert slope to TRI, in our data-set a grid square with a slope 
of 30° would likely have a TRI above 400 m. 
 
226 From the European Space Agency’s GlobCover 2009 dataset: 
<http://due.esrin.esa.int/page_globcover.php> 
 
227 Cf. Braudel 1995 (orig. 1949), 43. 
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the population and its economic resources spread relatively evenly across the territory.228  The 
Roman frontier, on the other hand, was linear and nodal: it concentrated force at specific points 
(forts and waystations) and along specific corridors (roads).  These lines and nodes were 
positioned to secure the scattered lowlands along the frontier, not to project force into the 
surrounding mountainous expanse where much of the subject population lived. 
Well suited for the support of large-scale campaigns, the Roman frontier was generally 
maladapted to enforcing territorial control in the border-zone itself.  Rome’s Parthian priorities 
thus came with a sizeable opportunity cost.  The price of imperial lack of interest may never have 
been an existential threat to Roman rule itself: as this chapter’s first section noted, the army 
successfully crushed the few rebellions our sources care to record.  Yet a holistic approach to the 
northeastern frontier, taking into account not only our literary evidence but also the physical 
disposition of Roman forces across the landscape, paints a picture of a shallow empire in eastern 
Anatolia.  Due to Roman political priorities and the physical structure of the land itself, wide 
tracts of nominally imperial space and large numbers of nominally imperial subjects lived 
beyond the effective reach of Roman military force.  Rome could have done more to control the 
hinterlands of Commagene, Cappadocia, and Armenia Minor.  A geospatial history of this region 
indicates that they chose not to. 
  
                                                          












































































































































































































 This dissertation has explored the interaction of terrain, force, and control in the Romans’ 
literary imagination and in a variety of real-world environments.  Outlining Rome’s distaste for 
warfare on broken ground through the narrative topoi of hill and mountain combat, Chapter One 
argued that in Roman decision-makers’ own conception, their empire was strongest and most 
secure in the plains.  Chapter Three gave the clearest evidence that this perception was correct: 
not only were the early military victories of the Jewish Revolt won thanks to the defensive 
advantages of broken ground, but the very decision to risk insurrection can also be linked to the 
Jews’ belief in the protection of rough terrain.  At the same time, while Chapters Two and Four 
mapped out Rome’s aversion to broken ground in both short-term conquest and long-term 
garrisoning, they also revealed Roman flexibility and adaptability.  We traced the evolution of 
Roman strategy in the Iberian peninsula: while river valleys and coastal plains always formed the 
core of Rome’s Spanish provinces, commanders learned through painful experience the threat 
posed by their unpacified neighbors in the hills.  Gradually and tentatively they began to 
redeploy their forces upland against these enemies.  We saw a similar tension on Rome’s 
northeastern frontier between the lowland menace of the Parthian Empire and the smaller-scale 
concerns of brigandage and insurgency in the Anatolian mountains.  While the patterns of 
Roman deployment responded primarily to the Parthian threat, survey across hundreds of miles 
of frontier has revealed evidence for local variation, as well as indications that at least in some 
places the Roman garrison was a force of occupation as well as defense. 
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 How, then, do these findings alter our broader vision of the Roman empire as an 
institution of violence and control?  By any estimate, Roman imperialism was remarkably 
successful (at least from the perspective of its mostly Roman beneficiaries).  Despite the 
obstacles of time, distance, and organic energy, Rome conquered and held an empire rarely 
matched in the pre-modern world.  Major revolts were surprisingly rare and, at least in the long-
run, unsuccessful.1  Between Hannibal’s departure from Italy in 203 BCE and the “barbarian” 
incursions of the third century CE, the basic integrity of the Roman state was never successfully 
challenged by foreign foes. 
Traditionally, credit for the success of the Roman empire has gone in large part to the 
quality of its army as a fighting force.  This dissertation gives no cause to reject that thesis, even 
in reference to broken ground.  In the military worldview of Chapter One and the real-world 
examples of Chapters Two, Three, and Four, the Roman army could fight and win on rough 
terrain.  In retort to disasters such as the semi-mythical Caudine Forks or the very real Beth 
Horon and Teutoberg Forest, the Romans could boast of victories at the River Aous, 
Thermopylae, and Masada.  Whatever its preference for relatively level terrain, sections of the 
northeastern frontier discussed in Chapter Four extended Roman force into regions that may lie 
beyond the reach even of the 21st century Turkish state.2  We should not (like the Galileans 
treated in Chapter Three) be too quick to doubt the relentless tenacity of Rome’s military culture 
and the capacity of its army for violence on broken ground. 
                                                          
1 See especially Gambash 2015, though note Woolf 2002 on the probable frequency of minor 
insurrections.  Cf. Kulikowski 2016. 
 
2 Mitford 2018, which makes passing reference throughout to territories controlled by the PKK and other 
separatist groups.  Cf. Braudel 1995 (orig. 1949), 40; Shaw 1990b, 264. 
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Nevertheless, this dissertation uncovers a certain vulnerability to the Roman “war 
machine.”  Whatever the ideology of imperium sine fine might claim, Roman control was limited 
even within its own nominal borders.  In Rome’s mostly small-scale struggles to win and hold 
control over its weaker neighbors, broken ground did not usually cause significant defeats; Beth 
Horon is exceptional in this respect.  Yet the costs of warfare on rugged terrain deterred military 
intervention and sapped the credibility of Roman threats, shaping the dynamics of imperial 
control.  When violence stopped being an efficient tool, Roman rulers fell back on persuasion or 
laissez-faire neglect, accepting a shallower and more tenuous level of authority in the process.  
In rare cases, the Romans might withdraw completely from regions they could not efficiently 
dominate: as Brent Shaw argues, the empire abandoned Mauretania in the 3rd century when the 
challenge and costs of controlling the Atlas mountains and their foothills proved too great to 
sustain.3 
Such fundamental pragmatism, the Romans’ flexibility in balancing the costs of empire 
with its material and ideological benefits, is this dissertation’s most significant conclusion.  The 
Romans emerge as canny and efficient wielders of power; as Tacitus puts it, “we value the power 
of empire, and dismiss its vanities.”4  The success and duration of their rule depended not just on 
the ability of Roman armies to win, but also on the prudence of Roman generals to know when 
not to fight.  While individual generals might have been incompetent or simply unlucky, Roman 
                                                          
3 Shaw 1986, 69.  The withdrawal from the Antonine fortifications in lowland Scotland provides a similar 
example, though the landscape here was “broken” more by hydrology and vegetation than mountains.  
Later, the Sassanid Emperor Sapor advised the Romans to adopt a similar policy towards Armenia and 
Mesopotamia, since the cost of controlling these provinces endangered the stability of the remainder of 
the empire (needless to say, Sapor had a vested interest in Rome’s eastern policies). 
 




commanders as a group did not blunder their way to imperial dominance.5  However poorly a 
minimalist reading of literary evidence reflects on the Roman capacity for strategic thought, the 
reconstructions of imperial action in Chapters Two and Four suggest a sophisticated 
understanding of terrain, force, and control.  While neither entirely consistent over time and 
space nor necessarily “grand,” Roman strategy understood the effects of the physical 
environment, and adjusted the deployment of imperial resources accordingly. 
Let us turn from this dissertation’s vision of Romans as conquerors and rulers of the 
Mediterranean world to its broader methodological contributions.  What emerges most strikingly 
is the potential of GIS technology, when carefully and thoughtfully used, for the study of the 
ancient world.  This dissertation argues in particular for the benefits of merging the impressive 
digital resources now available for ancient cultural geography with the sizeable and sophisticated 
physical geography datasets being developed by natural scientists.  Although GIS is now a 
standard component of the archaeologist’s toolkit, it remains at best an ancillary skill in the eyes 
of the historical community.  While technology is not a panacea for the challenges of ancient 
scholarship, digital approaches such as those attempted here have the potential to advance a 
variety of research questions, and GIS can be a valuable complement to more traditional skills of 
historical inquiry. 
This dissertation also challenges traditional approaches to mapping the Roman world.  It 
has its intellectual genesis in the standard map, found in any number of textbooks and 
monographs, of the Roman Empire at its Trajanic height: a shaded block of territory stretching 
outwards from the Mediterranean, its edges marked by a solid line dividing Roman and foreign 
                                                          
5 Contra Mann 1974, among others. 
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space.  For decades, historians have recognized this map and its sharp divides as convenient 
fictions.  We know that Rome both claimed and exercised power beyond its nominal borders, 
that these borders were never impermeable, and even that the “Roman-ness” of the shaded area 
within our map’s frontier varied place-to-place and time-to-time.  With the sophisticated data and 
mapping techniques now available, it becomes possible to match a nuanced understanding of 
“Roman” territory’s shifting administrative and cultural dynamics with equally nuanced maps.  
By focus on one type of terrain—broken ground—and its impact on one facet of imperial rule—
military force—this dissertation takes an instructive first step towards more creative, more 
accurate, and more useful ways of mapping the Roman Empire. 
To this end, the TRI datasets that inform much of the analysis in Chapters Two, Three, 
and Four will be released online under open license.  It is my hope that they may prove useful to 
future scholarship.  I make no claim to offer a definitive statement on terrain, force, and control 
in the Roman world, nor on the specific application of these concepts in Spain, Judaea, and Asia 
Minor.  However, by providing a set of tools to analyze the relationship between rulers, subjects, 
and the physical landscape, I hope to inspire discussion and future research on the topographic 
dynamics of the Roman empire, and of pre-modern imperialism more broadly. 
Let us consider some directions which such future research productively might take.  My 
case studies in Chapters Two, Three, and Four by no means exhaust the areas where Rome faced 
the challenges of controlling broken ground.  As already noted, Brent Shaw has produced 
important studies (albeit entirely devoid of maps) on the Roman frontier in Mauretania 
Tingitana, as well as the “internal frontier” of Isauria-Cilicia.6  The Lebanon mountains and 
                                                          
6 On Mauretania: Shaw 1986.  On Isauria-Cilicia: Shaw 1990a, 1990b. 
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surrounding badlands were similarly difficult spaces for the Romans to control; the lava fields of 
Trachonitis (in what is now southern Syria) were a particularly notable bandit haven throughout 
antiquity.7  The Alps, quantitatively the most imposing mountains of the Roman world, formed a 
troublesome external and internal frontier at various stages of Rome’s expansion.  Future work 
might even consider the Apennines within Italy itself: although Livy’s narrative of wars against 
the Samnites and other mountain-tribes in the early republic are, at best, deeply questionable 
sources of geographic information, archaeological surveys of the Italian mountains provide 
valuable supplementary data.8 
In addition, my case studies have not explored the processes of taking, losing, and 
holding power in their chosen regions across the full duration of Roman history.  More work 
remains to be done on the topographical patterns in Rome’s later Spanish wars, particularly in 
the prolonged Celtiberian and Lusitanian conflicts of the mid-2nd century BCE and Augustus and 
Agrippa’s final push into Cantabria in the far northwest.9  For Judaea, further study is required to 
compare the spatial dynamics of the Jewish revolt of 66-73 with the uprising under Simon bar 
Kochba in the 130s CE.10  Chapter Four leaves room for additional work on eastern Anatolia 
under the late Roman and Byzantine empires.11 
                                                          
7 Bowersock 1983, ch. 1; Isaac 1984; 1990, 56-68; Millar 1993, 63. 
 
8 Oakley 1995. 
 
9 The former wars are extensively (if imperfectly) documented in App. Hisp. 44-98.  For secondary 
scholarship, see especially Simon 1962.  For the Cantabrian wars and early Roman garrisoning in the 
northwest, see Syme 1979; Jones 1976. 
 
10 Eshel 2008. 
 
11 Van Dam 2002. 
293 
 
 Beyond expanding the geographical and chronological boundaries of the inquiry, I hope 
that future work on this topic will more fully intertwine the study of military affairs with the 
social, cultural, and material histories of Roman imperialism.  As noted in the Introduction, this 
dissertation explores imperial control as a product of force, violence, and fear, what Michael 
Mann describes as “military” and “despotic” power.12  I have focused primarily on the ability of 
the Roman army to enact and threaten violence on different types of terrain, and how this ability 
(and local perceptions thereof) affects a particular, fundamentally antagonistic relationship of 
domination and resistance between Rome and its provincial subjects.  Due to limitations of time 
and space, I have not fully investigated the effects of broken ground within the “civilian” sphere 
of the Roman provinces.  I have suggested that highlanders’ relative immunity from military 
force made them more likely to rebel against Roman authority; we should similarly ask how 
economic and social life in the hills and mountains was shaped by the difficulty and distance of 
Roman violence.  In particular, the methods of this dissertation may be used for a more effective 
analysis of brigandage and the other forms of low-level violence long seen as endemic to rugged 
terrain.13  This dissertation has primarily considered such forms of local violence as affronts to 
Roman order and threats to imperial security, adopting the perspective of the empire’s 
metropolitan center.14  Future research should consider brigandage and latrocinia from a local 
point-of-view, as economic strategies and tools for self-help in the absence of effective state 
institutions. 
                                                          
12 Mann 1984, esp. 188-189; 1986, ch. 3. 
 
13 See especially Shaw 1984, but also Braudel 1995 (1949), 33, 40; Shaw 1986; 1990a; 1990b; Fuhrmann 
2012. 
 
14 Expressed, among many other places, in Suet. Aug.  32; Tib. 37. 
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 On these and other questions, future work should expand upon this dissertation through 
the fuller consideration of archaeological evidence.  While I have made some use of physical 
evidence (particularly in Chapter Four), this dissertation is primarily based on the careful reading 
and GIS-enabled analysis of historical texts.  Archaeology has much to say about the disposition 
of Roman force in the provinces, and even more to contribute on the lived experience of Roman 
imperialism.  It is my hope that archaeologists and regional experts find this dissertation’s 
conclusions about the relationship between terrain, force, and control in the Roman world (along 
with its GIS techniques and data) useful in future projects. 
 In its study of both the discourse and the reality of warfare on broken ground, this 
dissertation may also prove useful beyond the field of Roman studies, to scholars of empires and 
imperialism in other times and places.  One of my goals, particularly in Chapter One, has been to 
challenge the idea of a “timeless” relationship between humanity and the natural world, to 
ground my analysis of mountain combat rigorously in the discourse of Roman military literature, 
rather than in assumptions about the transhistorical function of mountains in world history.  
While rugged terrain presented a similar set of physical and logistical challenges to the empires 
of the pre-modern world, culture also played a role in the success and shape of military activity 
there.15  Certainly, ancient Greek discourse on mountain combat largely matches later Roman 
material—as J.E. Lendon argues, Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides were the main progenitors 
of later Roman battle topoi—and we may see a similar discomfort with broken ground in 
Xenophon’s flight through Anatolia, or among Thucydides’ Spartan hoplites, pinned down by 
                                                          




skirmishers amid the rocks of Sphacteria.16  Yet we must ask how the Jewish tradition saw 
rugged ground, when the hills of Judaea were as much a refuge from foreign conquest as an 
obstacle to the Jews’ own state-building ambitions.17  What of the Parthians, whose military 
tradition emerged in the very different physical context of the Eurasian steppe?  What of the 
Franks and their descendants in medieval Europe, whose military mindset was born in a northern 
European landscape “broken” by heavy forests?  What of the Incas and their predecessors in 
South America, who built their power upon terrain far more rugged than the Romans would ever 
face?     
 Future work must weigh the cultural peculiarities of pre-modern warfare with the 
physical realities of battle and campaign in the mountains; with this balance properly struck, the 
door opens to new progress in the growing field of comparative imperial history.18  On a physical 
level, rough terrain impacted other empires in ways similar to the Roman experience: as Brent 
Shaw puts it, mountains were fundamentally different from the plains because pre-modern 
powers lacked “the technological powers available to the modern absolutist state.”19  How did 
other aspiring empires respond to this technological “limit of the possible,” both at the level of 
cultural discourse and of military action?  Did hills and mountains pose the same challenges to 
the great empires of Mesopotamia and Persia (or, looking even further afield, of India and 
China)?  Need we entirely limit this type of analysis to the pre-modern world?  As I write, the 
most powerful empire of the early 21st century negotiates its withdrawal from Afghanistan, bled 
                                                          
16 Lendon 2017a; 2017b.  On the battle of Pylos/Sphacteria: Thuc. 4.29-36. 
 
17 Josh. 10.11; 1 Macc. 3.13-26.  See discussion in Chapter Three above. 
 
18 See, among others: Graf 2005; Day 2008; Morris and Scheidel 2009; Scheidel 2009; Vasunia 2011; 
Ando and Richardson 2017; Lee 2020 (forthcoming).  
 
19 Shaw 1990b, 269-70. 
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to a stalemate (at best) after nineteen years of warfare with a mountaineer militia.  The methods 
outlined in this dissertation provide one approach to such questions, using modern technology to 
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